Casper v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 27 September 1943 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 42447. |
| Citation | 50 N.E.2d 858,320 Ill.App. 269 |
| Parties | CASPER v. CITY OF CHICAGO. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Wm. J. Wimbiscus, Judge.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries by Frank Casper against the City of Chicago, a municipal corporation. From a judgment granting defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Robert E. Dowling, of Chicago, for appellant.
Barnet Hodes, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (James A. Velde and L. Louis Karton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained by him on account of the negligence of defendant in permitting a sidewalk to remain in a defective condition, covered with ice and snow which had formed into hillocks and ridges. There was a jury trial and a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $15,000. The defendant filed its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its alternative motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial was overruled, the motion for judgment n.o.v. was allowed and plaintiff appeals.
The theory of plaintiff is that the city negligently permitted a defective and dangerous condition to exist in the sidewalk; that such defect caused snow and ice to accumulate on the sidewalk and to form into ridges which were allowed to remain for a long time, that plaintiff, in walking over this, slipped and fell and was seriously injured. Defendant's theory of the case is that there was no defect in the sidewalk; that the presence of snow and ice on the sidewalk was the result of unusual weather conditions for which the city was not liable.
The evidence tends to show that the sidewalk in question was of cement construction. There is a photograph of it in the record and a mark made thereon by the plaintiff during the trial, indicating the place near which plaintiff fell and, which plaintiff contends shows, the sidewalk was defective.
The accident occurred February 3, 1939, in front of the premises known as 2117 N. Cleveland avenue, Chicago, which is a built up section of the city for residence and rooming house purposes. The evidence is further to the effect that from January 30, 1939, to February 3, snow fell almost daily. There was a fall of 14.9 inches on January 30, within a period of 14 hours. The official weather report shows that this fall of snow broke all Chicago records for a 24-hour period. On February 3, the depth of the snow on the ground was 7.2 inches.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the evidence shows the sidewalk was cracked and in a defective condition which caused snow to accumulate on the sidewalk. The evidence is further to the effect that the sidewalk at the time and place plaintiff fell was covered with snow to a depth of from 4 inches to 2 1/2 feet, according to the various witnesses, and that as a result of the thawing and freezing of the snow it had become icy and was rough and uneven.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that whether the sidewalk was defective as a result of which snow and ice accumulated, and whether it was in hillocks and uneven and slippery, as a result of which plaintiff was injured, were questions for the jury; that the city is liable where snow accumulates on the sidewalk and is in hillocks and ridges as a result of which a person slips, falls and is injured and that this rule has been established by many decisions of this court and the Supreme Court and has not been overruled or modified by our Supreme Court in the case of Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911, affirming 260 Ill.App. 590, or Strappelli v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 72, 20 N.E.2d 43, reversing 295 Ill.App. 469, 14 N.E.2d 986.
In Mareck v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill.App. 358, it was held that mere slipperiness of a sidewalk occasioned by snow or ice would not make a municipality liable but if ice and snow were permitted to...
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