Cass v. Woodford

Decision Date09 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04 CV 1138 DMS (POR).,04 CV 1138 DMS (POR).
Citation432 F.Supp.2d 1061
PartiesManuel CASS, Jr., Petitioner, v. Jeanne WOODFORD, Director, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

Manuel Cass, Jr., Blythe, CA, pro se. Attorney General, State of California, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondents.

ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGITRATE JUDGE AND (2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

SABRAW, District Judge.

Petitioner. Manuel Cass, Jr., a prisoner in state custody proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a sentence of 17-years-to-life for second degree murder. He asserts the California Board of Prison Terms ("parole board" or "board") deprived him of due process of law when it denied his fourth request for parole by relying solely on pre-incarceration conduct, namely the circumstances of his underlying offense—second degree murder—despite evidence of exemplary behavior and rehabilitation during his fifteen years of imprisonment. In support of this claim, Petitioner relies upon a Ninth Circuit decision, Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.2003), for the proposition that continued reliance on "unchanging factors"—such as the commitment offense—as the sole basis to repeatedly deny parole violates due process. Petitioner also claims the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious.

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), first noting under settled law that California's parole statute creates in every inmate, including Petitioner, a cognizable liberty interest in parole which is protected by the due process clause.1 The R & R nevertheless rejected Petitioner's claim under Biggs, noting that (a) the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") only permits reliance on clearly established holdings of the United States Supreme Court as a basis to overturn a state court decision, and (b) the Supreme Court has not addressed whether continued reliance on unchanging factors to repeatedly deny parole violates due process. The R & R also rejected Petitioner's claim that the board's decision to deny parole was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner timely filed objections to the R & R, which the Court now considers. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

I DISCUSSION

Petitioner initially argues the Magistrate Judge erroneously dismissed Biggs as a source of habeas relief.2 In conjunction with this argument, Petitioner asserts the Magistrate Judge applied the wrong standard of review.

A. Standard of Review

Instead of applying AEDPA's standard of review, Petitioner asserts the Court should simply determine whether there is "some evidence" to support the board's decision. Petitioner misapprehends the nature of habeas review under AEDPA.

Although the Ninth Circuit has held that AEDPA's certificate of appealability requirement does not apply to decisions of administrative bodies, such as the parole board, see Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam), the court has never concluded, that AEDPA does not apply to habeas review of a state court decision upholding a parole board's denial of parole. See id. at 1232 (applying AEPA's standard of review to state court decision upholding board's denial of parole); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900-01 (9th Cir.2002) (assuming AEPA standard of review applies to decision of parole board reviewed by state court). See also Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.2004) (finding AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions challenging state administrative decisions). Because Petitioner's claim of due process violation by the parole board was heard by the state court on collateral review, his claim has been "adjudicated on the merits in [a] State court proceeding" within the meaning of AEDPA. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 900 (citing White v. Indiana Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 763-64 (7th Cir.2001)). Accordingly, Petitioner's objection to the R & R on this ground is overruled.

B. AEDPA and Biggs

Next, Petitioner contends the R & R does not comply with the "spirit" of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Biggs. The court in Biggs observed that a due process violation could occur if the parole board continued to rely on unchanging factors— such as the inmate's social history before committing the crime and the nature of the crime itself—to deny parole even though the inmate's behavior in prison demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation. 334 F.3d at 916-17. The Biggs court further noted that the parole board's determination whether to grant or deny parole is one of equity and requires a careful balancing and assessment of factors under both California's parole statute and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 916. Thus, the court concluded that "the parole board's sole supportable reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of parole [could] be initially justified as fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law." Id. at 916 (emphasis added). But the court cautioned: "Over time, however, should [the inmate] continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him parole simply because of the nature of [the] offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole." Id.

Several district courts have seized on the language in Biggs, and found error when the parole board repeatedly ignored evidence of an inmate's exemplary postincarceration development and rehabilitation, and placed decisive weight on the nature of the crime and other "unchanging" factors. In support, Petitioner cites Irons v. Warden of Calif State Prison, 358 F.Supp.2d 936, 947 (E.D.Cal.2005) (The board has "relied on these unchanging factors [i.e., commitment offense and drug use at time of offense] at least four prior times" to deny parole; "[T]he continued reliance on these factors . . . violated due process . ."); Clay v. Kane, No. 04-8663-VAP(AJW) (C.D.Cal. December 2, 2005) (similar); Saifullah v. Carey, No. 02-2664-MCE(DAD), 2005 WL 1555389 (E.D.Cal. June 28, 2005) (similar); Yellen v. Butler, No. S-01-2398-MCE, (E.D.Cal. March 31, 2004) (similar); Masoner v. State, No. 03-1261-ER, 2004 WL 1080177 (E.D.Cal. Jan 23, 2004) (similar).

The decisions on which Petitioner relies, however, do not constitute clearly established federal law sufficient to grant federal habeas relief. To determine what constitutes "clearly established federal law," the Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), that the statutory phrase "refers to holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision," and that the source of clearly established law is restricted to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Therefore, although federal circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of federal law, only Supreme Court holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Shaw v. Terhune, 353 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted) ("in the context of a habeas petition interpreted under the auspices of AEDPA, a Ninth Circuit decision without supporting Supreme Court precedent is not binding.")

In the present case, determining whether "clearly established federal law" exists is particularly important because California law is at odds with the federal cases relied upon by Petitioner. In contrast to the cases cited by Petitioner, the California Supreme Court has held that the "nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole." In Re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 682, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 (2002) (emphasis added). "Although the parole authority is prohibited from adopting a blanket rule that automatically excludes parole for individuals who have been convicted of a particular type of offense, the authority properly may weigh heavily the degree of violence used and the amount of viciousness shown by a defendant." Id. at 682-83, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174. See also In Re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1070, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783, cert. denied by Dannenberg v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 92, 163 L.Ed.2d 109 (2005) (upholding board's denial of parole after numerous prior suitability hearings where "Dannenberg's crime indicated a continuing public danger, thus making him presently unsuitable for parole, because the murder was `especially callous and cruel' and was committed for a trivial reason.") The California Supreme Court has thus made clear that parole may be denied solely on the circumstances of the commitment offense, as long as the parole board's decision is supported by some evidence that the crime involves "particularly egregious acts" beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that type of offense. Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 683, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.

California's emphasis on the commitment offense derives from its statutes and regulations regarding parole. California Penal Code Section 3041(b) provides:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . .

(emphasis added). Similarly, Section 2402(c)(1) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations provides a prisoner may be found unsuitable for parole if the board determines the commitment offense was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," as where the crime was carried out in a "dispassionate and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Atkins v. Davison
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • December 1, 2009
    ...application of, clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cass v. Woodford, 432 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1064-66 (S.D.Cal.2006); see Lucero v. Mendoza-Powers, 2008 WL 4661617, at *12-14, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84585, at *34-38 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 21, 2008)......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT