Cassady v. Wheeler, 2--57700
| Decision Date | 30 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 2--57700,2--57700 |
| Parties | Gary CASSADY, Plaintiff, v. The Hon. Waldo F. WHEELER, Defendant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John C. Wellman, Des Moines, for plaintiff.
Ray A. Fenton, County Atty. and Charles S. Crook, III, Asst. County Atty., for defendant.
Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REES, UHLENHOPP and McCORMICK, JJ.
The question in this certiorari action is the meaning of the legislature's definition of marijuana in Code § 204.101(16). The State charged plaintiff Gary Cassady with four counts of delivery and one count of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, under Code §§ 204.401(1) and 204.401(3). Before trial the State filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to prohibit Cassady and his counsel from mentioning or introducing evidence that other species of cannabis exist than the one called marijuana in the statute. The trial court sustained the motion, and we granted Cassady's petition for certiorari challenging the legality of that order. We annul the writ.
I. Code chapter 204 is the Iowa enactment of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Code § 204.401 defines prohibited acts, which include delivery and possession of controlled substances listed in schedules in §§ 204.203--204.212. Marijuana is listed in schedule I, § 204.204(4)(j).
Marijuana is defined in § 204.101(16):
'Marijuana' means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not, its seeds, the resin extracted from any part of the plant, and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin. It does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination.
Plaintiff contends that the legislature, in defining marijuana as cannabis sativa L., proscribed only one of several species of cannabis. As a matter of plant classification, the word 'cannabis' identifies the genus of the plant, the word 'sativa' identifies the species, and the abbreviation 'L.' identifies Linnaeus, the man who applied the nomenclature. Bell, Plant Variation and Classification, at 12--17 (1967).
Plaintiff's theory is that the State has the burden to prove he delivered or possessed the named species of cannabis and cannot obtain his conviction unless it does so. He points out there is a difference of opinion in the scientific community as to whether there is more than one species of cannabis, that is, whether cannabis is monotypic (a single species) or polytypic (more than one species). It is undisputed that cannabis has been referred to by different names. The question is whether those names are different names for the same species or in fact identify different species. See R. Schultes et al., Cannabis: An Example of Taxonomic Neglect, Botanical Museum Leaflets, Harvard University, Vol. 28, No. 9, at 337--367 (1974). Plaintiff contends the existence of a scientific viewpoint that cannabis is polytypic entitles him to present evidence to that effect to the jury, letting the jury resolve the scientific debate in determining whether the State has proved he delivered or possessed cannabis sativa.
He made an offer of proof in response to the State's motion in limine through the testimony of Robert W. Cruden, a professor of botany at the University of Iowa. Dr. Cruden testified his specialty is taxonomy, the science of plant identification. He said there are currently three recognized species of cannabis and at least two others which are not officially described. The three allegedly recognized species are cannabis sativa, cannabis indica, and cannabis ruderalis. He acknowledged that all cannabis contains the chemical tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the mind-affecting ingredient in the plant. He admitted there is a difference of opinion in the scientific community regarding the existence of more than one species of marijuana but asserted his view is the correct one.
The outcome of this action cannot be determined by letting the jury decide which scientists they believe. Plaintiff's position that the jury should resolve the issue on the basis of evidence from scientists is fallacious. The meaning of a statute is a question of law, not of science. It is an issue for the court, not the jury. Interpretation of a statute is always a matter of law for the court. Snook v. Herrmann, 161 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa 1968).
The question in this case is not what some scientists take the term cannabis sativa L. to signify but what the Iowa legislature intended it to signify when it enacted Code § 204.101(16) in 1971. See Acts 64 G.A., First Session, ch. 148, § 101(16).
II. We must therefore dicide what the legislature intended in its definition of marijuana. Familiar principles of statutory interpretation are applicable. Many of them are collected in Iowa National Industrial Loan Company v. Iowa State Department of Revenue, 224 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1974), filed December 18, 1974, State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1974), State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 1973), and State v. Vietor, 208 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1973). They will not be repeated here. The polestar is legislative intent.
The origin of the definition of marijuana used in Code § 204.101(16) sheds light on that intent. The same definition appeared in the final draft of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1932. 9B Uniform Laws Annotated at 417 (1966). Congress repeated this definition when it enacted a marijuana tax statute in 1937. Act August 2, 1937, c. 553, § 1; 50 Stat. 551. The same definition was used when Congress adopted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 21 U.S.C. § 802(15). It was also used in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act adopted by the Uniform Conference of Commissioners of State Laws in 1970. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at 226--227 (1970).
Iowa first used the definition when it amended the Iowa version of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in 1941. Acts 49 G.A. ch. 132, § 6; see § 204.1(10)(c), The Code, 1971. When the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was recommended to the states for adoption in 1970, the commissioners said:
'The Uniform Controlled Substances Act is designed to supplant the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933, and the Model State Drug Abuse Control Act, relating to depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic drugs, promulgated in 1966. With the enactment of the new Federal narcotic and dangerous drug law, the 'Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970' (Public Law 91--513, short title 'Controlled Substances Act'), it is necessary that the States update and revise their narcotic, marihuana, and dangerous drug laws.
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra, at 223.
The Iowa legislature appointed a Drug Abuse Study Committee which conducted an extensive study of the uniform act in 1970 and recommended adoption of a modified version. The committee findings are found in the Final Report of the Drug Abuse Study Committee to the Sixty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Iowa (1971). The bill recommended by the committee included the definition of marijuana found in the prior Iowa statute, the uniform act, and the federal statute. This definition was adopted in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act enacted by the 1971 legislature. Acts 64 G.A., First Session, ch. 148, § 101. The explanation attached to the bill was, in part, as follows:
It thus appears the purpose of the Iowa legislature in scheduling marijuana as a controlled substance and defining it was to conform Iowa law to the uniform act and federal legislation in a common effort to fight drug abuse. Iowa's legislative history demonstrates a pattern of statutory changes to keep the Iowa drug abuse statutes in harmony with model acts and federal statutes. In an analogous situation, we said:
Stromberg Hatchery v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm., 239 Iowa 1047, 1050, 33 N.W.2d 498, 500 (1948).
Therefore the intent of Congress and other jurisdictions in utilizing the same definition of marijuana is relevant in this case.
We are guided by interpretations by courts in other...
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