Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Com'n, No. 100183.

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Garman
• Citation: 218 Ill.2d 519,844 N.E.2d 414
• Parties: CASSENS TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Edwin Ade, Appellee).
• Decision Date: 17 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 100183.

844 N.E.2d 414 218 Ill.2d 519 CASSENS TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Edwin Ade, Appellee). No. 100183. Supreme Court of Illinois. February 17, 2006.

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Roddy, Leahy, Guill & Zima, Ltd., Chicago (Paul A. Krauter, of counsel), for appellant.

Jon E. Rosenstengel, of Bonifield & Rosenstengel, P.C., Belleville, and Edward J. Kionka, Carbondale, for appellee.

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The Industrial Commission made an award to an injured worker, Edwin Ade, in 1993. The award required Ade's former employer, Cassens Transport Company, to pay Ade a weekly wage differential on a continuing basis. Ten years later, Cassens sought to terminate that award on the grounds that Ade's wage in the year 2002 matched the wage he had been earning at the time of his injury in 1988. The Commission denied this relief. The circuit court of Coles County confirmed the Commission. The appellate court vacated this decision, finding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to review Ade's award. 354 Ill.App.3d 807, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274. We granted Cassens' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND

On August 24, 1988, employee Edwin Ade injured his left hand while working for employer Cassens Transport Company. As compensation for this injury, the Illinois¹ awarded Ade wage differential benefits in the amount of $203.55 per week. Although evidence of the initial proceeding is absent from the record in this appeal, the parties' briefing indicates that the Commission made its award pursuant to section 8(d)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002)). This section provides that an employee who is partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment shall receive a portion of the difference between his former wages and the wages he earns or is able to earn in his new employment. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002). An employee receiving an installment award under section 8(d)(1) is entitled to compensation "for the duration of his disability." 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002).

A decade after Ade's injury, Cassens renewed its interest in Ade's case. In the years 1999 and 2000, Cassens requested Ade's income tax returns. Ade declined to disclose this information. Cassens then filed a motion with the Commission, requesting that it suspend Ade's benefits based on his refusal to provide current wage information. The Commission denied this motion. While Cassens' appeal to the circuit court was pending, the company served a subpoena on Ade's current employer and obtained 11 years of information about Ade's wages. The wage information revealed that in the year 2002,

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14 years after he was injured as a Cassens employee, Ade began to earn a wage that exceeded the wage Cassens paid him at the time of his injury.

Cassens terminated the appeal of its original motion to suspend Ade's benefits. It filed a new motion to suspend benefits, arguing that the wage discrepancy which gave rise to Ade's award under section 8(d)(1) no longer existed. The Commission again denied Cassens' motion. The Commission relied on an appellate court case, Petrie v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Ill.App.3d 165, 111 Ill.Dec. 858, 513 N.E.2d 104 (1987), to determine that the section 8(d)(1) phrase "for the duration of his disability" refers to the duration of the employee's physical or mental disability, not the duration of an economic loss. Thus, the alleged change in Ade's earnings was irrelevant.

The circuit court of Coles County denied Cassens' motion to overturn the decision of the Commission, echoing the Commission's rationale. On appeal, the appellate court vacated the decision of the Commission and dismissed Cassens' motion to suspend benefits, finding that the Act did not give the Commission or the court jurisdiction to entertain the motion. 354 Ill.App.3d at 811, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274. The appellate court relied on section 19(h) of the Act, which requires requests for review based on a change in disability to be filed within 30 months of the date of an award. 354 Ill.App.3d at 810, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274, citing 820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2002). The court determined that the "duration" language in section 8(d)(1) of the Act did not give the Commission jurisdiction to reopen or modify an award after the 30-month period of section 19(h). 354 Ill.App.3d at 811, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274.

However, before dismissing the appeal, the court addressed Cassens' argument that the definition of "disability" in section 8(d)(1) includes economic loss. The court noted that while Petrie addressed the definition of "disability" in section 19(h) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2002)), it did so by examining the use of language throughout the Act. 354 Ill.App.3d at 809, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274. The Petrie court determined that "disability" means "physical disability" because the Act consistently uses other terms when referring to economic status. 354 Ill. App.3d at 809, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274, citing Petrie, 160 Ill.App.3d at 171-72, 111 Ill.Dec. 858, 513 N.E.2d 104. Thus, the section 8(d)(1) language addressing the duration of a disability refers to the duration of a physical disability. 354 Ill.App.3d at 809, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274. In a special concurrence, one justice noted that this discussion of the merits was dictum. 354 Ill.App.3d at 811, 290 Ill.Dec. 700, 821 N.E.2d 1274 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring). The special concurrence also noted that the court's holding on jurisdiction did not prevent an employer from unilaterally terminating benefits based on a belief that the duration of a claimant's disability had ended. 354 Ill.App.3d at 311, 289 Ill.Dec. 902, 820 N.E.2d 977 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring).

The appellate court denied Cassens' petition for rehearing, but filed a statement that the case involves a substantial question warranting consideration by this court. We granted Cassens' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

This case requires us to interpret section 8(d)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2000)). This is a matter of statutory construction, presenting a question of law that we review de novo. R.D. Masonry, Inc. v.

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Industrial Comm'n, 215 Ill.2d 397, 402, 294 Ill.Dec. 172, 830 N.E.2d 584 (2005). In interpreting the Act, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill.2d 225, 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822 (2001). We determine this intent by reading the statute as a whole and considering all the relevant parts. Sylvester, 197 Ill.2d at 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822; Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill.2d 546, 555, 286 Ill.Dec. 62, 813 N.E.2d 119 (2004) (declining to read section 8(d)(1) in isolation). We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous, avoiding an interpretation that would render any portion of the statute meaningless or void. Sylvester, 197 Ill.2d at 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822. We interpret the Act liberally to effectuate its main purpose: providing financial protection for injured workers. Flynn, 211 Ill.2d at 556, 286 Ill.Dec. 62, 813 N.E.2d 119.

This appeal presents the threshold question of whether the Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to reopen or modify a 10-year-old wage differential award. Cassens argues that section 8(d)(1) grants extended jurisdiction by allowing an employee to receive compensation "for the duration of his disability." 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2002). Cassens argues that the use of this phrase suggests that the Commission may modify an award whenever a disability no longer exists.

In determining whether section 8(d)(1) of the Act allows limitless modifications to an installment award for partial disability, we are mindful that the Workers' Compensation Commission is an administrative agency, lacking general or common law powers. Alvarado v. Industrial Comm'n, 216 Ill.2d 547, 553, 297 Ill. Dec. 458, 837 N.E.2d 909 (2005), citing City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill.2d 108, 113, 2 Ill.Dec. 711, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976). Because its powers are limited to those granted by the legislature, any action taken by the Commission must be specifically authorized by statute. Alvarado, 216 Ill.2d at 553, 297 Ill.Dec. 458, 837 N.E.2d 909, citing Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill.2d 192, 243, 144 Ill.Dec. 334, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1989). An act that is unauthorized is beyond the scope of the agency's jurisdiction. Alvarado, 216 Ill.2d at 553-54, 297 Ill.Dec. 458, 837 N.E.2d 909, citing Business & Professional People, 136 Ill.2d at 243, 144 Ill.Dec. 334, 555 N.E.2d 693.

Section 18 of the Act authorizes the Commission to settle all questions arising under the Act (820 ILCS 305/18 (West 2002)), and section 19 establishes the procedure by which the Commission is authorized to do so (820 ILCS 305/19 (West 2002)). Section 19(f) of the Act provides that a decision of the Commission is conclusive unless a proceeding for review is commenced within 20 days of receipt of notice of the decision. 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2002). Thus, the Commission may modify a conclusive decision only where the Act specifically authorizes it to do so.

This court recently noted that the Act specifies only two instances where the Commission may modify a final award. Alvarado, 216 Ill.2d at 555, 297 Ill.Dec. 458, 837 N.E.2d 909. Section 19(f) gives the Commission limited authority to correct clerical errors. 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2002); Alvarado, 216 Ill.2d at 555,...