Cassidy v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County

• Decision Date: 01 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 169,169
• Citation: 316 Md. 50,557 A.2d 227
• Parties: , 53 Ed. Law Rep. 528 Kirstie Marie CASSIDY et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 50

316 Md. 50

557 A.2d 227, 53 Ed. Law Rep. 528

Kirstie Marie CASSIDY et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY.

No. 169, Sept. Term, 1987.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 5, 1989.

Edward John Skeens, Suitland, for appellants.

Sheldon L. Gnatt (Paul M. Nussbaum, Reichelt, Nussbaum, Brown, Dukes & LaPlaca, all on brief), Greenbelt, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.

BLACKWELL, Judge.

This civil case arose out of injuries allegedly sustained by Kirstie Marie Cassidy ("Cassidy") on the grounds of a county school. The issue here is whether she can sue the Board of Education of Prince George's County ("Board") even though her prior suit was dismissed for failure to allege notice to the Board. We thus consider whether a final judgment, based on a plaintiff's failure to plead that a notice precondition had been satisfied, bars as a matter of res judicata a second suit alleging that this precondition has been satisfied. We shall hold that the claim is not barred.

I.

Respondent Cassidy sued Petitioner Board for breaching its duty to provide adequate security at Oxon Hill Senior High School where she had been attacked. ¹ The Board moved to dismiss the case arguing in part that Cassidy had failed to give the notice required by Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) Cts. & Jud.Proc. Art. § 5-306. ² Cassidy filed written opposition to this motion arguing that the school board was not an entity covered under the notice provision.

Neither party filed a request for a hearing on the matter. By written order entered on November 25, 1985, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, without indicating whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. ³ In the absence of an explanation for the decision, we shall assume that the dismissal was based on Cassidy's failure to allege notice in her complaint. ⁴ The clerk's office entered the order on the docket sheet without describing it as a "judgment."

At this point, the case entered a procedural quagmire. On January 30, 1986, Cassidy filed an amended complaint in the case which included an allegation of notice. On the same day the defense notified the court in writing that the case had already been dismissed. On March 21, 1986, a second judge conducted a status conference of the case and referred it back to the trial judge for clarification as to the finality of the dismissal order. ⁵ On May 2, 1986, that judge conducted the clarification hearing and indicated that the suit had been dismissed altogether via his original November 1985 order. ⁶

Thereafter, plaintiff's attorney filed a "Motion to Compel the Defendant to File a Responsive Pleading to the Amended Complaint." ⁷ The judge denied that motion in a hearing held on July 25, 1986. Cassidy's subsequent appeal was dismissed as untimely. ⁸

Cassidy then filed a second suit. Her complaint was essentially the same as the original one--except that it included an allegation that the school board had been notified of the injury by a third party. ⁹ The trial judge dismissed this claim on the grounds that it was barred by res judicata. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals upheld this ruling reasoning that the judge had made the factual determination that Cassidy had not given notice and that her opportunity to cure the defect had expired. We now reverse that decision.

II.

Estoppel by judgment generally precludes the relitigation of claims or issues which have already been fully, fairly and finally litigated between parties before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction. Murray Int'l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 545, 555 A.2d 502, 503 (1989). The purpose of the rule is to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 313 (1980); accord Ugast v. LaFontaine, 189 Md. 227, 231, 55 A.2d 705, 707 (1947) ("The doctrine rests on the ground that the party to be affected ... has litigated the same matter in a former action, and he should not be permitted to vex his opponent by litigating it again, even though the causes of action may be different."); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72, 79 (1862) ("Justice requires that every cause be once fairly and impartially tried; but the public tranquility demands that having been once so tried, all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should be closed forever."). As one court has aptly noted, "the 'law of estoppel by judgment is well settled, the only difficulty being in its application to the facts.' " State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 497 A.2d 974, 988-89 (1985) (quoting Pelham Hall Co. v. Carney, 27 F.Supp. 388, 390 (D.Mass.1939)).

A.

Turning to the facts here, we shall first consider whether Cassidy's initial dismissal should bar subsequent litigation of her entire claim. In articulating the rule of claim preclusion, the American Law Institute has stated that "[a] valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 (1980). ¹⁰ Under Maryland common law, the rule requires: 1) that the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier dispute, 2) that the claim presented in the current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication, and 3) that there was a valid, final judgment on the merits. Nicholson v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd., 265 Md. 453, 458, 290 A.2d 384, 386 (1972); accord Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 288 Md. 254, 418 A.2d 205 (1980); Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 668, 381 A.2d 671, 673 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S.Ct. 126, 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 488-89 (1977); Frontier Van Lines v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 274 Md. 621, 623, 336 A.2d 778, 780 (1975). ¹¹ The third element is the primary focus of this controversy. We therefore consider whether the dismissal of Cassidy's original complaint was a valid, final judgment on the merits.

Under the phrase "on the merits," we identify those judgments which should bar future litigation of the same claim. E.g. Goertz v. Backman, 195 Md. 450, 456, 74 A.2d 3, 5 (1950). The Restatement (Second) does not employ this phrase because of its possibly misleading connotations. Restatement (Second) § 19, comment a at 161. According to the drafters, the considerations of fairness to the defendant and sound judicial administration may require the preclusion of a claim "even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding, or has deliberately flouted orders of the court." Id. at 162.

While this Court has used "on the merits" terminology, we have, in essence, employed the policy considerations discussed above in determining what claims should be given preclusive effect. In Moodhe v. Schenker, 176 Md. 259, 4 A.2d 453 (1939), we held that a dismissal with prejudice of a twice-amended complaint which failed to allege all the elements of the underlying claim barred as res judicata a second suit on the same claim. We reasoned that "litigants cannot be encouraged in the practice of failing to allege material facts in a complaint." Id. at 269, 4 A.2d at 458.

We have also noted that where "there is an unqualified dismissal of a bill of complaint, the presumption is that the issue was disposed of on the merits and that the decree passed is res judicata." Sterling v. Local 438, Etc., 207 Md. 132, 142, 113 A.2d 389, 394 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875, 76 S.Ct. 119, 100 L.Ed. 773 (1955). However this presumption does not apply to all situations. For example, even in Moodhe, we noted that " 'a judgment on demurrer, based merely on formal or technical defects and raising only a question of pleading or want of jurisdiction, is no bar to a second action for [the] same cause.' " Moodhe, 176 Md. at 267, 4 A.2d at 457 (quoting 34 C.J. 797, 798); accord Blankman v. Hospelhorn, 177 Md. 442, 449-50, 9 A.2d 831, 834 (1939); Horowitz v. Horowitz, 175 Md. 16, 26, 199 A. 816, 820 (1938). Consistent with that reasoning, we have held that the dismissal of a claim in equity because it should have been brought at law does not bar a subsequent suit at law. Shoreham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills, Inc., 269 Md. 291, 305 A.2d 465 (1973); see Blankman, 177 Md. 442, 9 A.2d 831 (holding that the granting of a demurrer for misjoinder is not a ruling on the merits).

Petitioner Cassidy asks us to consider whether her failure to plead notice is a technical error which does not justify the application of claim preclusion. In support of her argument, she offers the Restatement (Second) § 20(2). That provision states that "[a] valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests ... on the plaintiff's failure to satisfy a precondition to suit does not bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after ... the precondition has been satisfied...." ¹² According to the Restatement (Second), a determination that a plaintiff has no enforceable claim because he or she has failed to satisfy a precondition to suit is not a determination that that person may not have an enforceable claim thereafter; he or she should therefore be given the opportunity to maintain the claim when it becomes enforceable. Id. § 20 comment k at 175.

Under section 20(2), the issuance of notice would clearly be classified as a precondition to suit. See, e.g., Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 187 Md. 67, 76-77, 48 A.2d 593, 598-99 (1946). Many courts have endorsed the general rule that a dismissal for failure to satisfy a precondition to suit should not bar as res judicata a subsequent...