Castaldo v. D'Eramo

• Decision Date: 23 June 1953
• Citation: 140 Conn. 88,98 A.2d 664
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CASTALDO v. D'ERAMO et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 664

98 A.2d 664

140 Conn. 88

CASTALDO v. D'ERAMO et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 23, 1953.

Sydney P. Simons, Bridgeport, Henry Greenstein, Bridgeport, on the brief, for appellants (defendants).

Samuel J. Tedesco, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., and BALDWIN, INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN and CORNELL, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover the amount of a cash deposit alleged to have been given by him when making an offer to purchase a house and lot from the defendants. The theory behind the plaintiff's cause of action was that his offer had been rejected and that no valid contract had ever arisen. Each defendant filed a general denial. In addition thereto, the named defendant attached to her answer a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff had entered into a written contract to purchase for $11,200 certain real estate owned by her and that he had breached his agreement, to her damage, by refusing to pay anything in excess of $400, his initial deposit.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both the complaint and the counterclaim. The defendants have appealed. The assignments of error which they press deal with the court's denial of their motion to set the verdict aside, with the finding and with the charge.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: During October, 1948, the plaintiff decided to buy a house for himself and his family. He communicated with a real estate broker named Karmasin and arranged to meet him at a development in Bridgeport known as Roslyn Terrace. The land in the development was owned by the defendant Rose D'Eramo, and the houses in process of construction upon it were being built by her husband, the defendant Philip D'Eramo. The defendants, who were working closely together in the building and selling of houses, had previously listed the lots in Roslyn Terrace for sale with Karmasin.

On the occasion of his first visit to the development, the plaintiff was shown and became interested in one of the lots upon which a cellar had been built. At the suggestion of Karmasin, he subsequently signed an instrument captioned 'Real Estate Contract.' At that time, no other signature was on the instrument. It recited that Rose D'Eramo agreed to execute and deliver a warranty deed of 'Lot No. 20' for the price of $11,200, of which receipt of $400 was acknowledged. It further recited: 'House to be similar to Brown House * * * This contract is subject to Catherine Castaldo's approval after birth of their youngster.'

When Karmasin brought the instrument to the defendants, Mrs. D'Eramo refused to sign it because of the two conditions just quoted. Another contract on a printed form, similar to the one used by the plaintiff, was then prepared for Mrs. D'Eramo. The two conditions to which she had objected were not inserted in this form. After Mrs. D'Eramo had signed the newly drafted instrument, she gave it to Karmasin, who then left with both defendants the $400 which the plaintiff had previously given him as a deposit. The defendants accepted it on the understanding that, if the plaintiff would not agree to the terms of Mrs. D'Eramo's counter proposal, the money would be returned to him. The plaintiff refused to execute the contract with the two conditions eliminated and, since then, he has unsuccessfully demanded his deposit. The $400 still remains in the possession of the defendants.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the jury were warranted in returning their verdict against Mrs. D'Eramo, since she was unlawfully withholding the deposit. The plaintiff had entered into no contract with her. The situation was one where the minds of the parties did not meet. The offer of the one, and the counter offer of the other, was rejected, or at least not accepted. Under such circumstances, the most elementary principles of the law of contracts govern. A contract between the parties did not arise. Leigh v. Smith, 138 Conn. 494, 496, 86 A.2d 567; Lloyd & Elliott, Inc., v. Parke, 112 Conn. 504, 506, 152 A. 825; Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 632, 131 A. 420; Hartford & N. R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 24 Conn. 514, 516; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 64; 12 Am.Jur. 530, § 37.

The jury were likewise warranted in finding against the defendant Philip D'Eramo. Contrary to his claim, the case is not one involving the principle that an agent may not be held liable in those instances where, acting within the scope of his authority, he contracts with a third party for a known principal. Whitlock's, Inc., v. Manley, 123 Conn. 434, 437, 196 A. 149; Sullivan v. Shailor, 70 Conn. 733, 736, 40 A. 1054; Restatement, 2 Agency § 328; 2 Am.Jur. 247, § 315. As already pointed out, there was no contract between the plaintiff and any other person. The liability of the defendant Philip D'Eramo rests entirely on his wrongful refusal to surrender money to which the plaintiff is legally entitled.

A further claim advanced by Mrs. D'Eramo is that the verdict on the counterclaim should have been set aside because, she contends, the evidence 'clearly and unmistakably demonstrates' that the plaintiff breached his agreement to purchase the property in question. It is obvious that a verdict for the plaintiff on the complaint would be utterly inconsistent with one for Mrs. D'Eramo on the counterclaim, since the latter would necessarily rest, as alleged, upon the existence of a contract between the parties, while the former would rest upon its nonexistence. The evidence in the case on this matter was conflicting. It was the privilege of the jury to determine where credibility lay. Sackett v. Carroll, 80 Conn. 374, 377, 68 A. 442; Barlow Bros. Co. v. Parsons, 73 Conn. 696, 706, 49 A. 205. We may not substitute our judgment for theirs. Lawrence v. Abrams, 121 Conn. 480, 481, 185 A. 414. Nor is the case one, as the defendants maintain, where the 'injustice of the verdict was so manifest that it was apparent that it was dictated by some improper influence * * * and not by a weighing of the evidence.' Roma v. Thames River Specialties Co., 90 Conn. 18, 21, 96 A. 169, 170; Levy v. Bromberg, 108 Conn. 202, 204, 142 A. 836. There was no error in the court's denial of the motion to set the verdict aside.

The defendants assign error in the finding. They seek to add a number of paragraphs to the plaintiff's claims of proof. We observe again, as we have done so frequently in the past, that a finding in a case tried to the jury has a limited objective. The finding is merely a narrative of the facts claimed to have been proved on either side, made for the purpose of fairly presenting claimed errors in the charge or in rulings of the court. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 716, 97 A.2d 556. Ordinarily, and as...