Castano v. Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC

• Docket Number: 2020-01358,Index No. 52299/17
• Decision Date: 22 February 2023
• Citation: Castano v. Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, 213 A.D.3d 905, 184 N.Y.S.3d 816 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)
• Parties: Nick CASTANO, appellant, v. ALGONQUIN GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

213 A.D.3d 905

184 N.Y.S.3d 816

Nick CASTANO, appellant,

v.ALGONQUIN GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.

2020-01358

Index No. 52299/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—December 1, 2022

February 22, 2023

Hach & Rose, LLP, New York, NY (Michael A. Rose, David Cheverie, and Harris J. Zakarin, P.C., of counsel), for appellant.

Goldberg Segalla, LLP, Buffalo, NY (Meghan M. Brown of counsel), for respondents.

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Maria G. Rosa, J.), dated January 22, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, (1) granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, and Henkels & McCoy, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them, (2) denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), and (3) denied the plaintiff's separate cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the bill of particulars to allege violations of certain additional sections of the Industrial Code with regard to the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6).

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendants Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, and Henkels & McCoy, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying the plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the bill of particulars to allege violations of certain additional sections of the Industrial Code with regard to the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), and substituting therefor a provision granting that cross-motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

On June 2, 2016, the plaintiff allegedly was injured while working on a project to replace a section of an interstate natural gas transmission pipeline underneath the Hudson River. The defendant Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC (hereinafter Algonquin), was the owner of the pipeline. The defendant Henkels & McCoy, Inc. (hereinafter Henkels), was the general contractor on the project. Henkels hired the plaintiff's employer, nonparty Southeast Directional Drilling (hereinafter Southeast), as a subcontractor.

The plaintiff testified at a deposition that, on the date of the alleged incident, he was unloading pipes, each weighing approximately 1,000 pounds, from a flatbed trailer. The plaintiff testified that he secured one of the pipes with a "choker" strap. Thereafter, as a coworker lifted the pipe using a CAT excavator, the pipe dropped, striking the plaintiff's leg.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, Algonquin and Henkels (hereinafter together the defendants), alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). The defendants moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Further, the plaintiff separately cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the bill of particulars to allege violations of certain additional sections of the Industrial Code with regard to the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6). The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them and denied the plaintiff's cross motions. The plaintiff appeals.

Labor Law § 240(1) "imposes on owners or general contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty, and absolute liability for injuries proximately caused by the failure to provide appropriate safety devices to workers who are subject to elevation-related risks" ( Saint v. Syracuse Supply Co., 25 N.Y.3d 117, 124, 8 N.Y.S.3d 229, 30 N.E.3d 872 ). " Labor Law § 240(1) applies to both ‘falling worker’ and ‘falling object’ cases" ( Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ). "With respect to falling objects, Labor Law § 240(1) applies where the falling of an object is related to ‘a significant risk inherent in ... the relative elevation ... at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured’ " ( id. at 267–268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085, quoting Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932 ). "[A] plaintiff must show that, at the time the object fell, it was being hoisted or secured, or that the falling object required securing for the purposes of the undertaking" ( Banscher v. Actus Lend Lease, LLC, 103 A.D.3d 823, 824, 960 N.Y.S.2d 183 ; see Simmons v. City of New York, 165 A.D.3d 725, 727, 85 N.Y.S.3d 462 ). A plaintiff must also show that "the object fell ... because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" ( Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ; see Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 N.Y.3d 658, 663, 985 N.Y.S.2d 416, 8 N.E.3d 791 ).

"To succeed on a cause of action under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated its duty and that the violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries" ( Roblero v. Bais Ruchel High Sch., Inc., 175 A.D.3d 1446, 1447, 109 N.Y.S.3d 329 ). Where the plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of his or her own injuries, there can be no recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) (see Robinson v. East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 N.Y.3d 550, 553–555, 814 N.Y.S.2d 589, 847 N.E.2d 1162 ; Melendez v. 778 Park Ave. Bldg. Corp., 153 A.D.3d 700, 701, 59 N.Y.S.3d 762 ).

Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence submitted in support of their motion, which included the plaintiff's deposition testimony, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ). Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (see Houston v. State of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 98 N.Y.S.3d 620 ), and whether the pipe fell because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device (see Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 267–268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37,...