Casteel v. Maddalena

Citation109 So.3d 1252
Decision Date03 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2D11–4455.,2D11–4455.
PartiesJohn CASTEEL, Appellant, v. Anna MADDALENA, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stephen F. Rosenthal of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami; Weldon E. Brennan of Brennan Holden & Kavouklis, P.A., Tampa; and Charles M. Laycock of Brooks Law Group, Winter Haven, for Appellant.

Mark D. Tinker and Charles W. Hall of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

MORRIS, Judge.

John Casteel appeals an order granting relief from judgment. The underlying negligence action arose out of a car accident involving Casteel and Anna Maddalena. A bifurcated trial 1 was held, and the jury determined that Casteel was 55% liable while Maddalena was 45% liable. Maddalena then moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(2). The basis for the motion was that testimony provided by one of Casteel's witnesses had been proven inaccurate. The trial court took the matter under advisement, but subsequently—without notice to the parties and without conducting a further evidentiary hearing—the trial court granted Maddalena's motion on an entirely different ground: fraud pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(3). We conclude that in doing so, the trial court erred.

Background

The crux of this case centers on the exact location of the accident. Casteel claimed that he was riding his motorcycle and that he had pulled up to a stop sign that abutted a roadway with two lanes of travel in each direction divided by a median. Because Casteel intended to turn left on the roadway, he would have to cross over two lanes of traffic and enter the median and wait there until he could complete his left turn. Casteel testified that traffic was heavy so he waited at the stop sign for approximately two minutes before entering the roadway. Casteel testified that he saw Maddalena's car approaching and that he estimated she was about six car lengths away. The parties agreed that Maddalena was traveling at about thirty-five miles per hour which meant she would cover those six car lengths within one to two seconds. Casteel contended that when the accident occurred, he had safely crossed the northbound lanes of traffic in which Maddalena was traveling and had come to a stop in the median. He alleged that his foot was down to steady his motorcycle as he waited to turn left into southbound traffic and that it was at that point that Maddalena hit him.

Maddalena, on the other hand, alleged that Casteel had not completed crossing the northbound lanes and was still in her lane of travel at the time she hit him. She testified that when she saw Casteel attempt to cross in front of her, she hit the brakes and blew the horn. She testified Casteel's motorcycle was still moving at the time of impact.

Because the question to be resolved was the location of the accident, the issue of whether Maddalena skidded to a stop on impact became the main focus of the trial. Maddalena testified that she did not skid at all and that skid marks reflected in photographs shown to the jury were not caused by her car. Casteel's counsel called Melanie Lopez, Casteel's girlfriend, who testified that she lived nearby. She arrived at the scene of the accident just a few minutes after it happened. Lopez further testified that she saw the skid marks at the scene and returned several hours after the accident to take the photographs which were shown to the jury. However, the testimony which became the basis for Maddalena's motion for relief from judgment was Lopez's testimony that because she lived so close to the scene of the accident, she had personal knowledge that the roadway had been freshly paved the day before the accident. Using that testimony, Casteel's counsel argued to the jury that Maddalena's car must have caused the skid marks and that Maddalena's testimony to the contrary was not reliable.

Lopez's testimony was a surprise to Maddalena because Lopez had not been listed as a witness for the liability portion of the trial. Rather, Lopez had been listed as a witness who would testify about Casteel's general health during the damages phase of the proceedings. Consequently, Maddalena's counsel conducted a posttrial investigation into Lopez's claim that the roadway had been paved the day before the accident. Through public records and later verification by a Lane Construction Corporation employee, Maddalena learned that Lopez's testimony was inaccurate and that the road had, in fact, been paved somewhere between ten days and three weeks before the accident, rather than the day before. Maddalena then filed her motion for relief from judgment based on that new evidence.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and after taking the matter under advisement, the court granted the motion. However, despite Maddalena's filing of the motion pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(2) on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the trial court, sua sponte, ruled that the motion was considered a motion filed pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(3) which deals with misconduct by an adverse party. Casteel filed a motion for rehearing but that motion was denied. This appeal follows.

Analysis

Ordinarily, we review an order on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Carmona v. Wal–Mart Stores, E., LP, 81 So.3d 461, 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Leach v. Salehpour, 19 So.3d 342, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). However, because the trial court's decision to apply rule 1.540(b)(3) was purely a question of law, we apply a de novo review to that decision. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Paiz, 68 So.3d 940, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Mourning v. Ballast Nedam Constr., Inc., 964 So.2d 889, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

I. Rule 1.540(b)(3) is not applicable in this case.

Rule 1.540(b)(3) specifically addresses fraud or misconduct of an adverse party. This includes situations where a party or their counsel participates in misconduct by a witness. Cf. Estate of Willis v. Gaffney, 677 So.2d 949, 950–51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (recognizing that motion for relief from judgment may be properly filed pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(3) where party induced witness to commit perjury). Had Maddalena alleged that Casteel encouraged Lopez to provide false testimony, Maddalena's motion could have been construed to be one filed under rule 1.540(b)(3). See Estate of Willis, 677 So.2d at 951 (noting that ‘the character of a motion will depend upon its grounds or contents, and not on its title.’ (quoting Jones v. Denmark, 259 So.2d 198, 200 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972))).

But Maddalena never alleged that Casteel or his counsel committed any fraud or participated in any misconduct committed by Lopez. In fact, Maddalena alleged the contrary in her motion for relief from judgment. Specifically, Maddalena alleged that

[t]his is not to say that [the] Plaintiff intentionally gave testimony [he] knew to be false, as the Plaintiff may have truly believed this allegation to be factual. It is merely Defendant's contention that the testimony was intentionally used to bolster the allegations of the Plaintiff, and this information has now been proven to be false, thus allowing a relief from judgment.

We have not found any Florida cases which specifically address a situation where an adverse party's witness is alleged to have provided false testimony but no connection is made to the adverse party or that party's counsel. But because rule 1.540 was modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60,2 we may resort to federal case law to aid us in our interpretation of rule 1.540.3 And federal case law indicates that rule 60 only applies to fraud committed by the adverse party.See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir.2001) (“A fraud committed by a witness ... is not a ‘fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3))); see also In re Bolin & Co., No. 3:08cv1793 (SRU), 2012 WL 4370530, at *4 (D.Conn. Sept. 24, 2012); Lee v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 765 F.Supp.2d 440, 450 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Chang v. Rockridge Manor Condo., 2010 WL 3063185, at *3–4 (N.D.Cal. Aug.3, 2010); Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 2005 WL 1869172, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Aug.2, 2005).

Maddalena's allegation that Casteel intentionally used Lopez's testimony to bolster his claims is not the same as an allegation that Casteel knew Lopez's testimony was false but presented it anyway thereby participating in the fraud. Maddalena simply did not allege any fraud on the part of Casteel or his counsel. Additionally, the trial court made it clear that its order should not be misinterpreted to suggest that Casteel's counsel presented Lopez's testimony despite knowing it was false. Indeed, the trial court stated “There is absolutely no reason to conclude anything of the sort.”

However, the trial court did find that Lopez's testimony “amounted to a fraud” because it “was not merely an ‘arguable miscalculation.’ And despite the fact that Maddalena expressly stated that she was not alleging that Casteel intentionally provided false testimony, the trial court—without any evidentiary support—found that Lopez's testimony was “prepared by the client.” The clear implication then was that Casteel participated in presenting false testimony. This finding was reached without the benefit of having received evidence on that matter and, as a result, is not supported by the record.

Under the facts of this case, where the moving party has expressly refrained from alleging any fraud on the part of the adverse party or that party's counsel, where the trial court itself has found no basis to conclude that the adverse party's counsel knowingly presented false testimony, and where there is absolutely no record evidence to support a finding that the adverse party participated in the fraud, we hold that rule 1.540(b)(3) is inapplicable. The fact that an adverse party's witness may have provided false testimony is not sufficient to entitle a moving ...

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