Casteel v. State
| Decision Date | 11 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 68260,68260 |
| Citation | 498 So.2d 1249,11 Fla. L. Weekly 631 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 631 John Anthony CASTEEL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann Butler and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
We have for review Casteel v. State, 481 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT FINDS THAT A SENTENCING COURT RELIED ON BOTH VALID AND INVALID REASONS FOR DEPARTURE, WHAT FACTORS SHOULD THE COURT WEIGH IN DETERMINING WHETHER IT IS CONVINCED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE INVALID REASON OR REASONS WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE TRIAL
COURT'S EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION IN DEPARTING FROM THE GUIDELINES.
Id. at 75. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and quash and remand to the district court.
Pursuant to a jury verdict, Casteel was adjudicated guilty of sexual battery with use of a deadly weapon, section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and burglary of a dwelling while armed with a dangerous weapon, section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes (1983). Departing from the recommended guidelines ranges of seventeen to twenty-two years for the sexual battery and five and a half to seven years for the burglary, the trial judge sentenced Casteel to thirty years on each count, to run concurrently. In his sentencing order the trial judge gave the following reasons for departure:
1. The offenses for which the Defendant was sentenced involved the use by him of a dangerous weapon, to wit: a knife.
2. The offenses for which the Defendant was sentenced were committed in a calculated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification.
3. The Defendant's prior history of criminal activity and behavior establishes a pattern of conduct that renders him a continuing and serious threat to the community.
4. The offense of sexual battery for which the Defendant was sentenced was committed in the view of the victim's son, who was 15 years of age at the time of the offenses, and even though the Defendant might not have been aware of the boy's presence, the Defendant's offense will have a lasting traumatic effect on the boy as well as the victim.
5. The Defendant shows little or no remorse for having committed the offenses for which he was sentenced. At the trial he testified that he was intoxicated and did not remember what happened. Such testimony is contrary to that of the victim and the testimony of the police officers with respect to the Defendant's statements at the scene of the crime.
On appeal the district court found reasons three (prior history of criminal activity) and five (lack of remorse evidenced by Casteel's testimony at trial that he did not remember what happened) invalid but found the other three reasons for departure to be clear and convincing. Concluding "beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court would have exceeded the guidelines sentence regardless of the improper reasons stated because of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the heinous, repugnant manner of commission, and the emotional trauma to the minor child present," the district court affirmed the sentence. 481 So.2d at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
In a case such as this, where an appellate court finds that a sentencing court relied on both valid and invalid reasons for departure, the sentence must be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing unless the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court would have rendered the departure sentence in the absence of the invalid reasons. Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla.1985). In other words, the reviewing court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the elimination of the invalid reasons would have affected the departure sentence. This standard of review is essentially the harmless error analysis as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and most recently explained by this Court in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). This harmless error test was adopted as a tool to avoid reversal when a departure sentence is partially based on invalid reasons which are clearly superfluous and, thus, consideration of those factors by the sentencing judge was harmless. *
In determining whether consideration of the invalid reasons was truly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the reviewing court should consider the relative importance of the invalid reasons. Looking to the overall record, the court should consider how substantial or compelling the reasons appear and how much weight the trial court placed on the invalid reasons. In his dissent, Judge Zehmer notes that he has "encountered substantial difficulty in applying the 'reasonable doubt' standard to the review of sentencing guidelines departures because that standard, in effect, requires the appellate court to discern what was in the mind of the sentencing judge by weighing the relative importance the trial judge placed on the various factors recited for departure from the guidelines." 481 So.2d at 75 (Zehmer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As is the case with any determination which is to be made by a reviewing court, the reasonable doubt analysis employed in reviewing a sentencing guidelines departure should be made solely from the record. Resort to "mind reading" is not necessary and, in fact, the need to resort to such mind reading would evidence a reasonable doubt. If a reviewing court cannot discern from the record that there is no reasonable possibility that the absence of the invalid reasons would have affected the departure sentence, the sentencing court's consideration of the improper reasons must be considered harmful and the case should be remanded for resentencing.
In making this determination the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. An appellate court must look only to the reasons for departure enumerated by the trial court and must not succumb to the temptation to formulate its own reasons to justify the departure sentence. Although a review of the record may reveal clear and convincing reasons for departure which were not expressly cited by the trial court, such reasons should not be considered.
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Bailey v. State
...Psychological trauma inflicted on the victim may, under certain circumstances, support departure from the guidelines, Casteel v. State, 498 So.2d 1249 (Fla.1986); Hankey v. State, 485 So.2d 827 (Fla.1986); Davis v. State, 458 So.2d 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), approved, 477 So.2d 565 (Fla.1985);......
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Lumpkin v. State, 86-3058
...at 284 (Fla.1987); see State v. Cote, 487 So.2d 1039 (Fla.1986); Tompkins v. State, 483 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Cf. Casteel v. State, 498 So.2d 1249 (Fla.1986) (emotional trauma valid ground for departure where woman sexually assaulted in presence of her child). The record in this cas......
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Robinson v. State, 87-0562
...court would have imposed the same sentence on the basis of the valid reason. See Hall v. State, 517 So.2d 692 (Fla.1988); Casteel v. State, 498 So.2d 1249 (Fla.1986); Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985); Nodal v. State, 524 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In any event, a single valid......
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