Castel v. State

Decision Date16 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 64A03-0705-CR-222.,64A03-0705-CR-222.
Citation876 N.E.2d 768
PartiesLilia CASTEL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Lisa A. Francis, Kenneth B. Elwood, Rhame & Elwood, Portage, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ann L. Goodwin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lilia Castel appeals from her conviction for Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI"), as a Class A misdemeanor; Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor; and Disobeying a Traffic Control Device, an infraction. Castel raises a single issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial court erred when it failed to inform her of her right to counsel before trial.

We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 23, 2004, a fatal traffic accident occurred on Crisman Road in Portage near the intersection with U.S. Highway 20. As a result of the accident, police officers closed off the northbound left turn lane from Highway 20 onto Crisman Road with cones, and Crisman Road west of the intersection was marked with cones, flares, and a marked squad car with the overhead lights activated. Portage Police Officer Michael Heckman was called to the scene to help secure it for the crash team.

As Officer Heckman approached the intersection, he saw Castel on the inside northbound lane of Highway 20 with a left directional on. Castel's vehicle proceeded through the intersection, where she ran over two traffic cones and turned left onto Crisman Road at a red light. Officer Heckman initiated a traffic stop.

As a result of that traffic stop, the State charged Castel with DWI, as a Class A misdemeanor; DWI, as a Class C misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor; Disregarding an Automatic Signal, as a Class C infraction; and Disobeying a Traffic Control Device, as a Class C infraction. After the initial hearing, Castel engaged counsel to represent her. Over the course of two years, the trial date was continued numerous times.

On November 13, 2006, Castel's counsel withdrew her appearance. The bench trial was scheduled for November 14, 2006, but the trial court continued that date to February 6, 2007. In a letter to Castel regarding the withdrawal, counsel "strongly advise[d] Castel to seek other counsel as soon as possible . . . ." Appellant's App. at 17.

The court held a bench trial on February 6, 2007. At the start of the proceeding, the trial court noted that Castel was appearing pro se. At the trial, the court did not discuss Castel's right to representation but asked Castel, "are you ready to proceed to trial today?" Transcript at 2. Castel replied "yes," and the trial commenced.

At the close of trial, the court found Castel guilty of DWI, as a Class A misdemeanor,1 and disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor. The court entered a judgment of conviction on the misdemeanors; entered judgment for the State on the charge of disobeying a traffic control device, an infraction; and entered a judgment for Castel on the charge of disregarding the automatic signal, an infraction. The trial court then sentenced Castel to 365 days in the Porter County Jail for the DWI, suspending all but ten days to be served as community service; imposed a fine and court costs; ordered participation in the Christian Intervention program (alcohol abuse) and Victim Impact Panel classes; ordered unsupervised probation for twelve months; and imposed a 90-day suspension of her driver's license. On the disorderly conduct count, the court sentenced Castel to a concurrent sentence of time served, waiving fines and court costs, and on the infraction the court imposed a fine.

On March 6, 2007, Castel requested the appointment of a public defender to appeal her convictions and the judgment on the infraction. After a hearing, the trial court appointed a public defender at Castel's request. Castel now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Castel contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to inform her of her right to counsel at the misdemeanor trial. In essence, she argues that her self-representation at trial constituted a waiver of trial counsel that was not knowingly and intelligently made. We must agree.

A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to representation by counsel by the United States and Indiana constitutions.2 U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV; Ind. Const. Art. I § 13. The right to counsel can only be relinquished by a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right. Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 280 (Ind.2004). A court need not provide an exhaustive list of the dangers of pro se representation, but must "impress upon the defendant the disadvantages of self-representation." Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726, 736 (Ind.2003) (quoting United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2352, 165 L.Ed.2d 278 (2006)).

Whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel depends on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ind.2001). To review the adequacy of a waiver, we consider four factors:

"(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of...

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7 cases
  • Hopper v. State, No. 13A01-1002-PC-41 (Ind. App. 4/28/2010)
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • April 28, 2010
    ... ... Id ...         A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Castel v. State, 876 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). This right can only be relinquished by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Id. at 771. We review de novo a conclusion that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389, ... ...
  • Hopper v. State Of Ind.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 30, 2010
    ... ... Id.        A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution ... Castel v. State, 876 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). This right can only be relinquished by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver ... Id. at 771. We review de novo a conclusion that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel ... Drake v. State, ... ...
  • Golden v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 9, 2016
    ...defendant had extensive experience with the criminal justice system and asked for and received appellate counsel); Castel v. State, 876 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waiver her right to counsel where trial court neither advi......
  • Fearnow v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 13, 2012
    ...both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Castel v. State, 876 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The right can only be relinquished by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Id. at 771. We conduct a de novo r......
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