Castellanos v. Starwood Vacation Ownership, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:14-cv-396-Orl-40KRS |
| Parties | GABRIEL A. CASTELLANOS, Plaintiff, v. STARWOOD VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
On April 27, 2012, Plaintiff Gabriel A. Castellanos filed a charge of discrimination against his former employer, Defendant Starwood Vacation Ownership, Inc., with the EEOC and the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 4; see also Doc. No. 16 at 18 (the "Charge of Discrimination"). Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in state court alleging Defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA") and discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.10, et seq. (the "FCRA"). Doc. No. 2 (the "Complaint"). More specifically, Plaintiff asserted four causes of action: (1) FMLAinterference (Count I); (2) FMLA retaliation (Count II); (3) FCRA national origin discrimination (Count III); and, (4) FCRA retaliation (Count IV). Id.
The action was removed to federal court on March 12, 2014. Doc. No. 1. On March 17, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's FCRA retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Doc. No. 7. Defendant contemporaneously filed an answer responding to the remaining claims asserted in the Complaint. Doc. No. 6.
On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint in which he reasserted the FMLA and FCRA claims and alleged two additional claims for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). Doc. No. 10 (the "Amended Complaint"). In light of the amended filing, Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as moot. Doc. No. 13.
On April 18, 2014, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 16. In the motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's FCRA retaliation claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the remaining causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Id. On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed its Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 22.
The motion has been referred to me for issuance of a Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff is a Hispanic male from Mexico. He was employed by Defendant from February of 1997 until March 26, 2012. Doc. No. 10 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. No. 16 at 18.2
The last position Plaintiff held while working for Defendant was Team Leader of the International Travelers Sales Team. Doc. No. 10 ¶ 12. During his employment, Plaintiff was subjected to less favorable working conditions than white employees. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff complained to Defendant about these conditions. Id. ¶ 15.
At some point during his employment Plaintiff suffered from one or more serious health condition(s). Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff gave notice of his health condition(s) to Defendant and requested FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant failed to timely provide Plaintiff with notice of his rights under the FMLA. Id. ¶ 19.
On March 26, 2012, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 20. Jim Johnson, a manager for Defendant who is white, told Plaintiff that he was terminated because of his job performance. Doc. No. 16 at 18. Plaintiff maintains, however, that he was terminated for unlawful reasons. Plaintiff satisfactorily performed the job requirements of his position, and he was an excellent salesman with many years of tenure working for Defendant. Doc. No. 10 ¶¶ 12-13. Prior to his discharge Plaintiff had never received discipline concerning his job performance. Plaintiff's sales production was greater than that of Bill Taylor, a white sales representative who was not terminated. Plaintiff was not offered severance pay. Non-Mexican employees who were terminated, however, were offered severance pay. Id.
In order to state a claim for relief a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "To survivea motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court will not, however, accept as true legal conclusions in the complaint. Id. Dismissal is appropriate if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989).
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims of violations of the FMLA and Section 1981. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff's claims of violations of the FCRA are so factually related to the federal claims that they form part of the same controversy as the federal claims. Therefore, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCRA claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Defendant seeks dismissal of Counts I, II and III pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's motion is untimely with respect to these counts because Defendant did not assert that these counts should be dismissed in its first motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) provides that, with certain exceptions, "a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion." Plaintiff correctly argues that he did not allege any new facts in the Amended Complaint. Because the defense of failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted was available to Defendant when it filed itsfirst motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is correct that the motion to dismiss Counts I, II and III of the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is untimely.
Nevertheless, the defense of failure to state a claim is not waived by failing to assert it in the original motion to dismiss. See Ingle v. Janick, No. 2:14-cv-544-FtM-38DNF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160841, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2014). One of the exceptions to Rule 12(g) is found in Rule 12(h)(2), which provides that failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may be raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) after the pleadings are closed.
Because Defendant has answered Counts I, II and III, the pleadings are closed as to those causes of action. Therefore, I will treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I, II, and III.3 In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the moving party. Williams v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 07-0561-CG-B, 2009 WL 1767658, at * 1-2 (S.D. Ala. June 23, 2009).
Under the FMLA, an eligible employee may take up to 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). An employer must not "interfere with, restrain, or deny [an employee's] exercise of or [his] attempt to exercise" FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C.§ 2615(a)(1). To state a claim for FMLA interference an employee must allege that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled under the FMLA. Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001).
Defendant admitted that it was Plaintiff's employer within the scope of the FMLA during the times relevant to the Complaint. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 8; Doc. No. 6 ¶ 8. Defendant also admitted that Plaintiff was a protected employee under the FMLA during the times relevant to the Complaint. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 6; Doc. No. 6 ¶ 6.
Defendant denied that Plaintiff was eligible for FMLA benefits, and it denied that Plaintiff had one or more serious health conditions as defined by the FMLA. Doc. No. 2 ¶¶ 16, 23; Doc. No. 6 ¶¶ 16, 23. In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegation that he has a "serious health condition" is a legal conclusion not supported by well-pleaded facts and, therefore, that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that he was entitled to FMLA benefits.
A "serious health condition" is defined in the FMLA to include an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condition that involves continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113(a), 825.115. As such, the term "serious health condition" is a conclusion of law, not a well-pleaded fact. Because Plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that his condition met the definition of serious health condition under the FMLA, I recommend that the Court find that Defendant's motion directed to Count I of the Complaint is meritorious. See, e.g., Juback v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-913-T-27EAJ, 2014 WL 3720540, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2014).
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show how Defendant allegedly interfered with his FMLA rights. I recommend that the Court find that this argument is also well taken. In his response to the motion, counsel for Plain...
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