Castellucci v. Castellucci
| Decision Date | 01 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-275-A,73-275-A |
| Citation | 352 A.2d 640,116 R.I. 101 |
| Parties | Adele CASTELLUCCI v. Eugene CASTELLUCCI. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This petition for a bed and board divorce was commenced by a Rhode Island wife against her Rhode Island husband in March 1972. Before it was heard the husband departed from this state, acquired a permanent residence in the State of Nevada, and was there divorced from his wife on April 18, 1972 without the court in that state having acquired personal jurisdiction over the wife. Thereafter, the wife's petition was reached on the Family Court calendar and a decree, assented to as to form by both parties, was entered on August 2, 1972. That decree recognized the validity of the Nevada divorce, took cognizance of its divesting effect on the Family Court's jurisdiction to grant the wife's petition, and then, after reciting that the parties had entered into a property settlement agreement, set out the terms of that agreement in full. It provided for the disposition of certain real and personal property and for weekly payments by the husband for the support of the wife and the parties' minor child, and it specifically stated that he would pay '* * * all bills owed by the Petitioner up to the maximum sum of $6,700.' A subsequent disagreement between the parties on what bills were required to be paid was brought to the court's attention by cross-motions, and on June 28, 1973 a decree was entered ordering the husband to pay certain specified bills. From that decree the husband appealed.
At the threshold the husband contends that the Nevada divorce which divested the Family Court of jurisdiction to grant the wife's petition also ousted it of jurisdiction to enforce the provision of the property settlement agreement obligating him to pay $6,700 of her outstanding bills. The wife questions the husband's right to raise that issue, arguing that he affronts the Family Court's dignity by contesting its jurisdiction over a subject disposed of by a decree entered with his express assent. That argument, however, runs directly counter to the established principles that jurisdiction over the subject matter is an indispensable requisite in any judicial proceeding, that it can be raised at any stage thereof either by the parties or by the court on its own motion, and that it can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the parties. Dutton v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 528, 530, 247 A.2d 86, 87 (1968); Petition of Loudin, 101 R.I. 35, 40, 219 A.2d 915, 918 (1966); McGann v. Board of Elections, 85 R.I. 223, 234-36, 129 A.2d 341, 347-48 (1957).
During oral argument the wife conceded, albeit reluctantly, that under these principles the husband's jurisdictional attack on the Family Court's August 1972 decree or on any subsequent action based upon it was not precluded by his having assented to its entry. She argued, nonetheless, that the husband's jurisdictional challenge was lacking in merit. In urging that position she did not rely on the broad general grant of jurisdiction contained in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-10-3 for the obvious reason that nothing contained therein would assist her. Instead, she suggested three specific bases any one of which, she asserted, conferred jurisdiction on the Family Court.
One was § 15-5-9. 1 That enactment authorizes the Family Court to assign a separate maintenance to a petitioner who has been granted a bed and board divorce. Inasmuch as none was granted here, § 15-5-9 does not apply.
Another was the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, G.L. 1956, chapter 11 of title 15, as amended, which we construed in Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 99-101, 249 A.2d 407, 412-13 (1969), to evince a legislative intent that a wife be able to receive support from a spouse who obtained a divorce from a court of a sister state which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife. That...
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