Castetter v. Lawrence Twp.

• Decision Date: 26 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 49A05–1105–PL–249.,49A05–1105–PL–249.
• Citation: 959 N.E.2d 837
• Parties: Jeff CASTETTER, Tony Jones, David Strode and Matthew Hickey, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. Lawrence TOWNSHIP, Appellee–Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

959 N.E.2d 837

Jeff CASTETTER, Tony Jones, David Strode and Matthew Hickey, Appellants–Plaintiffs,

v.Lawrence TOWNSHIP, Appellee–Defendant.

No. 49A05–1105–PL–249.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Oct. 26, 2011.

Kevin G. Harvey, Michael C. Cooley, Allen Wellman McNew, LLP, Greenfield, IN, Attorneys for Appellants Jeff Castetter, Tony Jones, and David Strode.

Fred R. Biesecker, Stephen E. Reynolds, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-plaintiffs Jeff Castetter (“Castetter”), Tony Jones, David Strode, and Matthew Hickey ¹ (collectively, “the Appellants”) appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and its grant of appellee-defendant Lawrence Township's (“Lawrence”) motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Issues

The parties raise several issues for our review, which we restate, reorder, and consolidate into the following two issues:

I. Whether the appeal is moot; and

II. Whether the trial court erred when it denied the Appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted Lawrence's motion for summary judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

By the summer of 2010, Lawrence was in serious discussions with the City of Indianapolis regarding merging the Lawrence Township Fire Department (LTFD) with the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD). Before any merger could take place, however, LTFD had to make certain adjustments to the ranks of its officers. IFD was willing to accept only 15 officers (5 captains and 10 lieutenants) in the merger, and would not accept any battalion chiefs. In the summer of 2010, LTFD had 38 officers (13 captains, 15 lieutenants, and 10 battalion chiefs). Although three of these officers transferred to the Lawrence City Fire Department, there remained 35 officers in LTFD for only 15 available spots in the IFD.

Lawrence Township charged the LTFD Merit Commission (“Merit Commission”) with modifying the LTFD ranks to conform to the proposed merger structure. On July 13, 2010, the Merit Commission held a public meeting for that purpose. After determining that a quorum was present and approving the minutes of the last meeting, Merit Commissioner Robert Wampler made the following statement:

As a preliminary matter, it has been brought to the attention of the commission that a certain action that we took on April 7th, 2007, did not comply with all the statutes and, and regulations applying to what was done. And therefore, at this time, I am asking for a motion that would rescind all actions taken by the commission to amend our rules and regulations on April 7th, 2007, and that we will proceed as if that amendment had not been adopted because it is not legally a part of our rules and regulations. And I would accept such a motion.

App. 21.

The motion was raised and passed. Commissioner Wampler then continued:

So the record will show that as of today, there are no merit battalion chiefs in the Lawrence Township Fire Department. All of the people that were promoted under the invalid provisions adopted will revert to the rank that they held at the time or before that amendment was passed.

App. 22.

The meeting minutes memorialized this action this way: “[a]ll of the individuals that were promoted under the invalid provisions will revert to the rank they held prior to passing of that amendment.” Appellee's App. p. 2. Later discovery indicates that the Merit Commission rescinded the amendment because its April 2007 actions “were not done in accordance with the required notice and comment process for amending the Commission's rules and regulations” and “[t]he purported rule amendments also were not furnished to each member of the department as required by Ind.Code § 36–8–3.5–22.” ² App. 118. Before the meeting, Appellant Castetter held the merit rank of Battalion Chief. His previous rank was Chauffeur/Engineer.

After rescinding its 2007 amendment and eliminating the merit rank of Battalion Chief in the LTFD, the Merit Commission then turned to the business of the fire department merger. Lawrence Township Trustee Russell Brown (“Brown”) testified and explained that LTFD had a $3.2 million operating fund deficit that was “dire.” App. 30. Brown added that Lawrence was permitted by statute to take out an emergency loan, but that any such loan over $2 million would be subject to a remonstrance process, although he later acknowledged that Lawrence had taken out emergency loans for the ten years prior and there had never been a remonstrance as to any of them. At the end of his meeting presentation, Brown opined that Lawrence could no longer afford a fire department as it was currently situated and structured, and that the merger with IFD would result in several economic benefits.

The Merit Commission heard comments from other attendees, and then adjourned into an executive session. Upon returning, the Commission introduced a resolution that modified the ranks of the LTFD, leaving five captains, ten lieutenants, and five alternates. None of the Appellants retained his position as an officer (although Strode was listed as an alternate), and all were demoted back to the Merit Rank of Private, pending completion of the merger. Commissioner Bush offered the following explanation on methodology:

There were three criteria that we looked at and so the first one was, was time and grade. We also looked at promotions and we also looked at rank. So there were three different criteria. Everyone got, was ranked in order and had a cumulative score.

App. 77.

After fielding more questions from the public attendees, the meeting was adjourned. On July 27, 2010, the Lawrence Township Board passed a resolution approving the merger. The two fire departments were consolidated on January 1, 2011.

On August 11, 2010, the Appellants appealed the Merit Commission's decision in Marion County Superior Court, maintaining that the action was illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and invalid. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment on March 1, 2011. On April 12, 2011, the trial court issued an order denying the Appellants' motion for summary judgment and granting Lawrence's motion for summary judgment.

This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

Mootness

We initially address Lawrence's argument that this appeal is moot because the merger between the fire departments has already taken place, the LTFD Merit Commission no longer exists, and the Appellants have suffered no damages. An issue becomes moot when it is no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, or when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 410–11 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). When the principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real controversy between the parties, the errors assigned become moot questions, and we will not retain jurisdiction to decide them. Id. An actual controversy must exist at all stages of the appellate review, and if a case becomes moot at any stage, then the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss. Id.

The remedy for a due process violation by a Fire Department Merit Commission in the discipline of a firefighter is to remand the case back to the Commission for further determination. Neal v. Pike Twp., 530 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. Because the merger has already taken place, the LTFD no longer exists and cannot afford the Appellants any due process that they were denied. Nor could it reinstate the Appellants to their prior rank in a fire department that no longer exists.

Nevertheless, even if an appeal is moot or no practical remedy is available to the parties, we can still review issues under the public interest exception when the case involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur. Board of Comm'rs of Morgan County v. Wagoner, 699 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). In Wagoner, after an appointed member of a local zoning board was removed from his position, the zoning board was eliminated through repeal of an ordinance. Id. at 1197–98. We concluded that sound public policy required us to review Wagoner's case because he had pursued the proper legal procedures and would be denied a statutory right to appeal. Id. at 1199.

The Appellants present similar circumstances here. When a firefighter is aggrieved by a decision of a merit commission to discipline him, he may appeal to the circuit or superior court of the county in which the unit is located. I.C. § 36–8–3.5–18(a). In the appeal, “the unit shall be named as the sole defendant.” I.C. § 36–8–3.5–18(b). “ ‘Unit’ means county, municipality, or township,” I.C. § 36–1–2–23, and in this case refers to Lawrence Township. Pursuant to Lawrence's Ordinance passed on July 27, 2010:

Upon consolidation, any indebtedness related to fire protection services incurred prior to the effective date by the Township ... shall remain the debt of the Township and does not become a debt of, and may not be assumed by, the City. Such indebtedness shall include, but not be limited to all personnel costs, utility expenses, legal claims and other expenses of providing fire protection services incurred through the effective date.

App. 182 (emphasis added).

The Appellants filed their complaint on August 11, 2010, well before the effective date of January 1, 2011. They named Lawrence, the unit, as the defendant and appealed to Marion County Superior Court. The Appellants therefore followed correct legal procedures,³ and if we dismissed the Appellants' appeal as moot, we would effectively deprive them of meaningful appellate review. As such, we resolve their appeal on the merits.

Summary Judgment

Standard of Review

“The purpose of summary judgment is to resolve quickly and inexpensively those disputes in which no genuine issue of material fact exists and in which one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Bailey v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 615 N.E.2d 508, 509 (I...