Castillo v. Jackson

Decision Date21 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 71412,71412
Citation594 N.E.2d 323,171 Ill.Dec. 471,149 Ill.2d 165
Parties, 171 Ill.Dec. 471 Victorino CASTILLO et al., Appellees, v. Sally JACKSON et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitors Gen., and Jennifer A. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Jeffrey B. Gilbert, Barbara Kahn and Susan Wishnick, Chicago, for appellees.

Linda R. Yanez, Arturo Jauregui and Ricardo Meza, Chicago, for amicus curiae Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund.

Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs' cases, consolidated below, were brought in the circuit court of Cook County seeking review of a determination by the Illinois Department of Employment Security (the Department) that plaintiffs were ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. The circuit court confirmed the decisions of the Department. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision (207 Ill.App.3d 799, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404), and we granted the Department's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 317).

The question presented for our review is whether, under Illinois law, aliens who applied for legalization under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) (8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988)) were "permanently residing in the United States under color of law" (PRUCOL) as of IRCA's effective date. We answer this question in the affirmative and find that the plaintiffs were improperly denied unemployment insurance benefits by the Department.

BACKGROUND

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (1988)) was enacted by Congress as part of a Federal-State system of unemployment insurance. Congress adopted FUTA in the wake of the Great Depression as part of the effort to address the needs of workers unemployed as a result of economic downturns. It chose to accomplish its ends by "encouraging" States to establish unemployment compensation systems.

FUTA levies an excise tax on "wages" paid by "employer[s]" in covered "employment." (26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988).) However, FUTA also provides each State a means by which to shelter its employers from the burden of the tax. If the State enacts an unemployment compensation program that conforms to Federal requirements, employers within that State obtain a tax credit of up to 90% against their basic FUTA liability. (26 U.S.C. §§ 3302, 3304(a) (1988).) In addition, conforming States are provided monies to defray the costs of administering their unemployment benefit programs. (42 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).) The Secretary of Labor of the United States certifies conforming States on an annual basis. (26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1988).) The Secretary of Labor is required to certify those States whose unemployment law complies with certain Federal statutory requirements. (26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1988).) If a State is not certified, it may lose its Federal funds and its employers may lose their tax credits.

The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.) was passed by the General Assembly in response to FUTA. The purpose of the Act is to afford relief to those who are involuntarily unemployed and to ameliorate the economic insecurity incident to involuntary unemployment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 300. See also Bernstein, The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act, Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 48, at XIII (Smith-Hurd 1986).) Under section 500E of the Act, a claimant must earn sufficient wages within his or her "base period" in order to qualify for benefits. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 420E.) The base period is the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters prior to the first day of the week in which a claimant files a claim. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, pars. 347, 352.

Certain classes of persons are precluded by the Act from receiving unemployment benefits regardless of whether they meet the wage tests of section 500E. Section 614 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 444) limits unemployment benefits to alien residents and provides in part:

"An alien shall be ineligible for benefits * * * on the basis of wages for services performed by such alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise is permanently residing in the United States under color of law * * *."

The language of section 614 is designed to keep Illinois within the certification requirements of FUTA. Section 3304(a) of FUTA states:

"The Secretary of Labor shall approve any State law submitted to [her] * * * which [she] finds provides that--

* * * * * *

(14)(A) Compensation shall not be payable on the basis of services performed by an alien unless such alien is an individual who was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time such services were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing such services, or was permanently residing * * * under color of law at the time such services were performed * * *." 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1988).

As originally enacted, section 3304(a)(14)(A) of FUTA did not include the second category of eligible aliens, those "lawfully present for the purpose of performing services." This language was added by Congress to FUTA in 1977 principally to allow the States to pay benefits to certain Canadian and Mexican employees who legally worked in the United States but who chose not to reside here. (See Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-19, § 302(a), 91 Stat. 39, 44 (1977); S.Rep. No. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14 (1977), reprinted in, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 79; Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-86 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training administration Oct. 28, 1985), 51 Fed.Reg. 29713, 29715 (1986).) Although the General Assembly passed section 614 of the Act after Congress amended section 3304(a)(14) of FUTA, the General Assembly did not include in the Act the second class of nonresident aliens recognized by Congress, those "lawfully present for purposes of performing services." The parties, therefore, agree that FUTA's "lawfully present for purposes of performing services" language does not control the present dispute, although plaintiffs in this case might have been entitled to benefits under this provision had the General Assembly adopted Congress' amending language. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 12-87, Change 1 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Sept. 28, 1988), 54 Fed.Reg. 10113, 10114 (1989) (aliens once granted lawful temporary resident status under IRCA are "lawfully present for purposes of performing services" and States may treat such status as retroactive to November 6, 1986); Brambila v. Board of Review (1991), 124 N.J. 425, 438, 591 A.2d 605, 612 (because Department of Labor regulations found inconsistent with intent of Congress as expressed by IRCA, aliens need only make timely application for amnesty in order to claim "lawfully present for purposes of performing services" status retroactive to November 6, 1986).

IRCA became law on November 6, 1986. IRCA implemented a comprehensive reform of United States immigration law in two ways. First, IRCA made it unlawful for employers to hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized aliens, and set out a comprehensive program of sanctions against employers who hired or failed to screen prospective employees. (8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1), (a)(2) (1988).) With regard to these sanctions, however, IRCA allowed employers to retain or hire aliens eligible to apply for amnesty under IRCA without fear of prosecution. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1255a(a)(3)(A) (1988). See also Brambila, 124 N.J. at 434-35, 591 A.2d at 610 (discussing Catholic Social Services v. Meese (E.D. Cal.1987), 664 F.Supp. 1378).

Second, IRCA provided a one-time opportunity to millions of undocumented aliens who already resided in the United States to obtain documented immigration status. IRCA's "legalization" or "amnesty" provisions were designed, in part, to allow qualified aliens who were longtime United States residents to enter the mainstream of American society. The IRCA legalization process, however, was not simple.

Prior to entering the formal process, an alien first presented himself to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) during the one-year period beginning May 5, 1987, for an initial determination that his claim of amnesty was not frivolous. If the alien's claim passed this initial screening, INS granted "work authorization" to the applicant, which served to give notice to employers that they would not be subject to prosecution for employing the alien. (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e) (1988).) In addition, work authorization assured the alien that he may seek employment without fear of deportation. Next, INS formally evaluated the alien and granted or denied lawful "temporary resident" status based upon evidence presented by the alien relating to the requirements of IRCA. (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1988).) This initial process could take as long as four years. (Brambila v. Board of Review (1991), 124 N.J. 425, 428, 591 A.2d 605, 607.) After a further waiting period of at least 18 months, the alien was required to apply for "permanent-resident status" which, if certain basic Unlike most other immigration provisions that give to the INS or the Attorney General broad discretionary powers to determine whether an alien should be allowed to enter the United States, IRCA compelled the INS to treat bona fide IRCA applicants as being "lawfully admitted." (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1988).) In addition, before and during the legalization window created by IRCA when certain aliens could apply for amnesty, IRCA prohibited the INS from deporting any alien who could "establish a prima facie case of eligibility" under IRCA's legalization scheme. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(e)(1), (e)(2) (1988).

[171 Ill.Dec....

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