Castillo v. United States
Decision Date | 24 March 2020 |
Docket Number | 3:16-cv-431-RJC,3:08-cr-134-RJC-15 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Parties | CESAR YOALDO CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, (Doc. No. 1), in which he raises a claim pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The Government has filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 12).
Petitioner was one of 26 individuals charged in a 70-count Third Superseding Indictment relating to an MS-13 gang RICO conspiracy. See (3:08-cr-134, Doc. No. 623). The charges pertaining to Petitioner are: Count (1), conspiracy to commit racketeering; Count (26), accessory after the fact to murder (18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 2); Count (35) assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity and aiding abetting the same by "unlawfully and knowingly assault[ing] Victim No. 2 with a dangerous weapon, that being a firearm..." on or about February 3, 2008 "in violation of North Carolina law, Gen. Stat. § 14-32" (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and 2); Count (36), use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 35) on February 3, 2008 (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); Count (37), assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity and aiding abetting the same by "unlawfully and knowingly assault[ing] Victim No. 3 with a dangerous weapon, that being a firearm..." on February 3, 2008 "in violation of North Carolina law, N.C Gen. Stat. § 14-32" (18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3), 2); Count (38), use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 37) on February 3, 2008 (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); Count (39), assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity and aiding and abetting the same by "knowingly and unlawfully assault[ing] Victims No. 4, 5, and 6 with a dangerous weapon, that being a firearm," on February 16, 2008 "in violation of North Carolina law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32" (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and 2); Count (40), using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 39) on February 16, 2008 (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); Count (46), Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951); and Count (47), attempted Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 2). (3:08-cr-134, Doc. No. 623).
Petitioner pled guilty to Counts (1), (26),1 (35), (36), (37), (39), and (40) and "admit[ted] to being in fact guilty as charged in those counts."2 (Id., Doc. No. 759 at 1). As part of his guilty plea, Petitioner waived his direct appeal and post-conviction rights except for claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. See (Id., Doc. No. 759 at 6). Petitioner agreed that, "should he file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after it has been accepted ..., such action will be considered a material breach of the terms of this plea agreement and, should the defendant be unsuccessful in his motion to withdraw his plea, the United States will be relieved of all its obligations under this plea agreement but defendant will not be allowed to withdraw from this plea agreement and will still be bound by its terms." (Id., Doc. No. 759 at 6). "[A]ny breach of the Plea Agreement ... will allow the United States, at its sole discretion, to withdraw from its obligations under the Plea Agreement. in such event, the United States will be free to proceed on any properly-filed pending, superseding, or additional charges, including any charges dismissed pursuant to the Plea Agreement." (Id., Doc. No. 759 at 9).
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") scored the combined adjusted offense level as 24 after applying the multiple-count adjustment. (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶ 24). Three levels were deducted for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 21. (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶¶ 98-99). No Chapter Four enhancement was applied. (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶ 97). The PSR's criminal history section indicates that Petitioner was charged with "Assault with Deadly Weapon Intent to Kill, Inflict Serious Injury" for the February 16, 2008 vehicle chase and shooting in North Carolina Superior Court case number 08CRS215706, which was dismissed on August 7, 2008 because "[t]hese charges are part of the instant federal criminal case." (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶ 116). Petitioner had a total of six criminal history points and a criminal history category of III. (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶¶ 109-110). The resulting advisory guideline range was 46 to 57 months' imprisonment plus mandatory consecutive sentences of not less than 10 years for Count (36) and not less than 25 years for Count (40). (Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶¶ 133-34).
At the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to the existence of a factual basis to support the plea. (Id., Doc. No. 1560 at 3). Defense counsel agreed that the Court can rely on the offense conduct set forth in the PSR. (Id., Doc. No. 1560 at 3). The PSR describes the conduct underlying the VICAR and § 924(c) offenses as follows:
(Id., Doc. No. 1295 at ¶¶ 51-52) (emphasis added).
Petitioner stated in open court that he had a chance to read the PSR, understood it, and had enough time to go over it with counsel. (Id., Doc. No. 1560 at 4). Petitioner told the Court he is "sorry ... for everything [he has] done." (Id., Doc. No. 1560 at 25).
The Court found the existence of a factual basis to support entry of the plea and adopted the PSR without change. (Id., Doc. No. 1560 at 3). The Court sentenced Petitioner below the advisory guideline range to a total of 392 months' imprisonment comprised of two months for Counts (1), (35), (37), and (39), concurrent, 90 months, consecutive, for Count (36), and 300 months, consecutive, for Count (40). (Id., Doc. No. 1334); see (Id., Doc. No. 1335) (Statement of Reasons). Petitioner did not appeal.
Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 Motion to Vacate through counsel on June 21, 2016, asking that his § 924(c) convictions be vacated under Johnson. He argues that the predicate VICAR offense is not a "crime of violence" because § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and the force clause requires the use of violent force, which assault does not satisfy. He further argues that the Court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence him for Counts (36) and (40) because the Indictment fails to state an offense against the laws of the United States as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
This case was stayed for several years during the pendency of Fourth Circuit cases United States v. Ali, No. 15-4433 and United States v. Simms, No. 15-4640 and United States Supreme Court case United States v. Davis, No. 18-431. See (Doc. Nos. 5, 8).
On October 4, 2019, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the § 2255 Motion to Vacate is waived, procedurally barred, and meritless. (Doc. No. 12). The Government argues that assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) is a valid § 924(c) predicate because the generic offense of assault with a dangerous weapon is a crime of violence. Even if the generic offense did not qualify, the § 1959 offenses still satisfy § 924(c)'s force clause because the underlying state statute, § 14-32(a) and (c), requires assault with a weapon "with intent to kill."
Petitioner filed a Response, (Doc. No. 15), arguing that his § 924(c) claim is meritorious based on United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019), and that his claims are not waived or procedurally defaulted. Petitioner asserts that North Carolina General Statutes § 14-32, is not a § 924(c) predicate because the least culpable of the statute's three alternatives, § 14-32(b), is satisfied by culpable negligence and does not include an ...
To continue reading
Request your trial