Castillo v. Walsh

• Decision Date: 03 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05 CIV. 4499(VM).,05 CIV. 4499(VM).
• Citation: 443 F.Supp.2d 557
• Parties: Elvis CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. James WALSH, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

443 F.Supp.2d 557

Elvis CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. James WALSH, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 05 CIV. 4499(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

August 3, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Elvis Castillo, Fallsburg, NY, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se petitioner Elvis Castillo ("Castillo") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Castillo was convicted in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, of six counts each of first and second degree robbery and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years' imprisonment. In his petition, Castillo asserts that he is entitled to the writ because (1) he was deprived of a fair trial on account of the trial court's failure to give limiting instructions on uncharged crimes evidence, (2) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support conviction on two counts of the indictment, (3) he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, and (4) he was denied due process because the trial court did not issue a curative or adverse inference charge or hold an independent source hearing with regard to certain in-court witness identifications. For the reasons set forth below, Castillo's petition is denied.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Castillo was arrested on August 14, 2000 at Joe DiMaggio Sporting Goods in Queens, New York following a call to the police about an impending robbery in the store. The police officer on the scene arrested Castillo after the store manager alerted him to a gun laying beneath a jacket Castillo had been observing. Castillo later conceded that the gun belonged to him but said he purchased it for protection in his job as a taxi driver. Castillo was not charged with robbery in connection with his arrest in Queens, but on September 6, 2000, he was charged in connection with three previous robberies in Manhattan, specifically robbing three people at A Tech Enterprises on July 15, 2000, one person at Sahara Furniture on July 26, 2000, and two people at R & F Furniture on August 1, 2000.² Two codefendants, Cesar Mateo and Jorge Delacruz, were also charged and each pled guilty to two counts of first degree robbery. Castillo was offered and rejected a 25-year sentence in satisfaction of the indicted and un-indicted crimes.

On June 21, 2001, following a jury trial, Castillo was convicted in New York State Supreme Court, New York County (the "trial court"), of six counts each of first and second degree robbery in violation of New York State Penal Law § 160.15(4) and § 160.10(1). Castillo was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years' imprisonment.

In February 2003, Castillo appealed his conviction to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division (the "Appellate Division"). His counsel on appeal, Andrew C. Fine, argued that (1) Castillo was deprived of a fair trial because evidence of his apprehension in Queens (an uncharged crime) was admitted without a limiting instruction to the jury as to its use in assessing Castillo's involvement in the other robberies, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on counts alleging Castillo took money from Chun-Ja Kim at A Tech Enterprises, and (3) Castillo's sentence was excessive. In October 2003, Castillo filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he added two additional claims: (1) his trial counsel, Ruth Yang, did not provide effective representation, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by not issuing a curative or adverse inference charge or holding an independent source hearing with respect to certain in-court identifications of Castillo.

On January 13, 2005, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Castillo's convictions. See People v. Castillo, 14 A.D.3d 390, 786 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2005). The Appellate Division found that Castillo's arguments concerning the uncharged crimes evidence were unpreserved and declined to review them, and that no basis existed to reduce his sentence.³ The Appellate Division further stated that it had considered and rejected Castillo's remaining claims in his original and pro se supplemental brief. In February 2005, Castillo sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. His request was denied on March 11, 2005. See People v. Castillo, 4 N.Y.3d 829, 796 N.Y.S.2d 584, 829 N.E.2d 677 (2005). On April 21, 2005, Castillo timely filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.⁴

III. DISCUSSION

As a starting point, the Court notes that Castillo is a pro se litigant. As such, his submissions must be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (citation omitted). The Court must read his submissions "liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted).

A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

A petitioner in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state trial court is entitled to habeas relief only if he can show that his detention violates the United States Constitution or federal law or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Before seeking federal relief, however, a petitioner generally must have exhausted all available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).⁵ To do so, the petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to the highest available state court, setting forth all of the factual and legal allegations he asserts in his federal petition. See Daye v. Att'y Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 191-92 (2d Cir.1982) (internal citations omitted).

Most of Castillo's claims are exhausted. As Respondent concedes, Castillo raised his claims surrounding uncharged crimes evidence, insufficient evidence, lack of curative charge or independent source hearing, and part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the highest available state courts⁶ (See Resp. Mem. at 16.) As will be discussed below, however, Castillo raised the balance of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time in his reply brief to this Court. These claims are unexhausted and cannot be reviewed by this Court.

1. State Court Disposition of Claims

A federal court's ability to review a habeas petition also depends on whether the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits or on procedural grounds. A state court adjudicates a petitioner's federal claims on the merits when it: (1) disposes of the claim on the merits, and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir.2001). A claim resolved on the merits is finally resolved, with res judicata effect, on substantive rather than procedural grounds. See id. at 311; see also Diaz v. Herbert, 317 F.Supp.2d 462, 481 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

With the exception of Castillo's uncharged crimes and length of sentence claims, the Appellate Division considered and summarily dismissed Castillo's claims without explanation.⁷ As there is no indication that dismissal was based on procedural grounds, this Court considers the Appellate Division to have adjudicated these claims on the merits. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312, 314; Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir.2001).

Where a state court has decided a petitioner's federal claims on the merits, this Court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court precedent]" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Alternately, state court review of a petitioner's claims may result in a judgment based on state law grounds that are independent of the federal questions raised and that are adequate to support the judgment. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)); Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 76-78 (2d Cir.1999). Where the highest state court that rendered a judgment in the case "clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar," such procedural default constitutes independent and adequate state grounds to deny habeas relief. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Levine v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 44 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 1995); Glenn v. Bartlett, 98 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir.1996). In such cases, a federal court is generally barred from reviewing the petitioner's claims.⁸

In all such procedural default cases, a federal habeas court may review a petitioner's claims only if the petitioner demonstrates (1) cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or (2) that the failure to consider the claims will "result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). As to the first test, "cause" is defined as "`some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state court." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). As to prejudice, the petitioner...