Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and Planning Bd. of Medfield

• Decision Date: 09 May 1962
• Parties: CASTLE ESTATES, INC. v. PARK AND PLANNING BOARD OF MEDFIELD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 540

182 N.E.2d 540

344 Mass. 329

CASTLE ESTATES, INC. v. PARK AND PLANNING BOARD OF MEDFIELD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued March 6, 1962.

Decided May 9, 1962.

Joseph R. Santos, Bernard V. Martin, Martin & Santos, Walpole, for plaintiff.

Joseph S. Kennedy, Dedham, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This is an appeal under G.L. c. 41, § 81BB (as amended through St.1957, c. 199, § 2), by Castle Estates, Inc. (Castle), the owner of land in Medfield, from a decision of that town's planning board with respect to a subdivision plan filed by Castle. The board approved the plans 'subject to three * * * conditions: 1. A suitable water distribution system [shall] be installed for domestic use and fire protection * * * connected to the public water supply system * * * and * * * subject to the approval of the * * * [w]ater and [s]ewerage [c]ommission. 2. A drainage easement must be obtained * * * on land owned * * * by [one] Hussey * * * to be recorded * * * prior to the issuance of any building permits. 3. No permit shall be issued for any dwelling until the sanitary system has been approved by the * * * [b]oard of [h]ealth.' A judge of the Superior Court made findings and ordered that a decree be entered stating that the members of the board had acted 'within the scope of their authority as defined by the subdivision control law.' From the final decree Castle appealed. The facts are stated on the basis of the judge's findings. ¹

Castle's plan 'conformed with all the requirements of the [t]own [b]y-laws and necessary regulations. The board had adopted, under the subdivision control law, certain regulations governing the development of land in Medfield. Some of these are quoted or summarized in the margin. ² 'The proposed [town] water system * * * is about 3,200 feet from any approved proposed subdivision.' Medfield 'adopted [the subdivision control law] on October 8, 1951.' Castle's plan 'indicates * * * some twenty-nine lots in the proposed development, and each lot contains at least thirty thousand square feet * * *. There are some eight houses already completed on this development * * * under permits issued by the [t]own * * *. Each of these houses is supplied with domestic water * * * [from] drilled wells. The purchasers of these * * * houses * * * are now occupying most of these.'

Castle contends that the first two conditions (requiring a water system connected with town water and acquisition of a drainage easement in adjacent land) imposed by the planning board upon its approval of the subdivision plan are without warrant in the subdivision control law or the town's regulations. Castle does not contend that the board could not impose the third condition concerning the board of health's approval of each dwelling's sanitary system.

1. In Daley Constr. Co. Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Randolph, 340 Mass. 149, 152-156, 163 N.E.2d 27 we discussed several of the pertinent provisions of the subdivision control law. ³ We expressly did not decide (p. 156, 163 N.E.2d p. 31) 'whether a planning board under § 81U may require that, before lots are sold * * * arrangements be made to connect the water pipe system within a subdivision with pipes leading to a proper water supply.' In the Daley Constr. Co. case, and in Doliner v. Planning Bd. of Millis, 342 Mass. ----, 175 N.E.2d 919 ^a we reviewed in detail the purposes and legislative background of essentially the present provisions of the subdivision control law (G.L. c. 41, §§ 81K to 81GG, as amended) and there is no occasion for repeating what was there said. ⁴ The general purposes of the law are stated in § 81M (see the Daley Constr. Co. case, 340 Mass. at pp. 153-154, 163 N.E.2d 27), and it is contemplated (see Doliner v. Planning Bd. of Millis, at p. 922 of 175 N.E.2d ^b) 'that the planning board shall ensure compliance of subdivision plans not only with the zoning by-law, but also with the rules and regulations which must be adopted under § 81Q * * * by each planning board in a community where the subdivision control law is in effect' (emphasis supplied). See Pieper v. Planning Bd. of Southborough, 340 Mass. 157, 163, 163 N.E.2d 14. See also the 1952 special commission report upon which much of the present statute is based, 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, at pp. 55-56, where it is said that the revised § 81Q is designed to ensure 'that a prospective subdivider will know in advance in every case what will be required of him in the way of street construction and public utilities.' In the Pieper case, we pointed out (p. 163, 163 N.E.2d p. 18) that the adoption of regulations under § 81Q is 'mandatory' and that the legislative history there quoted 'gives no indication that planning boards were to have freedom to disapprove plans which comply with applicable standards merely because the board feels general public considerations make such action desirable.' ⁵ See, however, McCarty, Planning Boards and Sub-Division Control Again, 40 Mass.L.Q. (No. 4) 23, 25. In the light of the statutory provisions we think that any power of the Medfield planning board, to impose upon Castle the water supply and drainage conditions, must be found in the statutory provisions already quoted or in its duly adopted regulations existing when the subdivision plan was filed.

2. We find in the statute (considered apart from any regulations adopted by the planning board) no basis for the conditions imposed by the Medfield board. Although § 81M, as amended (see footnote 3, supra), includes as a purpose of the law 'securing adequate provision for water, sewerage, drainage and other requirements where necessary in a subdivision,' § 81M definitely states that a plan shall be approved if it 'conforms to the recommendation of the board of health and to the reasonable * * * regulations of the planning board.' The record discloses no recommendation of the board of health that the plan be disapproved or approved only conditionally. Section 81Q, as amended, merely defines what regulations may be adopted by a planning board and by what procedure. Section 81U, as amended, in terms emphasizes (see language italicized, footnote 3, supra) that the plan is to be approved unless it 'does not comply with' the statute or the planning board's regulations and that 'the installation of municipal services' is to be 'in accordance with the * * * regulations.'

3. The Medfield planning board has adopted regulations. It has covered many procedural matters and some substantive matters. We find, however, in the relevant regulations (footnote 2, supra) no explicit provisions permitting the board to require that subdivision plans in any area or areas shall contain provision (a) for connection of the water systems in the subdivision with town water or (b) for obtaining, in appropriate cases, drainage easements to take off surplus water. The planning board, in any event, cannot impose conditions of this type upon its approval of subdivisions, where it has not included (or incorporated by reference to other regulatory provisions) in its regulations provisions defining (a) what ways and utilities are or may be required in connection with subdivision plans; (b) what standards are to be applied by the board in exercising any powers given to it by the regulations to withhold approval and to impose conditions; and (c) what those powers are. The subdivision control law attaches such importance to planning board regulations as to indicate to us that they should be comprehensive, reasonably definite, and carefully drafted, so that owners may know in advance what is or may be required of them and what standards and procedures will be applied to them. Without such regulations, the purposes of the law may easily be frustrated.

The Medfield regulations deal with the matters here in issue in terms (see footnote 2, supra) too vague and general to inform owners about the standards which they must meet. In the absence of adequate regulations, it is not necessary for us to pass upon the extent of the board's power to adopt regulations under § 81Q, or upon the validity of any particular type of regulations. It is sufficient to say that no present regulation of the board permits it to do what it has tried to do.

4. The final decree is reversed and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

1 The evidence is not reported despite a statement to the contrary in a certificate transmitting certain exhibits without reproduction in the record. The certificate is dated long after the final decree. See Dodge v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Newburyport, 340 Mass. 382, 386, 164 N.E.2d 309. Cf. Clarke v. Board of Appeals of Nahant, 338 Mass. 473, 475, 155 N.E.2d 754. The exhibits transmitted, however, are referred to in the judge's findings. Counsel for all parties referred at the arguments to these exhibits, and they have been considered by this court. It would have been appropriate for the judge expressly to have incorporated them by reference in his findings, thus avoiding ambiguity about whether they are properly part of the record. See Jenckes v. Building Com'r. of Brookline, 341 Mass. 162, 163, 167...