Castle v. Barrett–Jackson Auction Co.
Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA–CV 10–0851.,1 CA–CV 10–0851. |
Citation | 229 Ariz. 471,276 P.3d 540,634 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 |
Parties | Marshal CASTLE, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BARRETT–JACKSON AUCTION COMPANY, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Defendant/Appellee. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Porter Law Firm By Robert S. Porter, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, LLP By George Brandon, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
[229 Ariz. 472]¶ 1 Appellant Marshal Castle appeals the superior court's dismissal of his claim for violation of Arizona's Consumer Fraud Act (the Act), Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 44–1521 through 44–1534 (2003 & Supp. 2010), against Appellee Barrett–Jackson Auction Company, LLC (Barrett–Jackson). Castle also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to amend the complaint and in awarding Barrett–Jackson its attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 Barrett–Jackson conducts automobile auctions in Arizona. The vehicles available at these auctions belong to consignors, who pay a commission to Barrett–Jackson for the sale of their vehicles.
¶ 3 On January 22, 2010, Barrett–Jackson offered a 1957 Thunderbird Convertible ‘E’ Type (the Vehicle) at auction. Castle was the highest bidder. He later filed a complaint against Barrett–Jackson and the seller of the Vehicle, Bill Tyson dba Auto X Press. Castle subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) and pled a consumer fraud claim against Barrett–Jackson.
¶ 4 Barrett–Jackson moved to dismiss the FAC on the grounds that it had not made any representations about the Vehicle and Castle had not alleged that he relied on any representations made by Barrett–Jackson. In support of its motion, Barrett–Jackson submitted copies of its Bidder Agreement with Castle, the window sticker for the Vehicle (known as a Car Card), and the Event Program for the auction. In each document, Barrett–Jackson disclaimed that it had made any representations concerning any auction vehicle and declared that each vehicle description was the responsibility of the consignor.
¶ 5 Castle opposed the motion, arguing that he alleged in the FAC that Barrett–Jackson misrepresented the Vehicle and that its standardized form documents and disclaimers did not relieve it from liability for consumer fraud. He also argued that he was not required to prove reasonable reliance on Barrett–Jackson's misrepresentations in order to state a claim for consumer fraud.
¶ 6 The court granted the motion and denied Castle leave to amend his complaint. Castle timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(1) (Supp.2011).1
¶ 7 Castle argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. When Barrett–Jackson filed its motion to dismiss, it attached copies of Castle's Bidder Agreement, the Car Card for the Vehicle, and the Event Program. On appeal, the parties do not take issue with the trial court's decision to consider these documents without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. SeeAriz. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 27, ¶ 6, 191 P.3d 1040, 1043 (App.2008) ( ). We find that Castle has waived any argument that conversion was required; therefore, we do not address the issue.
¶ 8 We review a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion and review questions of law de novo. Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 281, ¶ 11, 130 P.3d 978, 980 (2006). We accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and “resolve all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Env'tl Quality, 191 Ariz. 40, 41, 951 P.2d 1232, 1233 (App.1997), approved in part,194 Ariz. 22, 976 P.2d 872 (1999). We will uphold dismissal only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts. Id.
¶ 9 The Act provides:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.
A.R.S. § 44–1522(A) (Supp.2011). “The elements of a private cause of action under the [A]ct are a false promise or misrepresentation made in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise and the hearer's consequent and proximate injury.” Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, 342, 666 P.2d 83, 87 (App.1983).
¶ 10 Castle argues that Barrett–Jackson violated the Act by falsely representing on the Car Card that the Vehicle had undergone a “professional off-body” restoration and was in drivable condition. The FAC, however, does not allege that the misrepresentations were made by Barrett–Jackson; instead it merely alleges the Car Card and Event Program contained misrepresentations without identifying who made the misrepresentations.
¶ 11 Furthermore, Castle agreed and acknowledged prior to the auction that Barrett–Jackson had not made any representations concerning the Vehicle. The Bidder Agreement, which Castle signed, disclaimed any representations by Barrett–Jackson concerning any vehicle sold at auction. In particular, it stated the seller provided all descriptions and information and Barrett–Jackson did not verify that information. The Car Card contained a description of the Vehicle, but it stated that a buyer should not rely on the description as a representation of fact and should “conduct any inspections and examination necessary to satisfy himself of all material facts before making any bid.” The Event Program reiterated that each vehicle description was provided by the consignor and further stated:
Barrett–Jackson makes no express or implied warranty or representation of any kind or nature with respect to particular items sold at auction. In no way shall Barrett–Jackson be responsible for correctnessof, or be deemed to have made any representations or warranty of merchantability, fitness for use, description, size, genuineness, attribution, provenance or condition concerning vehicles and/or other memorabilia.
These documents, on which Castle's claim is based, make clear that the representations at issue were made by the seller, not Barrett–Jackson.2
¶ 12 Nevertheless, Castle argues that the Bidder Agreement is unenforceable because a party may not contractually free itself of liability for its own fraud. See e.g., Lutfy v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 506, 115 P.2d 161, 166 (1941) (). The Bidder Agreement does not purport to relieve Barrett–Jackson of liability for its own fraud but rather evidences Castle's agreement that Barrett–Jackson did not make any representations concerning the Vehicle. We therefore reject Castle's argument that the Bidder Agreement is an unenforceable waiver of a claim against Barrett–Jackson for consumer fraud.
¶ 13 Castle also contends that the Bidder Agreement and Car Card were not binding on him because they contain provisions that violated his reasonable expectations. We disagree.
¶ 14 In Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 390, 682 P.2d 388, 395 (1984), our supreme court adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations, which allows enforcement of standardized contracts even when the consumer has not read the agreement or specifically assented to each of the terms. The doctrine provides, however, that if the drafting party has “reason to believe” that the signing party would not accept a particular term, the court may strike that term from the agreement. Id. at 391, 393–94, 682 P.2d at 396, 398–99. The drafter's reason to believe that the signing party would not have assented to the term may be: (1) shown by the parties' prior negotiations; (2) inferred from the circumstances of the transaction; (3) inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive; (4) inferred from the fact that the term eviscerates the non-standard terms to which the parties explicitly agreed; or (5) inferred if the term eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. Id. at 392, 682 P.2d at 397 (...
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