Castle v. Hedgpeth

• Decision Date: 26 July 2011
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01754-AWI-SMS
• Parties: SY LEE CASTLE, Plaintiff, v. A. HEDGPETH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

SY LEE CASTLE, Plaintiff,

v.A. HEDGPETH, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01754-AWI-SMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: July 26, 2011

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 84, 94, 95)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Sy Lee Castle ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff's first amended complaint filed May 12, 2009, against Defendants Hedgpeth, Marta, and Amavisca for violating Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. (ECF No. 7.) Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2011. (ECF No. 84.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 5, 2011.¹ (ECF No. 94.) Defendants filed a reply on July 13, 2011. (ECF No. 95.)

II. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving partyis entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be entered, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). However, the court is to liberally construe the filings and motions of pro se litigants. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010.) The "party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11.

The parties bear the burden of supporting their motions and oppositions with the papers they wish the Court to consider and/or by specifically referencing any other portions of the record for consideration. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will not undertake to mine the record for triable issues of fact. Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010)

III. Plaintiffs Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hedgpeth promulgated a regulation that prohibited the purchase, receipt, and possession of prayer oil. Defendants Marta and Amavisca enforced the regulation against Plaintiff. The possession and use of prayer oil in Plaintiff's cell is rooted in his sincerely held religious beliefs, and Defendants denied him prayer oil in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.²

IV. Undisputed Facts

1. Defendant Hedgpeth was the Warden of Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP") from January 1, 2007 through December 1, 2008.

2. All prisons within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") are governed by the Department Operations Manual ("DOM").

3. A warden has discretion to establish a supplement to the DOM based upon the needs of his or her particular institution.³

4. On December 7, 2007, Defendant Hedgpeth implemented DOM Supplement 101060, mandating that inmate prayer oils be contained in factory sealed plastic see-through containers, prohibiting inmates from possessing prayer oils in their cells, and from purchasing prayer oils generally.

5. DOM Supplement 101060 was created in response to serious safety and security concerns that had arisen at KVSP. Prior to establishing DOM Supplement 101060, KVSP officials determined that a rogue Chaplain was smuggling contraband into the prison and distributing the contraband to inmates. One way that the contraband was disseminated was through the distribution of containers of prayer oils.⁴

6. KVSP is a Level IV high-security prison. Level IV prisons house the most dangerous and violent inmates incarcerated in the State of California. The possibility of unknown contraband in the possession of Level IV inmates under the guise of prayer oil constitutes aserious breach of security.⁵

7. Therefore, Defendant Hedgpeth was compelled to create DOM Supplement 101060 in order to make sure that inmates were not in possession of contraband, to prevent any contraband from being brought in, and to eradicate the contraband that existed.⁶

8. Under DOM Supplement 101060, inmates were still allowed to use prayer oils in the prison chapel, which was open to inmate use during the day, as well as during religious services. Because inmates were still able to use prayer oils, and the institution was able to address the compelling governmental interest of removing contraband, this was determined to be the least restrictive means of ensuring the safety and security of the institution.⁷

9. Plaintiff was able to pray five times per day while DOM Supplement 101060 was in effect.

10. Soon after implementing DOM Supplement 101060, KVSP staff began the process of investigating and removing the contraband that the Chaplain had distributed to inmates. The Chaplain at issue was also removed from the prison following an investigation by the Office of Internal Affairs.⁸

11. DOM Supplement 101060 was implemented to address a serious security concern at the prison, while still allowing inmates access to prayer oils in the prison chapel. Furthermore, DOM Supplement 101060 applied to all inmates, regardless of religious affiliation.⁹

12. On July 8, 2008, after resolving all lingering safety and security concerns with inmates possessing prayer oils, Defendant Hedgpeth issued an addendum to DOM Supplement 101060, which allowed inmates to purchase sixteen ounces of prayer oils from approvedvendors, as long as the prayer oil was in a sealed clear plastic container, and was nonalcoholic and non-flammable. Prayer oils were no longer to be stored in the Chapel, and Chaplains were not allowed to buy, donate, or distribute prayer oils to inmates, in order to prevent further dissemination of contraband.¹⁰

13. Plaintiff acknowledges that safety and security override other concerns in a prison setting.

14. Defendant Marta is a sergeant in Receiving and Release at KVSP. As a sergeant in Receiving and Release, it is Defendant Marta's responsibility to supervise the screening of all inmate packages that enter KVSP.

15. Defendant Amvisca is a correctional officer assigned to Receiving and Release. Defendant Amavisca's job responsibilities include screening inmate packages that enter KVSP to make certain that they are in compliance with institutional policy and do not contain contraband or other items that are prohibited from entering the prison.

16. Defendants Amavisca and Marta complied with the requirements of DOM Supplement 101060.¹¹

17. Any failure to comply with DOM Supplement 101060 would have been insubordination, and Defendants Amavisca and Marta could have been disciplined accordingly, had they permitted inmates to receive prayer oil.

18. From December 7, 2007 to July 8, 2008, Defendants Amavisca and Marta enforced DOM Supplement 101060 in an equal and non-discriminatory manner. All prayer oils purchased by any inmate, regardless of religious affiliation, were returned to the vendors who sent the prayer oils to the institution.

19. Neither Defendant Amavisca nor Defendant Marta know Plaintiff, and it is unlikely that they would have ever had knowledge of him if not for this lawsuit. Defendants Amavisca and Marta did not act to interfere with Plaintiff's religious observance, but only to comply withinstitutional policy.¹²

20. Muslim Chaplain O'Meira is the Muslim chaplain at the California State Prison-Los Angeles County ("Lancaster").

21. In 1967, Muslim Chaplain O'Meira graduated as Imam from the Anssar Islamic Institute in Damascus, Syria, where he studied under the Syrian Grand Mufti. Additionally, he is co-founder of the Islamic Center of North Valley, which offers prayer services and Islamic instruction to the Muslim communities of Lancaster and Palmdale, California. Moreover, Chaplain O'Meira is currently a student of Advanced Islamic Studies at the Cloverdale Seminary, of Mishawaka, Indiana.

22. Among other things, Chaplain O'Meira's job duties include providing spiritual guidance to Muslim inmates, presiding over Jumah Prayer Services, Ramadan, and other Islamic days of religious observance, and instructing classes in Islamic religion.

23. Pursuant to the Quran, the seminal religious text of Islam, Muslims are required to pray five times per day; however, the Quran does not state that Muslims are required to use prayer oils during prayer or in preparation for prayer.

24. In Chaplain O'Meira's expert opinion, the use of prayer oils in Islam is complimentary to prayer, but is not mandatory.¹³

V. Qualified Immunity

A. Legal Standard

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v....