Castle v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 04 December 1918
• Docket Number: 5073,5074.
• Citation: Castle v. Lewis, 254 F. 917 (8th Cir. 1918)
• Parties: CASTLE v. LEWIS, Sheriff. TULK v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

254 F. 917

CASTLE v. LEWIS, Sheriff.

TULK v. SAME.

Nos. 5073, 5074.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

December 4, 1918

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

John A Fain, U.S. Atty., of Lawton, Okl., and S. M. Rutherford, of Muskogee, Okl., for appellants.

T. J Leahy and Corbett Cornett, both of Pawhuska, Okl. (C. S. Macdonald, of Pawhuska, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN, CARLAND, and STONE, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

These are appeals from judgments of Hon. John H. Cotteral, United States District Judge, that the petitions of D. F. Castle and Sam W. Tulk, for writs of habeas corpus and for a discharge from the custody of Seth M. Lewis, sheriff of Osage county, Okl., be dismissed and denied.

An information was filed in the district court of Osage county by the county attorney of that county, which charged that Castle, Tulk, and William Bryant, on April 25, 1917, shot and murdered Charles Mosier. Castle and Tulk had been arrested and arraigned, had pleaded not guilty, and, in default of bonds of $5,000 each, fixed by the court, had been committed to the county jail in the custody of Lewis, the sheriff of the county. Thereupon Castle and Tulk presented to Judge Cotteral petitions for writs of habeas corpus, in which they alleged that they were on April 25, 1917, officers of the United States, duly authorized under the laws thereof to arrest persons for the offense of introducing whisky into Osage county, Okl., which was Indian country; that on that day Charles Mosier, Henry Mays, Roy Tinker, and Charles Roberts were engaged in transporting whisky in an automobile in the presence and within the knowledge of the petitioners into Osage county, which was Indian country, in violation of the laws of the United States; that the petitioners in the discharge of their official duty endeavored to arrest these violators of the law; that they called upon them to halt and to submit to arrest, but they refused and fled; that while they were fleeing the petitioners fired several shots from their guns at the departing automobile, to disable it, so that they could arrest its occupants; that they did not intend to shoot or injure Mosier; and that whatever acts they did were done in the discharge of their official duties as officers of the United States and by authority of its laws. Upon the filing of these petitions Judge Cotteral issued orders upon the sheriff to show cause why writs of habeas corpus should not be issued, and why Castle and Tulk should not be discharged from his custody. The sheriff answered that he held them under a commitment issued by the district court of Osage county, Okl., which commanded him to confine them in the county jail under the charge of murdering Mosier, until they should be legally discharged therefrom. Upon the presentation of this response the cases went to final hearing, testimony that occupies 107 pages of the printed record was introduced, and the court dismissed the petitions and refused to discharge the petitioners upon the merits of their cases.

When a person is in custody under the process of a state court for an alleged offense against the laws of such state, and it is claimed (a) that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States, or (b) for an act done or omitted to be done by him in pursuance of a law of the United States, the District Courts of the United States and the judges thereof have plenary jurisdiction to inquire into the cause of such confinement by means of the writ of habeas corpus, and to discharge the petitioner if his detention is in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States, or if he is in custody for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States. United States Revised Statutes, Secs. 751, 752, 753 (2 United States Compiled Statutes 1916, Secs. 1279, 1280, 1281); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248, 6 Sup.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868.

It does not follow, however, from the grant of this jurisdiction, that the duty is imposed upon the court or its judges to discharge the petitioner in every case immediately after the hearing, even if the court or the judge is of the opinion that the confinement is unwarranted. The injunction of the statute is to hear each case on the writ of habeas corpus summarily and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice may require. ' This direction leaves to the wise judicial discretion of the court, or judge, the time and mode in which the granted power shall be used. That discretion should be so exercised 'in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution' (117 U.S. 251, 6 Sup.Ct. 740, 29 L.Ed. 868), in the light in each case, of the nature of that case, whether it involves an alleged violation of the Constitution or a confinement for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, whether it is a case of urgency where a failure to discharge the petitioner immediately will or may substantially delay the enforcement of the laws of the United States, or seriously interfere with the operation of its government or the administration of its affairs, or a case which really involves only the question whether the issues presented shall be first tried in the federal court or in the state court, and in the light of the clearness and certainty with which the material facts are established, whether they are admitted or proved beyond doubt, or are involved in uncertainty and the subject of conflicting testimony which naturally invokes the verdict of the jury.

If an officer or soldier of the United States is in custody under the process of a state court for an alleged offense against the laws of a state for an act which he claims was done by him in his official capacity, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, such as the shooting of the person he was trying to arrest, and at the close of the hearing under the writ of habeas corpus the facts are admitted or clearly proved (a) that his confinement is in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States, and that the state court is without jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged against him (Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376, 25 L.Ed. 717; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55; In re Waite (D.C.) 81 F. 359, 362, 371, 372; Campbell v. Waite, 88 F. 102, 107, 31 C.C.A. 403; In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 10 Sup.Ct. 584, 33 L.Ed. 949; In re Fair (C.C.) 100 F. 149), or (b) that he had authority from the United States to arrest persons guilty of the offense for whose commission he was trying to make an arrest, that he had reasonable cause to believe and did honestly believe that the person he shot was guilty of the offense for which he was trying to arrest him, that he acted in attempting to make the arrest within the scope of his authority and used no more force than he honestly and reasonably believed was necessary in order to make the arrest, and that the case is one of urgency in which the delay of a trial by the state court will seriously interfere with the enforcement of the laws of the United States or the operations of its government, the court or judge may and should immediately discharge the petitioner without waiting for such trial (Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283, 19 Sup.Ct. 453, 43 L.Ed. 699; United States v. Fuellhart (C.C.) 106 F. 911, 914; In re Laing (C.C.) 127 F. 213, 217; United States v. Lipsett (D.C.) 156 F. 65). The cases, however, which present such facts, are exceptional, and the general rule and settled practice of the courts and judges of the United States, in cases which do not fall within the classes just enumerated, is to so exercise their discretion, in view of the delicate relation of the national and the state courts, as to refuse to interfere by writ of habeas corpus with the custody of the state court, at least until after the trial of the petitioner therein. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 Sup.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868; Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 6, 8, 26 Sup.Ct. 229, 50 L.Ed. 343; In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 181, 182, 26 Sup.Ct. 602, 50 L.Ed. 984, and cases there cited. The judge below, after hearing the evidence in the cases in hand, was of the opinion that they fell under the general rule, and in the exercise of his discretion he refused to discharge the petitioners before their trial in the state court, and the question now presented is: Was his action erroneous or an abuse of his discretion?

The only ground on which Castle and Tulk alleged in their petitions that they were entitled to a discharge from the custody of the state court was that they were officers of the United States, who had the authority under its laws, and upon whom the duty was imposed thereby, to arrest persons introducing whisky into Osago county in their presence, that Mays, Tinker, and Roberts were such persons, that the petitioners tried to arrest them, that they fled in an automobile, that it was necessary for the petitioners, in order to arrest the occupants of the automobile, to fire their guns at it, that they did so for that purpose, with no intent to shoot or injure its occupants, and that all their acts were done in their official capacity, in pursuance of the laws of the United States.

Conceding without deciding, that the petitioners were authorized under the laws of the United States to arrest without a warrant persons who upon reasonable grounds they honestly believed were committing in...