Castonguay v. Comm'r of Correction.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18599.,18599.
• Citation: 16 A.3d 676,300 Conn. 649
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Gary CASTONGUAYv.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

300 Conn. 649

16 A.3d 676

Gary CASTONGUAY

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 18599.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 9, 2010.Decided April 19, 2011.

Damon A.R. Kirschbaum, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Terrence M. O'Neill, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN and EVELEIGH, Js.ROGERS, C.J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 53a–35b,¹ which defines a sentence of life imprisonment as a term of sixty years, is applicable in cases where the defendant committed the offense before July 1, 1981, the effective date of § 53a–35b, but the defendant was sentenced after that date. The petitioner, Gary Castonguay, was convicted, after a jury trial, of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) §§ 53a–54a and 53a–54b, and felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) §§ 53a–54a and 53a–54c. He committed the offense on November 21, 1977, and ultimately was sentenced on December 19, 1989, to an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–35.² Thereafter, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that the respondent, the commissioner of correction, improperly had calculated his sentence as authorizing his confinement for the remainder of his natural life when § 53a–35b, which became effective as of July 1,1981, defines life imprisonment as a definite sentence of sixty years. The habeas court concluded that § 53a–35b applies only to sentences for offenses that were committed after the effective date of the statute and, therefore, denied the petition. Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes § 52–470(b), the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court also denied. The petitioner then filed this appeal ³ claiming that the habeas court improperly denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and his petition for certification to appeal from the denial of that petition. We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal and, therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

To provide context for our discussion of the facts and procedural history of this case, we must set forth the legislative genealogy of the relevant statutes. Before July 1, 1981, all felonies, with limited exceptions, were punishable by an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a–35. Under this scheme, the trial court was authorized “to set both the minimum and maximum portion of the sentence ... [and] parole eligibility is established at the minimum less any good time used to reduce that minimum term.” (Citations omitted.) Williams v. Bronson, 24 Conn.App. 612, 618, 590 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 913, 593 A.2d 138 (1991). The maximum term for a class A felony was life imprisonment, which meant the prisoner's natural life. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a–35 (b); Williams v. Bronson, supra, at 619, 590 A.2d 984 (for purposes of § 53a–35 [b], life imprisonment means natural life). In 1980, as part of the legislature's comprehensive revision of the state's sentencing structure abolishing indeterminate sentencing and creating definite sentencing, the legislature enacted No. 80–442 of the 1980 Public Acts (P.A. 80–442), which became effective July 1, 1981, and amended § 53a–35 to provide that § 53a–35 was applicable only to felonies committed before July 1, 1981. See P.A. 80–442, §§ 9 and 28, codified as part of General Statutes § 53a–35. The legislature also enacted new legislation; P.A. 80–442, §§ 10 and 28, codified at General Statutes § 53a–35a; ⁴ that provided that, effective July 1, 1981, felonies committed on or after July 1, 1981, are punishable by a definite sentence. Under this scheme, sentencing courts were authorized “to impose a flat or exact term of years of imprisonment without a minimum or maximum [term]....” Williams v. Bronson, supra, at 618, 590 A.2d 984. For the crime of murder, the legislature provided that the sentence is a definite term of “not less than twenty-five years nor more than life....” P.A. 80–442, § 10, codified at General Statutes § 53a–35a. The legislature also enacted new legislation; P.A. 80–442, § 11, codified at § 53a–35b; defining “imprisonment for life” as “a definite sentence of sixty years.”

With this background in mind, we review the undisputed facts and procedural history of the present case. In 1980, the petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of capital felony and felony murder in connection with the shooting death of a police officer on November 21, 1977. The trial court originally imposed consecutive sentences of not less than twenty-five years to life on each charge for a total effective sentence of fifty years to life imprisonment. Upon the petitioner's motion to correct the illegal sentence, the trial court modified its judgment and sentenced the petitioner to a net effective sentence of twenty-five years to life. Thereafter, the petitioner appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court, and this court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on the question of whether the petitioner was entitled to a new trial because the jurors had been instructed that they could discuss the case among themselves before it was formally submitted to them for deliberation. State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 436–37, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). After the hearing, a new trial was ordered and a jury again found the petitioner guilty of both charges. State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 489, 590 A.2d 901 (1991). On August 25, 1988, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life. Thereafter, on December 19, 1989, pursuant to the petitioner's motion, the trial court vacated one of the sentences and sentenced the petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life pursuant to § 53a–35. The petitioner again appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 512, 590 A.2d 901.

During his imprisonment, the petitioner earned jail credit, jail credit good time and statutory good time credit.⁵ The respondent applied these credits to the minimum twenty-five year portion of the petitioner's sentence and, as a result, that portion of the sentence expired on May 24, 1987, and he became eligible for parole on that date.⁶ The respondent determined, however, that the petitioner was not entitled to any credits against the maximum portion of the sentence because life imprisonment meant the petitioner's natural life. See Williams v. Bronson, supra, 24 Conn.App. at 617–20, 590 A.2d 984 (credits for jail time and good time do not apply to maximum term of indeterminate sentence when maximum term is natural life imprisonment). Accordingly, that portion of the petitioner's sentence will never expire and he will be released from prison only if he is granted parole prior to his death pursuant to General Statutes § 54–125. If he is released on parole, the petitioner will remain under the supervision of the department of correction for the remainder of his natural life, unless his sentence is discharged by the board of parole pursuant to General Statutes § 54–129.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was unlawfully confined because the maximum portion of his indeterminate sentence—life imprisonment—was a definite term of sixty years pursuant to § 53a–35b, and the respondent had unlawfully refused to apply the various credits against that term.⁷ The habeas court denied the petition on the ground that, pursuant to this court's decision in Mead v. Commissioner of Correction, 282 Conn. 317, 920 A.2d 301 (2007), § 53a–35b does not apply to life sentences that were imposed for offenses that were committed before July 1, 1981. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, which the habeas court also denied. This appeal followed.

The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and his petition for certification to appeal from that denial. Specifically, the petitioner claims that, because § 53a–35b plainly and unambiguously defines “imprisonment for life” as a term of sixty years, and because the terms of the statute do not limit its application to defendants who are sentenced on or after July 1, 1981, the statute applies “quasi-retroactively” ⁸ to the sentences of persons who committed the offense prior to that date but who are sentenced to an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of life imprisonment after that date. He argues, therefore, that this court's holding in Mead v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 282 Conn. at 322, 920 A.2d 301, that § 53a–35b does not apply retroactively, was limited to cases in which the defendant was sentenced before July 1, 1981. The respondent contends that, to the contrary, this court's holding in Mead applies to all sentences for offenses committed before that date.

“We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and procedural hurdles that the petitioner must surmount to obtain appellate review of the merits of a habeas court's denial of the habeas petition following denial of certification to appeal. In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), we concluded that ... § 52–470(b) prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted an abuse of discretion by the habeas co...