Castrello Merced v. Hernandez Colon

• Decision Date: 20 June 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. RLA 86-1172 JAF.
• Citation: 740 F. Supp. 108
• Parties: Angeles CASTRELLO MERCED, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rafael HERNANDEZ COLON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

740 F. Supp. 108

Angeles CASTRELLO MERCED, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rafael HERNANDEZ COLON, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. RLA 86-1172 JAF.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 20, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rafael F. Castro-Lang, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiffs.

Zuleika Llovet, Saldaña, Rey, Moran & Alvarado, San Juan, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

This is another civil rights case brought by employees of La Fortaleza (the Governor's mansion in Puerto Rico) who were dismissed from their positions following the gubernatorial election in 1984. At least three other cases involving dismissed La Fortaleza employees have already served as a basis for First Circuit decisions. See Rosario-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, 889 F.2d 314 (1st Cir.1989); Santiago-Correa v. Hernández-Colón, 835 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1987); Vázquez Ríos v. Hernández Colón, 819 F.2d 319 (1st Cir.1987). Like their counterparts before them, plaintiffs herein allege they were fired for political reasons and in violation of their rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as under Puerto Rico law. Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action.

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

The fourteen plaintiffs profess to be members of the Partido Nuevo Progresista ("PNP"). Prior to being dismissed they were employed at La Fortaleza in a variety of support staff positions. Initially, most if not all of the plaintiffs were hired as "conditional" or "confidential" employees, but in each case the status was changed to "career." As will be discussed in greater detail, the defendants claim that all of the plaintiffs were hired or promoted in violation of the recruitment standards prescribed by Puerto Rico's civil service laws. In any event, plaintiffs' names, titles, and monthly salaries prior to their dismissal are set forth below:

                         Plaintiff                    Job Title          Salary p/m
                Angeles Castrello Merced   Typist Clerk II               $615.00
                Pedro J. Reyes             Revenue Assistant III          897.00
                Sonia I. Monzón            Executive Officer I            642.00
                Irving Trujillo Zambrana   Messenger I                    507.00
                Ada E. Santiago Hernández  Executive Officer II           676.00
                Juan Garcia Valcárcel      Messenger II                   507.00
                Irma Peninton Santos       Clerk I                        550.00
                Ismael Morales Lebrón      Transportation Supervisor      767.00
                Lourdes Andino             Administrative Technician III  862.00
                Rafael Serrano             Property Manager               666.00
                Eduardo Pérez Carrión      Clerk IV                       595.00
                Andrés Morales Díaz        Printing Equipment Operator    767.00
                Angel S. Correa            Revenue Assistant III          863.00
                Migdalia López Pérez       Typist Clerk IV                666.00
                

In the elections of 1984, codefendant Rafael Hernández Colón, of the Partido Popular Democrático ("PPD"), was elected governor of Puerto Rico, unseating his PNP predecessor. Soon thereafter, Governor Hernández Colón appointed codefendant Franklin Martínez Monge to serve as his aide in charge of La Fortaleza's administration. In May 1985, after reviewing the personnel rosters, Martínez Monge sent letters to each of the plaintiffs informing them that they had been hired or promoted to "career positions" in contravention of personnel regulations. The letters also said that this lapse of protocol alone could justify termination from employment and that the addressees were entitled to an administrative hearing to review the matter after which their future as gubernatorial staff members would be decided.

Several of the plaintiffs requested and received some sort of hearing, although it is now claimed that the whole hearing process was a "sham." Then, between July 15 and November 4, 1985, each plaintiff received another letter from Martínez Monge, this time stating that their appointments were found to be "null and void" and that their employment at La Fortaleza would be terminated. Plaintiffs soon after left their positions and the vacancies were filled with PPD faithful. Plaintiffs allege that their replacements, like themselves, were not hired in accordance with the public service hiring standards.

The present suit was filed on July 15, 1986. In addition to making two claims under Puerto Rico law, plaintiffs seek injunctive and monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging a) that they were fired for reason of their political affiliation in violation of their rights under the first amendment; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); b) that they were deprived of due process in their termination; Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); and c) that they were deprived of their right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Defendants filed papers for summary judgment on May 28, 1987. That motion was left unresolved pending first a panel and then an en banc decision by the First Circuit in Rosario-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, 889 F.2d 314 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc). With the Rosario-Torres opinion now docketed, we proceed to decide defendants' motion.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

As an initial matter, defendants argue that all federal causes of action should be dismissed as time-barred. It is well settled that this district has adopted Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.1982); Gual Morales v. Hernández Vega, 604 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1979); Ramírez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.1978). It is equally well established that in cases alleging illegal dismissal from employment, the one-year period begins to run when a plaintiff is given notification of dismissal and not when the employment relationship actually ends. Chardón v. Fernández, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir.1982).

This action was filed July 15, 1986. Defendants assert the letters sent by Martinez Monge to the plaintiffs in May 1985 constitute notification of termination, or, in the alternative, "notification of a constitutional violation." We disagree. As stated above, the May 1985 letters merely informed plaintiffs that they had been illegally hired and that a determination regarding their employment would follow. The court does not construe the May letters as unambiguously stating that plaintiffs were being shown the door. That did not occur until the second round of letters which, with a single exception, were received on dates ranging from July 15 to November 4, 1985. It makes no difference that plaintiffs may have suspected "something was up" from the first round of letters, or even that defendants secretly planned to fire them all along; the May 1985 letters do not order dismissal and in fact invite plaintiffs to present reasons why they should be allowed to keep their jobs. Because the bulk of plaintiffs did not receive notification of termination until July 15, 1985 or after, the court finds their allegations to be timely.¹

The alluded to exception involves plaintiff Juan García Valcárcel, who was notified of his dismissal in a letter dated June 28, 1985 and who actually left his job at La Fortaleza two days later. Because plaintiff García did not file his action within a year of notification, his section 1983 action is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED.

III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Defendants next argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under due process. Essentially, the due process claim is based on the allegation that plaintiffs were asked to leave their posts without the benefit of an adequate hearing. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to any hearing at all, however, depends on whether they had a property interest in public employment, which in turn is determined by local law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Defendants submit that because plaintiffs were hired or promoted to career positions in violation of Puerto Rico's Personnel Act, any property right associated with a career position is rendered null and void under Puerto Rico law.

This was precisely the issue in Rosario-Torres, supra, where the First Circuit held that dismissed La Fortaleza employees hired in violation of the Governor's Office hiring regulations had no property interest in continued employment and no right to a pre-dismissal hearing. Rosario-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, 889 F.2d at 319-20; accord Santiago-Negrón v. Castro-Dávila, 865 F.2d 431, 435-37 (1st Cir.1989); Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988). The en banc court found no significance in the fact that defendants themselves hired new employees without regard to the personnel regulations, or that these same regulations were in practice seldom if ever observed. Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 319-20.² In short, the court found that "two wrongs, after all, do not make a right." Id.

In light of the above, plaintiffs herein can fare no better than did their former co-workers in Rosario-Torres. Defendants have asserted that each plaintiff was hired in violation of the Office of the Governor's Personnel Regulations, Article 7, which, whatever its history of application, appears to require examinations, public notice of opportunities, and a register of eligible candidates with respect to every job opening at La Fortaleza. Defendants also submit that most if not all of the plaintiffs lacked formal educational and/or experiential requirements for their positions. See Memorandum in Support of Motion...