Castrellon v. State

• Decision Date: 19 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. CR–12–975.,CR–12–975.
• Citation: 428 S.W.3d 607,2013 Ark. App. 408
• Parties: Eric CASTRELLON, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

2013 Ark. App. 408

428 S.W.3d 607

Eric CASTRELLON, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR–12–975.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

June 19, 2013.

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Leaann J. Adams, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge.

Appellant Eric Castrellon was charged with one count of second-degree sexual assault over allegations that he engaged in sexual contact with a twelve-year-old girl. Prior to trial, Castrellon filed a motion for supplemental discovery, asserting that he believed the accuser had undergone some form of mental health treatment or counseling and that the records of her treatment had not been provided to him. Following a hearing and briefs on the issue, the circuit court denied the motion. The court did, however, conduct an in camera review of the records, and it informed the parties at a hearing that it did not find anything in the records that would be considered exculpatory or Brady material. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury found Castrellon guilty of second-degree sexual assault. The jury recommended sentencing Castrellon to five years' probation, and the circuit court accepted the jury's recommendation. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and in denying him access to the accuser's medical, psychological, and counseling records. We find no error and affirm.

In his first point on appeal, Castrellon challenges the circuit court's denial of his directed-verdict motion. On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429;Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529, 385 S.W.3d 257. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Paschal, supra. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id.

A person commits the offense of second-degree sexual assault if he, being eighteen years of age or older, engages in sexual contact with another person who is less than fourteen years of age and not the person's spouse. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–125(a)(3) (Supp.2011). “Sexual contact” is defined as “any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or anus of a person or the breast of a female.” Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–101(10) (Supp.2011). On appeal, Castrellon does not deny that he was over the age of eighteen or that his victim was under the age of fourteen. Rather, he contends that the evidence was lacking that he engaged in “sexual contact” because there was no proof that his actions were for the purpose of sexual gratification.

The victim in this case, twelve-year-old H.C., testified at trial that Castrellon was an old family friend of her father's, as well as her pastor. On the night of the events in question, H.C. spent the night with Castrellon's children, A.C. and J.C., who were her friends. The girls all went to sleep in A.C.'s bunk bed. At some point during the night, H.C. stated that she woke up, opened her eyes, and saw Castrellon. She felt him “rubbing on [her] vaginal region” over her clothes. H.C. said she did not know how long the rubbing had been going on before she opened her eyes, but it stopped after she woke up.

Castrellon's wife testified that, on the night in question, she asked Castrellon to go into the girls' bedroom and check to see if their five-year-old daughter had wet the bed. She said that she did not tell Castrellon that they had company that night. Castrellon also testified that he had no idea that H.C. was in the house that night. He subsequently stated, however, that he came home late that night and recognized that his wife was tired because she had “the four kids, plus H.C.” that day.

Castrellon testified that he went in the bedroom to check whether the five-year-old had wet the bed. He said that he “just felt around to see if [he] could feel wetness,” but then he saw a “bigger leg” and realized that H.C. was in his daughter's bed. He thought H.C. was asleep, so he left the room and did not say anything to anyone because it would have been “awkward.” Castrellon denied knowing who he was touching at the time. He noted that he had been around H.C. many times after that, and her behavior did not lead him to think that she was afraid of him or that he had done anything to her.

On appeal, Castrellon concedes that the touching happened, but he contends that it was accidental and not done for the purpose of sexual gratification. Castrellon argues that “most of the cases” discussing whether an act was for the purpose of sexual gratification involve either penetration or “some other obviously non-accidental activity.” Our supreme court, however, has repeatedly held that, in cases of sexual abuse, the jury can assume that the defendant had sexual contact with the victim for the purpose of sexual gratification, and it is not necessary for the State to directly prove that he was so motivated.¹Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420, 378 S.W.3d 66;Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, 377 S.W.3d 152;Holbert v. State, 308 Ark. 672, 826 S.W.2d 284 (1992) (affirming sexual-abuse conviction where defendant grabbed the victim between the legs and there was no evidence of penetration).

Castrellon describes the circumstances of the touching as “ambiguous” and asserts that his actions should not have been interpreted as being for sexual gratification.² H.C. unambiguously testified, however, that Castrellon was “rubbing on [her] vagina.” A sexual-assault victim's testimony may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction for sexual assault. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008). The victim's testimony need not be corroborated, and the victim's testimony alone, describing the sexual contact, is enough for a conviction. Colburn v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 587, 2010 WL 3582441. The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury's consideration. Tryon v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007). Even where the defendant denies the allegations, the credibility and weight of the evidence are issues properly left to the fact-finder. Estrada v. State, 2011 Ark. 3, 376 S.W.3d 395. The jury in this case chose to believe H.C. Her testimony, standing alone, constituted substantial evidence to sustain Castrellon's conviction.

In his second point on appeal, Castrellon argues that the circuit court should have allowed him access to H.C.'s counseling records, contending that the court erred in finding that the materials were privileged. The standard of review for the circuit court's decisions in such matters is whether the court abused its discretion. See Johnson v. State, 342 Ark. 186, 207, 27 S.W.3d 405, 418 (2000) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“Certainly the extent of any waiver of a privilege must be reviewed by this court on a case-by-case basis for an abuse of discretion.”) (citing Schaefer v. State, 695 So.2d 656 (Ala.Crim.App.1996)).

Castrellon sought access to H.C.'s medical, psychological, and counseling records on the basis that they might contain statements by H.C. that contradicted the allegations she had made against him. The circuit court initially denied Castrellon's motion outright, but it later agreed that it would review the records in camera to determine whether there was any exculpatory evidence contained therein. After conducting that review, the court did not find any such information. The court stated that there was no renunciation of H.C.'s allegations in her records, but it also agreed that, if her trial testimony was inconsistent with her medical records, the court would “turn that over ... to the prosecutor and the defense for that limited section of it.” The court ultimately concluded, however, that there was “nothing based on my information to this point that there's anything that I find exculpatory to the defense.”

On appeal, Castrellon first urges that, under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), he was entitled to an in camera review of the allegedly privileged information to determine whether the materialscontained any exculpatory evidence. The circuit court here conducted the in camera review afforded by Ritchie. Castrellon appears to contend that he was entitled to review the allegedly privileged information himself. His argument, however, misapprehends the holding of Ritchie. In Ritchie, the Supreme Court held that a “defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the [State's] files.” 480 U.S. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989. Rather, a defendant's “interest (as well as that of the [State] ) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the [privileged] files be submitted only to the trial court for an in camera review.” Id. at 60, 107 S.Ct....