Castrellon v. United States
| Court | United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas |
| Decision Date | 17 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | EP-10-CR-2213-KC-5,EP-22-CV-80-KC |
| Parties | ARTURO GALLEGOS CASTRELLON, Reg. No. 86139-080, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
ARTURO GALLEGOS CASTRELLON, Reg. No. 86139-080, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Nos. EP-22-CV-80-KC, EP-10-CR-2213-KC-5
United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division
March 17, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KATHLEEN CARDONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Arturo Gallegos Castrellon challenges his sentences through a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 2127.[1] His motion is denied because his claims are untimely, without merit, or procedurally barred.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Castrellon is a 43-year-old federal inmate serving consecutive life sentences at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Find and Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search for Reg. No. 86139-080) (last visited March 10, 2022).
Castrellon was a lieutenant in a transnational criminal organization-called the Barrio Azteca-which engaged in drug trafficking, extortion, racketeering, kidnapping, murder, and money-laundering. United States v. Castrellon, 636 Fed.Appx. 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2016). He supported the Barrio Azteca's ongoing war with a rival drug cartel by organizing assassination teams in Juarez, Mexico. Id. He received information on potential targets in Juarez from Barrio Azteca operatives in El Paso, Texas. Id.
On March 31, 2010, Castrellon ordered a hit team to assassinate the occupants of a white Honda Pilot with Texas license plates while they were in Mexico. Id. He suspected members of a rival gang had used the vehicle to follow him. Id.
Castrellon's hit team located two similar vehicles with Texas license plates in Juarez at a birthday party attended by United States Consulate employees. Id. Castrellon' team complied with his order, riddled both vehicles with bullets, and killed three people-Consulate employee Leslie Ann Enriquez Catton, her husband Arthur Redelfs, and Jorge Alberto Salcido Ceniceros. Id.
Castrellon was arrested by Mexican authorities and transferred to the United States. Id. He was indicted for conspiring to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1963 (Count One); conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 (Count Two); conspiring to import heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 960 (Count Three); conspiring to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Count Four); conspiring to kill persons in a foreign country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (Count Five); murder resulting from the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence (COV) and drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 and 2 (Counts Six, Seven, and Eight); and murder in aid of a racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959 and 2 (Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven). Third Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 930. He was convicted by a jury on all counts. J. Crim. Case, ECF No. 1388. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison on Counts One, Two, Three, Five, Nine, Ten, and Eleven; consecutive terms of life in prison on Counts Six, Seven, and Eight; and a concurrent term of 240 months' imprisonment on Count Four. Id.
Castrellon appealed the conviction on Count Five-conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956. Castrellon, 636 Fed.Appx. 204. He argued “the evidence was insufficient to establish two essential elements of the offense: no conspirator performed an overt act in the United States, and no conspirator was in the United States at the time he conspired.” Id. His arguments were rejected, and his conviction was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 8, 2016. Id. at 207.
Castrellon makes four new claims in his § 2255 motion. Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 2127. First, he alleges that the following domestic laws have no extraterritorial applicability:
(1) conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 1962 and 1963 (Count One), [2]
(2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 (Count Two), [3]
(3) conspiracy to import heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 960 (Count Three), [4]
(4) murder resulting from the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to COV and drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 and 2 (Counts Six Seven, and Eight), and
(5) murder in aid of a racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959 and 2 (Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven).
Id. at 4-13. Second, he observes that the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)-which defines a COV as a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”-was void for vagueness. Id. at 15. He argues that, based on Davis, murder is not a COV. Id. And he contends that he was therefore unconstitutionally convicted on Counts Six, Seven, and Eight-murder resulting from the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a COV and drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 and 2. Id. Third, he maintains that he was “unconstitutionally convicted” on Count One-conspiring to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1963. Id. at 24. He reasons that “8 U.S.C. § 1962(c) is no longer a crime of violence after . . . Davis. Id. at 24. Finally, he contends that the Court erred when it “improperly enhanced [the] maximum sentence under the ‘notice of special sentencing factors.'”[5] Id. at 28. He asks that “the Court to set aside this void judgment for lack of jurisdiction, and violation of procedural due process per 5th Amendment.” Id. at 44.
APPLICABLE LAW
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “‘provides the primary means of collateral attack on a federal sentence.'” Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cox v. Warden, 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990)). But “it does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). It identifies only four grounds on which a movant may obtain relief: (1) the “sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Consequently, it does not permit relief on a claim of error that is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional unless the error constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). It also requires the prisoner to bear the burden of establishing a claim of error by a preponderance of the evidence. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Kastenbaum, 613 F.2d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 1980)). It permits a court to “vacate and set the judgment aside” if a prisoner's claims are meritorious and to “discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant [him] a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Upon receiving a § 2255 motion, the reviewing court must first conduct a preliminary review, and “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of the prior proceeding that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 4(b). If the court determines the motion raises a non-frivolous claim to relief, it must order the Government to file a response or to take other appropriate action. Id. The court may then require the parties to expand the record as necessary and, if good cause is shown, authorize limited discovery. Id. Rules 6-7.
ANALYSIS
A. Limitations
A § 2255 motion is subject to a one-year limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). A motion must be filed within one year from the date on which (1) the judgment became final; (2) the government-created impediment to filing the motion was removed; (3) the United States
Supreme Court initially recognized, and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, the legal predicate for the motion; or (4) the movant could have discovered, through due diligence, the factual predicate for the motion. Id.
The one-year limitations period is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). Equitable tolling is not, however, available for “‘garden variety claims of excusable neglect.'” Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rashidi v. Am. President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996)). It “is permitted only ‘in rare and exceptional circumstances.'” Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). Such circumstances include situations in which a movant is actively misled by the respondent “‘or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.'” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999)). Additionally, “‘[e]quity is not intended for those who sleep on their rights.'” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Covey v. Arkansas River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989)). But “‘[e]quitable tolling is appropriate where, despite all due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to...
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