Castro-Ramirez v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 13 Civ. 6001 (KPF)
| Decision Date | 30 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | 13 Civ. 6001 (KPF) |
| Parties | RAMON ANTONIO CASTRO-RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Pro se Plaintiff Ramon Antonio Castro-Ramirez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of an April 2013 final decision of Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")1 denying his application to become a naturalized citizen of the United States. Defendant has moved to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred from becoming a naturalized citizen as a result of his prior criminal conviction. For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this Opinion, Defendant's motion to dismiss is converted to one for summary judgment, and is granted.
Plaintiff is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, and was admitted into the United States as a Permanent Resident on or about February 12, 1967. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2). On April 26, 1983, Plaintiff was arrested in Yonkers, New York, and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree; the controlled substance was cocaine. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4). Plaintiff pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree on December 22, 1983, and was scheduled to be sentenced on January 19, 1984. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). When Plaintiff failed to appear for that sentencing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. (Id. at ¶ 6).
Plaintiff was arrested on or about May 22, 1996, on the January 19, 1984 bench warrant. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7). On September 5, 1996, Plaintiff was sentenced in the Supreme Court of New York, Westchester County, to a term of one to three years' imprisonment. (Id. at ¶ 8). On September 5, 1996, awritten judgment was entered against Plaintiff, reflecting his conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.39. (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff was incarcerated from approximately September 19, 1996, to September 5, 1997. (Feb. 19 Opp. 2-3).
As a result of his 1996 conviction, Plaintiff was found to be deportable under Section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 10). However, on or about March 17, 2003, Plaintiff was granted a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), by an Immigration Judge. (Id. at ¶ 11).3
Plaintiff filed an application for naturalization on April 3, 2012. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12). USCIS issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application on December 1, 2012, on the grounds that his felony conviction precluded a finding of good moral character, as required for naturalization. (Id. at ¶ 13; Buchanan Decl. Ex. I). Plaintiff appealed that decision on December 19, 2012. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 14). On April 23, 2013, USCIS reaffirmed its decision to deny Plaintiff's naturalization application. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Plaintiff initiated the instant action on August 22, 2013, seeking additional review of USCIS's decision to deny his naturalization application. (Dkt. #1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he is not precluded from establishing "good moral character" because his criminal conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony. (Pet. 1-2).
On December 11, 2013, Defendant filed a pre-motion letter, seeking leave to move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. #8). Pursuant to the briefing schedule set forth at the January 10, 2014 pre-motion conference (Dkt. #10), Defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, was filed on February 10, 2014 (Dkt. #11). Plaintiff's opposition titled "Incarceration Time" was filed on February 19, 2014 (Dkt. #16), and Plaintiff's opposition titled "Judicial Notice Following: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(f)" was filed on March 11, 2014 (Dkt. #17). The motion was fully submitted as of the filing of Defendant's reply on April 11, 2014. (Dkt. #18). The Court will now consider Defendant's motion.
Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Thus, a district court may convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when the motion presents matters outside the pleadings, but the court must give "sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond." Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995).
"Care should, of course, be taken by the district court to determine that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered has had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that the party for whom summary judgment is rendered is entitled thereto as a matter of law." Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 6 James W. Moore, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.12, at 56-165 (2d ed. 1995)). "Notice is particularly important when a party is proceeding pro se and may be unaware of the consequences of his failure to offer evidence bearing on triable issues." Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1983).
Both parties have presented matters outside the pleadings in connection with this motion. Moreover, there are no material facts in dispute; indeed, Plaintiff has not controverted any facts put forth by Defendant. Conversion is proper here because Defendant provided Plaintiff with notice that the Court might treat Defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and informed him that if he did not respond "by filing sworn affidavits and other papers as required by Rule 56(e)," his "COMPLAINT MAY BEDISMISSED." (Dkt. #15). See Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 308 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (). Lastly, Defendant has submitted a Local Rule 56.1 Statement in connection with its motion and has titled its motion as one for summary judgment in the alternative; in response, Plaintiff has submitted additional matters outside of the pleadings for the Court's review. Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to convert Defendant's motion to one for summary judgment.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken together "show[] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson). The movant may discharge this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear theburden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) ().
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial" using affidavits or otherwise, and cannot rely on the "mere allegations or denials" contained in the pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and cannot rely on "mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment," Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Quarles v. General Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, "[m]ere conclusory allegations or denials cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must "construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in its favor." Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 2005)). In a pro se case, the Court must go one step further and liberally construe the party's pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, ...
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