Castro v. Baker

• Decision Date: 06 February 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-01237-MMD-EJY
• Parties: MARTIN SALAZAR CASTRO, Petitioner, v. RENEE BAKER, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

MARTIN SALAZAR CASTRO, Petitioner, v. RENEE BAKER, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 2:16-cv-01237-MMD-EJY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

February 6, 2020

ORDER

I. SUMMARY

Petitioner Martin Salazar Castro filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ("Petition") (ECF No. 7) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court for adjudication on the merits. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the Petition and grants him a certificate of appealability for Ground Five only.

II. BACKGROUND

Castro's convictions are the result of events that occurred in Clark County, Nevada on January 31, 2008. (ECF No. 14-16 at 3.) In its order affirming Castro's convictions, the Nevada Supreme Court described the crimes, as revealed by the evidence at Castro's trial, as follows:

Appellant Martin Castro, along with Courtney Collins, entered a house in which two females, C.B. and J.T., and two males, N.M. and D.W., were present. Castro and Collins had shotguns, and threatened the four victims. The victims testified that Castro forced them to the ground, stole property from D.W. and J.T., groped C.B. and J.T., and penetrated C.B.'s and J.T.'s vaginas digitally and with shotguns.

A struggled ensued when the victims fought against Castro and Collins, and during the fighting, Castro was shot. He was hospitalized in the Intensive

///

Care Unit (ICU) of the University Medical Center. Castro gave a statement to police while in custody there.

(ECF No. 16-14 at 3-4.)

On March 22, 2010, a jury convicted Castro of the following: one count of conspiracy to commit robbery; one count of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon; four counts of first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon; two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon; one count of conspiracy to commit sexual assault; three counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon; one count of attempted sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon; two counts of battery with intent to commit sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon; four counts of battery with the use of a deadly weapon; and four counts of open or gross lewdness with the use of a deadly weapon. (ECF No. 16-4.) Castro appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on March 30, 2012. (ECF No. 16-14.) Remittitur issued on April 24, 2012. (ECF No. 16-15.)

Castro filed a state habeas corpus petition and a counseled, supplemental petition on August 1, 2012, and September 17, 2013, respectively. (ECF Nos. 16-16, 17-5.) The state district court denied the petition on April 28, 2014. (ECF No. 17-9.) The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on December 18, 2015. (ECF No. 17-14.) Remittitur issued on January 12, 2016. (ECF No. 17-15.)

Castro dispatched his federal habeas corpus petition for filing on or about May 25, 2016. (ECF No. 7.) Respondents moved to dismiss parts of Ground Two of the Petition. (ECF No. 12.) Castro moved for a stay in order to exhaust the unexhausted grounds in the Petition. (ECF No. 18.) This Court found that Ground Two Part B and Ground Two Part C were unexhausted. (ECF No. 22 at 4.) This Court also determined that Castro's motion for a stay was premature and, as such, denied it without prejudice. (Id. at 5.) This Court ordered Castro to either abandon the unexhausted claim; return to state district court to exhaust his unexhausted claims, in which case the Petition would be denied without prejudice; or file a renewed motion for a stay. (Id. at 4-6.) Castrochose to renew his motion for a stay. (ECF No. 27.) This Court denied Castro's motion and order Castro to either abandon the unexhausted grounds or dismiss the Petition without prejudice in order to return to state district court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. (Id. at 4.) Castro chose to abandon Ground Two Part B and Ground Two Part C. (ECF No. 31.)

Respondents answered the remaining grounds in the Petition on August 30, 2018. (ECF No. 32.) Castro did not reply.

In his remaining grounds for relief, Castro asserts the following violations of his federal constitutional rights:

1. His trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a full and adequate cross-examination of the victims.

2A. His trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable and adequate pretrial investigation regarding the criminal histories of the victims.

3. His trial counsel failed to object to the State's improper questions.

4. There were cumulative errors.

5. The state district court erred in admitting Castro's involuntary statements to the police.

6. The state district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial after a panel member implied that Castro was incarcerated.

7. There was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for sexual assaults, attempted sexual assault, conspiracy to commit sexual assault, or kidnapping.

8. The state district court erred by providing incorrect jury instructions and by rejecting his proposed jury instructions.

(ECF No. 7.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000), and citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). "The 'unreasonable application' clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10) (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has instructed that "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has stated "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the standard as a "difficult to meet" and "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,

///which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Petition asserts eight remaining grounds for relief. (ECF No. 7 at 7-50.) The Court will address each ground in turn.

A. Ground Seven¹

In Ground Seven, Castro argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for sexual assaults, attempted sexual assault, conspiracy to commit sexual assault, and kidnapping. (ECF No. 7 at 40-41, 43.) With regard to the sexual assault-based convictions, Castro asserts that the victims implicated his co-assailant, Courtney Collins, not him. (Id. at 41.) In Castro's appeal of his judgment of conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court held:

Castro also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon, and conspiracy to commit sexual assault. When considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we determine "'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational [juror] could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" McNair v State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The State presented the testimony of all four victims and Castro's statement. This was enough evidence to allow a rational juror to convict Castro on a theory of direct commission or as a co-conspirator.

(ECF No. 16-14 at 4 n.1.) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence of the kidnapping conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court held:

The standard that this court uses to review sufficiency of the evidence is "'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational [juror] could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" McNair v. State, 10 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The testimony at trial established that Castro's and Collins's actions physically restrained the victims and that the risk of harm to the victims wasmore than was required to complete the robbery and sexual assault. Thus, sufficient evidence supports the first-degree kidnapping convictions.

(Id. at 11.) These rulings were...