Castro v. Dart
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-00471 |
| Citation | 483 F.Supp.3d 564 |
| Parties | Richard CASTRO, Rolando Guzman, Irma Leibas, and Anthony Lott, Plaintiffs, v. Thomas DART, Toni Preckwinkle, and Cook County, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Kenneth Philip Ross, Eugene J. Schiltz, Francis Charles Wilkie, Crotty & Schiltz, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Kathleen Cunniff Ori, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Cory D. Anderson, David L. Miller, John Joseph Rock, Joseph Thomas Baratta, Michael Charles Stephenson, Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Thomas J. Dart.
Lyle Kevin Henretty, Mia Buntic, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Illinois Cook County.
Plaintiffs Richard Castro, Rolando Guzman, Irma Leibas, and Anthony Lott brought this action against Defendants Cook County, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, and President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners Toni Preckwinkle under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have enforced a sick leave policy that infringes their constitutional rights and interferes with their FMLA rights. Plaintiffs do not object to the dismissal of Defendant Preckwinkle, [29] at 13; thus, Defendant Preckwinkle is dismissed. Defendants Cook County and Dart move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss [26] is granted as to the FMLA claim but is otherwise denied.
In evaluating Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true the following factual allegations from the complaint. See Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Faulkenberg v. CB Tax Franchise Sys., LP , 637 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiffs are Deputy Sheriffs for Cook County who hold the rank of Correctional Officer. First Am. Compl., [16] at 2 ¶¶ 3–6.1 In January 2018, Cook County entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "CBA") with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 700 (the "Union"). [16] at 4 ¶ 4. The Union represented a bargaining unit consisting of all employees in certain job classifications, including that of Correctional Officer, within certain departments and operational units and subject to certain exceptions. [16] ¶ 12. Plaintiffs allege they are members of this bargaining unit. [16] ¶ 13. The complaint alleges that "Cook County and the Office of Sheriff are plaintiffs’ employers." [16] at 3 ¶ 9. The CBA states that Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County are joint employers. [26-1] at 8.2
Separate sections of the CBA address sick leave, [26-1] at 25–26 § 8.2, and FMLA leave, [26-1] at 32 § 9.4. Within the sick leave section is a "home check" provision: employees who call in sick are required to remain home during a missed shift and must report movement to a "medical call in line." [16] at 5 ¶ 17 (quoting CBA § 8.2.H).3 From the briefing, the parties appear to agree that the fact that the provision applies to employees who "call in" sick means that the provision governs unexpected sick leave, not preapproved sick leave. Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the provision, Correctional Officers who call in sick may only leave their home for medical matters related to the leave. [16] ¶ 18. Employees who call in sick may receive calls and in-person home checks from the Sheriff's "Home Check Unit" to ensure compliance. [16] ¶¶ 19–20. Employees who violate this policy may be disciplined, up to and including termination for repeat violations. [16] at 7 ¶ 21.
In addition to the CBA, in response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs attached what they describe as "the Sheriff's Department's Procedure 123, ‘Medical Call-In Procedure,’ from the Cook County Department of Corrections Procedure Manual." [29] at 7 & Ex. A.4 Plaintiffs point to the Medical Call-In Procedure from the Manual in support of their allegation that the Sheriff enforces the home check provision of the CBA.5
Plaintiffs concede that "the CBA itself does not impose its home check policy on employees on FMLA leave." [29] at 2 n.2 (citing [16] ¶17; [26-1] at 25). However, the "Home Check Visits" provision of the Medical Call-In Procedure applies when an employee "calls in a medical/sick and/or FMLA benefit day ... and does not report for work," but "is compensated for the day (e.g., medical/sick time used, FMLA time used)." [29-1] at 4. Additionally, plaintiffs Leibas, Guzman, and Lott allege that they were subject to home confinement and home checks while on FMLA leave. [16] at 7–8 ¶¶ 23, 25, 26.
According to the complaint, each Plaintiff took sick leave and / or FMLA leave in 2018 after Cook County and the Union adopted the CBA. Each of them was confined to their home during the leave, and each received visits from the home check unit. [16] at 7–8 ¶¶ 23–26.6
Plaintiffs brought this action in 2019 and subsequently filed the operative First Amended Complaint. [16]. Plaintiffs allege that the home check provision of the CBA and Defendants’ enforcement of the provision violate the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, warranting declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1), violate the Equal Protection Clause, again warranting relief under § 1983 (Count 2), and interfere with Plaintiffs’ rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (Count 3). Defendants now move to dismiss. [26].7
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring their constitutional claims.8 "In ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, the district court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor." Lee v. City of Chicago , 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003). Since Defendants are challenging Plaintiffs’ standing on the face of the complaint, Plaintiffs are not required to present evidence to demonstrate standing. Id.
The Constitution authorizes federal courts to adjudicate disputes in which the alleged injury is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policy:
confines plaintiffs to their residences while legitimately on sick or FMLA leave and thereby infringes and imposes a chilling effect upon plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to vote, to freely exercise their religion by attendance at their chosen house of worship, to go to court, to attend political or family gatherings and to travel while on sick or FMLA leave.
[16] at 8 ¶ 29.
Defendants argue that any constitutional harm is speculative, since Plaintiffs have not actually attempted to engage in the protected activities they cite. Since Plaintiffs have not attempted to violate the policy, Defendants have not prevented them from engaging in these activities or disciplined them for doing so. Defendants also argue that a mere threat of sanctions only amounts to a constitutional injury when the freedom of speech is implicated.
Pienta v. Vill. of Schaumburg, Ill. , 710 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1983), is directly on point. There, the Seventh Circuit considered regulations that confined employees of the Schaumburg Police Department on injury or sick leave to their homes, only allowed them to leave for medical reasons, and subjected them to calls and home visits. Id. at 1259–60. The plaintiffs challenged the regulations under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1259. The Seventh Circuit held that by confining plaintiffs to their homes, the regulations infringed the plaintiffs’ "rights to vote, to exercise freely their religion by church attendance, to go to court, to attend political or family gatherings, and to travel," and that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the regulations "without attempting to disobey." Id. at 1260. Plaintiffs allege here the same injuries found sufficient in Pienta .
Defendants also try to distinguish Pienta since unlike there, here Plaintiffs could first pursue a grievance under the CBA. But as discussed below, the CBA does not require Plaintiffs to pursue constitutional and statutory claims through the grievance process.
Finally, Defendants analogize to cases concerning individual employees’ standing to bring claims for breaches of collective bargaining agreements. This analogy fails since Plaintiffs are alleging violations of constitutional and statutory rights, not violations of the CBA. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this challenge.
The court next addresses whether Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the grievance procedures in the CBA. Defendants argue that this dispute boils down to a disagreement about the Plaintiffs’ rights under the terms of the CBA. Since the CBA provides a mandatory grievance process for contractual disputes, Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue. The court assumes without deciding that Rule 12(b)(3) is an appropriate procedural vehicle for this request. See Grasty v. Colorado Tech. Univ. , 599 F. App'x 596, 597 (7th Cir. 2015) ( ) (citations omitted); Johnson v. Orkin, LLC , 556 F. App'x 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); Faulkenberg , 637 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(3) m...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rosas v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.
...custom that not only causes but is the 'moving force' behind the deprivation of constitutional rights."); Castro v. Dart, 483 F.Supp.3d 564, 573-74 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ("To satisfy Monell, Plaintiffs must also allege facts that plausibly suggest the deprivation was caused by (1) an express mun......
-
Brown v. Hyatt Place
...those in the Complaint, it "construes all facts" and "draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Castro v. Dart, 483 F. Supp. 3d 564, 571 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (citing Faulkenberg, 637 F.3d at 806) (quotations omitted).2 II. Background Brown was first employed by Hyatt Place in Janu......