Castro v. State

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CADY, Chief Justice.
• Citation: Castro v. State , 795 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 2011)
• Decision Date: 01 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–0332.,09–0332.
• Parties: Mark Angelo CASTRO, Appellant,v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

795 N.W.2d 789

Mark Angelo CASTRO, Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 09–0332.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 1, 2011.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Frank Severino, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.CADY, Chief Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether an application for postconviction relief from a judgment and sentence imposed in a criminal case based on a plea of guilty was properly dismissed on summary adjudication. On our review, we affirm the decision of the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Mark Castro was charged by the State with five counts of sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3(2) (2005). He subsequently pled guilty to five counts of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4. The crimes involved repeated sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl over a period of approximately four months. Castro lived in an apartment with the child's grandmother, and the abuse occurred when the child visited her grandmother. Castro made numerous incriminating statements to police during their investigation. The statements were made after Castro was informed of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver of those rights.

The district court accepted Castro's plea of guilty after considering his answers to a series of questions propounded by the court. Based on the colloquy, the court found Castro entered his plea voluntarily, understood his rights, and understood the consequences of his plea. In the course of the colloquy, Castro told the court he was not under the influence of any medication that impaired his ability to clearly think. He did inform the court he was taking medication for high blood pressure, depression, and anxiety. Yet, he assured the court the medication did not impair his ability to understand his decision to plead guilty or the proceedings. Castro identified the medication as Atenolol, Lexapro, and Ativan. Castro was sentenced to incarceration for five consecutive ten-year terms.

Castro filed an application for postconviction relief after he began serving his sentences. He alleged three grounds relevant to this appeal to support his application. Castro first alleged the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because his trial attorney failed to devote adequate time to the investigation of his case prior to the plea. Castro next alleged the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because his trial attorney failed to investigate whether his mental health and medication regimen supported a diminished-capacity defense to the crime or rendered his incriminating statements involuntary and inadmissible. Finally, Castro alleged his guilty plea was rendered involuntary and unintelligent because his drug regimen was altered just prior to the time he entered his plea and his state of mind rendered him incompetent to fully understand the proceedings. Castro attached numerous documents to his application for postconviction relief. These documents primarily detailed the pharmacology, purpose, warnings, precautions, and other information about the drugs he was taking. Castro cited no particular information from the documents to support his claim.

The State moved for summary judgment. First, it asserted the initial two grounds alleged by Castro could not support postconviction relief as a matter of law because the claims did not pertain to matters intrinsic to the plea of guilty. As such, the State claimed Castro was prohibited from challenging alleged constitutional infirmities of the pre-plea actions or inactions of his trial counsel in a postconviction relief proceeding because such challenges were waived by pleading guilty and failing to file a subsequent motion in arrest of judgment. Second, the State claimed the plea colloquy adequately showed Castro's medication regimen had no effect on the voluntariness or understanding of his plea of guilty.

Castro resisted the motion for summary judgment. While the resistance largely focused on allegations pertaining to the conduct amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel, Castro did allege his “guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing[ ], and intelligent[ ] due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” The resistance also asserted factual issues existed concerning the effect of his medication regimen on his ability to understand the plea proceedings, and a hearing was necessary so the factual dispute over the effects of his medication regimen could be resolved by medical testimony.

The district court granted summary judgment. It found the first two claims brought by Castro involving the acts or inactions of trial counsel were not intrinsic to the guilty plea and were waived as a matter of law. Second, the court determined the prior plea colloquy established Castro's medication regimen did not render his guilty plea involuntary or unintelligent, and Castro failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a genuine factual dispute over the issue to overcome the prior finding by the trial court that the plea was voluntary and intelligent. Unlike the first two grounds, the court recognized this third ground for relief was intrinsic to the plea. Yet, it concluded Castro introduced no facts or opinions to support a connection between the medication regimen or change in medication and an inability to voluntarily and intelligently enter a plea of guilty to warrant a hearing.

On appeal, Castro claims the district court erred by categorically rejecting his first two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims the allegation supporting the two grounds show they were intrinsic to the plea of guilty, which entitled him to a hearing on the merits. Furthermore, he claims the third ground for relief concerning his ability to enter a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea due to the effect of his drug regimen on his state of mind during the time of his plea presented an issue of material fact giving rise to the need for an evidentiary hearing.

II. Standard of Review.

We normally review postconviction proceedings for errors at law. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). This includes summary dismissals of applications for postconviction relief. Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Iowa 2002). Applications for postconviction relief that allege ineffective assistance of counsel, however, raise a constitutional claim. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Iowa 2006). We review postconviction proceedings that raise constitutional infirmities de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, the moving party has the burden of proving the material facts are undisputed. Kolarik v. Cory Int'l Corp., 721 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 2006). We examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

III. Discussion.

Generally, a criminal defendant waives all defenses and objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Iowa 2006). One exception to this rule involves irregularities intrinsic to the plea—irregularities that bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Id.

In State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009), we clarified how the intrinsic-irregularity exception applies to postconviction relief claims of ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on the failure of counsel to perform certain pre-plea tasks that ultimately render the plea involuntary or unknowing. This clarification was a response to our opinion in Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 2000), in which we said “claims arising from ... counsel's failure to investigate or file a motion to suppress do not survive the entry of a guilty plea.” Speed, 616 N.W.2d at 159. In Carroll, we explained that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims survive the guilty plea when a postconviction relief applicant can show trial counsel breached a duty in advance of the guilty plea that rendered the plea involuntary or unintelligent. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 644. Thus, the distinction between ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that do not survive a guilty plea as illustrated in Speed and those that do survive is the existence of a showing that the pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea involuntary or unintelligent. The component of the claim involving the voluntariness of the plea is largely tied to the prejudice element of all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Id. This element means criminal defendants who seek postconviction relief after pleading guilty must establish the guilty plea would not have been entered but for the breach of duty by counsel. Id. Thus, when a postconviction relief claim following a guilty plea is properly alleged, a case-by-case analysis is necessary “to determine whether counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and whether any such breach rendered the defendant's plea unintelligent or involuntary.” Id.

A. Allegations Derived From Failure to Investigate and Failure to File a Motion to Suppress. The district court found the first two claims for postconviction relief brought by Castro did not relate to the voluntariness of the plea, but only pertained to the constitutional deficiencies of the actions or inactions of his trial counsel. As such, it concluded the claims were waived when Castro entered a plea of guilty and failed to subsequently file a motion in arrest of judgment. Thus, the district court accepted Castro's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as true for purposes of summary judgment, but found...