Castro v. State of California

• Decision Date: 24 March 1970
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 466 P.2d 244 Genoveva CASTRO et al., Plaintiffs-Petitioners, and Appellants, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 29693.

Page 20

85 Cal.Rptr. 20

2 Cal.3d 223, 466 P.2d 244

Genoveva CASTRO et al., Plaintiffs-Petitioners, and Appellants, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29693.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 24, 1970.

Don B. Kates, Jr., James D. Lorenz, Jr., Gary Bellow, Carol Ruth Silver, Diane Delevett, Chaparro, Perez & Buckley, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence Sperber, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs-petitioners and appellants.

Gerald L. Rosen, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs-petitioners and appellants.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sanford N. Gruskin, Deputy Atty. Gen., John D. Mahara, County Counsel, and Edward H. Gaylord, Asst. County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

In this case we are called upon to determine whether that portion of article II, section 1 of the California Constitution which conditions the right to vote upon an ability to read the English language is constitutional as applied to persons who, in all other respects qualified to vote, are literate in Spanish but not in English. As we explain, Infra, we have concluded that the challenged provision, as so applied, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is, therefore, a constitutionally impermissible exercise of the state's power to regulate the franchise.

Insofar as is here relevant, article II, section 1 provides '* * * no person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this State; * * *' Various sections of the California Election Code implement the constitutional exclusion. Section 100 limits eligibility to vote to those persons who qualify 'under the provisions of Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of this State and who (comply) with the provisions of this code governing the registration of electors * * *.' Section 200 requires each prospective voter to complete, in the presence of a county clerk, an affidavit of registration as a precondition to inclusion in the register of voters, and section 310 prescribes that the affidavit set forth, inter alia, 'Whether the elector is able to read the Constitution in the English language and to write his name, * * *.' (Elec.Code, § 310, subd. (h).) ¹

Plaintiffs-petitioners (petitioners) ² are adult, native born United States citizens residing in Los Angeles County. Both are fully qualified to vote except for their inability to read English and both were denied registration on this basis alone. ³ Defendant-respondent (respondent) Frank M. Jordan is the Secretary of State of respondent State of California and is charged specifically with the enforcement of its electoral laws, including article II, section 1 of the Constitution and the Election Code sections just referred to. Respondent Ben Hite is the Registrar of Voters and County Clerk of Los Angeles County and is charged with the supervision of the registration of voters in that county. ⁴ Authorized representatives of respondent Hite refused to register petitioners because of their inability to prove literacy in English and sign the required affidavit attesting to such literacy.

After having thus been denied registration, petitioners instituted the present action challenging the constitutionality of the English literacy requirement and seeking the following relief: (a) A declaration that the English literacy requirement of article II, section 1 is unconstitutional as applied to them and to other Spanish literates; (b) mandatory relief requiring respondents to register petitioners; and (c) mandatory relief requiring respondents to print a reasonable percentage of the ballots at each election in Spanish, or otherwise to facilitate their ability to vote in Spanish.

The case was tried on the basis of the pleadings, evidence contained in a stipulation of facts, and documentary evidence submitted by the petitioners. Petitioners sought to prove that they have access to Spanish language periodicals, newspapers and other communication media adequate to inform themselves about local, state and national issues and candidates. Included in the stipulation, for this purpose, were the names, estimated circulations, and brief descriptions of 17 newspapers and 11 magazines printed wholly or partially in Spanish and available to residents of Los Angeles County. Petitioners also sought to prove that the historical purpose of the English literacy requirement was to disenfranchise immigrant groups on the basis of their ancestry and national origin. To this end, petitioners introduced substantial documentary evidence setting forth debates in the State Assembly regarding the proposed constitutional amendment which added the literacy requirement to article II, section 1, contemporary newspaper editorial comment, and letters purporting to demonstrate the popular attitude toward the requirement. ⁵ Respondents introduced no evidence on either issue. They included, however, in the stipulation of facts, a list of the schools maintained by the Los Angeles Unified School District at which instruction in English as a second language is provided, without tuition, for non-English speaking adults.

The trial court gave judgment for respondents. It refused petitioners' proposed finding to the effect that residents of Los Angeles County who were literate only in Spanish would be able adequately to identify and familiarize themselves with political candidates and issues from Spanish-language news media, on the ground that the record did not contain sufficient evidence as to the contents of and coverage afforded by such media. ⁶ It likewise refused petitioners' proposed finding on the issue of discriminatory legislative and popular intent in enacting the literacy requirement. Viewing Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd. (1959) 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072, as dispositively upholding the constitutionality of literacy tests, the court concluded that a requirement of literacy in English is a rational state policy, that the challenged provision is designed to serve a legitimate state interest, that its classifications are valid and nondiscriminatory and that it is, accordingly, constitutional on its face and as applied both to petitioners and to all persons who are literate in Spanish but not in English. ⁷

We do not propose to consider in detail the substantial evidence which petitioners introduced in an effort to establish that the English literacy requirement was a direct product of the narrow and fearful nativism rampant in California politics at the end of the Nineteenth Century. ⁸ We refrain from doing so in part because inquiry into legislative intent or motive is a perplexing conceptual and epistemological problem and, for the judiciary, a 'hazardous' undertaking at best. (Flemming v. Nestor (1960) 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435; see also discussion in Developments in the Law--Equal Protection (1969) 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1091--1097.) A more practical reason for our restraint is, as petitioners concede, that the question of motive is not determinative of the present constitutionality of the literacy requirement. (See United States v. O'Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367, 382--386, 88 S.Ct. 1637, 20 L.Ed.2d 672.) We cannot accept, however, respondents' contention that because the requirement is fair on its face and not unfairly administered, evidence of a discriminatory purpose in its enactment is irrelevant.

One of the primary purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to strike down discriminatorily motivated state legislation directed against racial minorities. ⁹ (McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222.) Thus 'Irrespective of the express terms of a statute, particularly in the area of racial discrimination, courts must determine its purpose as well as its substance and effect. * * * ' (A)cts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end.' (Citation.)' (Fn. omitted.) (Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, D.C., 197 F.Supp. 649, 652, affd. per curiam (1962) 389 U.S. 515, 82 S.Ct. 529, 7 L.Ed.2d 521.) In Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828, the court mentions 'evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of (New York State's English literacy) requirement' (Fn. omitted.) (384 U.S. at p. 654, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1725), as among the grounds upon which Congress could reasonably have concluded that the requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment. ¹⁰ Just last term, in a case involving a challenge to Ohio's electoral laws, the court stated 'In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, * * *' (Williams v. Rhodes (1968) 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24. See also this court's discussion of the relevance of historical context in Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529, 534, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825, affd. (1967) 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830.) The following summary of the evidence, therefore, is intended simply to provide a brief account of the origin of the California literacy requirement. It is relevant to an understanding of our ultimate conclusion that the requirement violates petitioners' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is in no way crucial to that holding.

The English literacy requirement was introduced as a proposed constitutional amendment in the State Assembly in 1891. Its author was Assemblyman A. J. Bledsoe who, five years previously, had been a member of the vigilante Committee of Fifteen which expelled every person of Chinese ancestry from Humboldt County. ¹¹

Assemblyman Bledsoe was forthright about the purposes of his amendment. In introducing it he quoted from article V of the 1890 platform of one of...