Castro v. Superior Court

Citation88 Cal.Rptr. 500,9 Cal.App.3d 675
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date17 July 1970
PartiesSalvatore B. CASTRO et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 34178.

Oscar Acosta, Neil M. Herring, Paul M. Posner, Herman Sillas, Jr., Herbert E. Selwyn, Ralph M. Segura, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood, Head, Appellate Division, Maurice H. Oppenheim and Arnold I. Guminski, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

As a result of our decision in this writ proceeding and the passage of time, several of the petitioners who, according to the evidence presented to the grand jury, clearly committed or aided and abetted in the commission of several misdemeanors, may never be tried for those crimes. We share the view of anyone who thinks that this is a most undesirable result. We stress, however, at the outset, that with one minor exception noted herein, the authorities did not choose to charge the misdemeanors. This opinion therefore cannot and a fortiori does not deal with crimes which, at the time of their public commission, generated considerable notoriety.

Petitioners, Salvatore B. Castro, Moctezuma Esparza, Henry Gomez, Frederic Bernard Lopez, Carlos Michael Montez, Carlos Munoz, Gilberto Cruz Olmeda, Ralph Luna Ramirez, Joe Angel Razo, Eliezer Lozado Risco, David John Sanchez, J. Patricio Sanchez, Richard Vigil, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles from proceeding to try them on an indictment which originally contained sixteen counts. In various ways these were reduced to three. These are: Count VIII which charged petitioners, Frederic Bernard Lopez, Gilberto Cruz Olmeda Ralph Luna Ramirez and David John Sanchez, with a misdemeanor violation of section 415 of the Penal Code (disturbing the peace), on March 5, 1968; Count XV which charges all petitioners with a conspiracy to violate section 16701 of the Education Code, which at the time read as follows: 'Any person who wilfully disturbs any public school or any public school meeting is guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable by a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100)'; and Count XVI which charged all petitioners with conspiracy to 'disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood encompassing (four designated high schools) and persons in the proximity thereof, by loud and unusual noise and by tumultuous and offensive conduct, and in a loud and boisterous manner. * * *'

The evidence before the grand jury showed that between March 5 and March 8, 1968, there occurred certain disturbances at four high schools in Los Angeles. Essentially these took the form of a large number of Mexican-American students attempting to leave or actually leaving the school grounds and attending protest meetings. The alleged reason for these so-called 'walkouts' was a protest against conditions in the schools which were claimed to provide the students with inferior education. 1

Several petitioners actively encouraged students to leave school during schools hours. 2 Unquestionably several petitioners and quite a few students committed a numbers of misdemeanors--not limited to those petitioners are charged with having conspired to commit. 3 Many of these appear to have been spontaneous. Several, however, were inferentially planned in advance, though not necessarily by petitioners or, at least, by all petitioners. Illegal acts committed at the scene of the walkouts covered the spectrum from morally reprehensible to relatively technical violations of law. Without deciding that the matters about to be mentioned constituted violations of those portions of section 415 of the Penal Code which petitioners are accused of having conspired to violate, we briefly mention what appears to us to be the most serious transgressions, without duplicating any conduct described in the next preceding footnote:

1. On March 5, at Garfield High School threats and 'obscenities' were hurled at police officers and school officials;

2. At Roosevelt High School on March 6 several petitioners caused a chain by which a gate to the school was closed to snap open, permitting about two hundred students to leave the school premises;

3. At Belmont High School on March 7 garbage cans were tossed down the steps by students and fire alarms were broken. Fires were set in trash cans and fights broke out. Rocks and bottles were thrown. None of petitioners were shown to be directly involved.

4. The next day, again at Belmont, a few rocks were thrown by students and cherry bombs were ignited. Again no involvement by any petitioner was shown.

Apart from the charge contained in Count VIII these violations are not before us, except to the extent that their commission and the aiding and abetting of their commission by some petitioners is circumstantial evidence 4 of the felonies charged in Counts XV and XVI. The thrust of those counts is simply that petitioners, none of whom was a student at any of the schools affected, 5 planned the walkouts and took certain steps--'overt acts'--toward the accomplishment of their objective.

Petitioners attack the indictment on several fronts. They claim: 1. that the grand jury was unconstitutionally constituted; 6 2. that the evidence before the jury does not support the indictment, even if one disregards alleged constitutional frailties; 3. that, if they are mistaken on that point, it failed to show any connection between the conspiracy and five particular petitioners; 4. that the People have alleged a single conspiracy, whereas the evidence, at most, shows several separate conspiracies; 5. that the evidence conclusively shows that petitioners were merely exercising First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly and that, whatever the definition of the crimes charged may be under California law and however adequate the proof may be that they came within such definition, the state cannot constitutionally punish them; 6. that section 16701 of the Education Code is unconstitutionally vague; 7. that section 415 of the Penal Code is unconstitutionally vague; 8. that section 16701 of the Education Code is overbroad; 9. that section 415 of the Penal Code is overbroad; 10. that a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the misdemeanors involved constitutes, because of is chilling effect on free speech, a denial of due process; and 11. that a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the misdemeanors involved constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

A shifting majority of this court has reached the conclusion that for the reasons set forth in this and the two concurring opinions a writ of prohibition against the further prosecution of petitioners on Counts XV and XVI should issue.

We dispose of the misdemeanor charge contained in Count VIII by returning it to the Superior Court for certain proceedings outlined in this opinion.

CONSPIRACY TO DISTURB THE PEACE--COUNT XVI.

The views set forth in this part of the opinion represent only those of the writer. Justice Stephens concurs only in the result reached with respect to Count XVI. Justice Reppy dissents.

The People's summary of the direct evidence of a conspiracy with respect to the walkouts is as follows: 'In October, 1967 at a joint UMAS (United Mexican American Students) and MASA (Mexican American Students Association) (meeting) petitioner Castro said that the only way to impress the kids and the Board of Education was to get the kids to walk out.

'In January or February petitioner Castro had informed the UCLA Chapter of UMAS that high school students were talking about walking out. UMAS passed a motion assuming responsibility as monitors to protect the high school students. Then there were several meetings with petitioner Castro about proposals to be submitted to the Board of Education and the walkous. Petitioners Risco, Razo and Esparza and possibly Munoz attended some of these meetings. Signs were made sometime in February for use during the walkouts. * * *'

In addition there was offered, against Petitioner Castro only, a radio broadcast he made on May 14, 1968. The People's summary of the broadcast is as follows: '* * * Castro outlined the history of the walkouts and indicated that he had asked college students to assist by making signs and monitoring the walkouts. Petitioner Castro received help from California State, U.C.L.A. and Valley State. East L.A. College would not endorse the program. An unexpected walkout at Wilson prematurely triggered one at Garfield. Petitioner Castro then advised that the other two schools would have to have a walkout in order to show unity to the Board of Education. He explained that the Lincoln walkout was called for 10:00 and 12:00 was set for Roosevelt. He explained how well the walkout which led to Hazard Park was supervised by the College and high school monitors.

'Petitioner Castro indicated that the kids were angry because the first wave of walkouts had some defects. So the planning for further walkouts began. Intelligence reports about Thursday's walkouts, availability of signs and the weather were considered. It was planned that all four schools would walk out about 9:00 a.m. and the students would meet in Hazard Park. He described the plans for Garfield, Roosevelt and Lincoln High schools and analyzed what happened at Belmont.'

It is thus apparent that the People do not even claim direct proof that the walkouts, as planned, were to involve criminal disturbances of the peace. Further, it is evident that there is no direct proof that any of petitioners, except Castro, Risco, Razo, Esparza and possibly Munoz, were directly proved to have been parties to the planning of the walkouts....

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