Caswell v. People

• Jurisdiction: Colorado,United States
• Parties: Constance Eileen CASWELL, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Citation: 536 P.3d 323
• Decision Date: 03 October 2023
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 21SC749

536 P.3d 323

Constance Eileen CASWELL, Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 21SC749

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 3, 2023

Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jessica A. Pitts, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Olivia Probetts, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOURdelivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE SAMOURdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Our forefathers considered the right to trial by jury on par with the right to vote.SeeUnited States v. Haymond,––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375, 204 L.Ed.2d 897(2019).They viewed the two rights as "the heart and lungs, the mainspring and the center wheel" of our liberties, absent which "the body must die; the watch must run down; the government must become arbitrary."Id.(quoting Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym(Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 169 (R. Taylored. 1977)).Much as the right to vote sought to protect the people's power over their government's executive and legislative functions, the right to trial by jury sought to protect the people's power over their government's judicial functions.Id.

¶2 The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is a pillar of the Bill of Rights and a core ingredient of the American scheme of justice.Duncan v. Louisiana,391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491(1968);Haymond,139 S. Ct. at 2376.Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in all state criminal cases, which if tried in federal court, would come within the protective canopy of the Sixth Amendment.Duncan,391 U.S. at 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444.But is a criminal defendant in Colorado state court entitled to a jury trial on the recidivist provision of the cruelty-to-animals statute, § 18-9-202(2)(b)(I), C.R.S.(2023)("subsection (2)(b)(I)"), which transforms a conviction from a misdemeanor into a felony?Seeid.("A second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section is a class 6 felony," not a class 1 misdemeanor).The answer is no, at least not under the circumstances of this case.

¶3 Because the cruelty-to-animals statute doesn't explicitly state whether subsection (2)(b)(I) sets forth an element of the offense, which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or a sentence enhancer, which may be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence, we look to the provisions and framework of the statute to determine the legislature's intent.SeeUnited States v. O'Brien,560 U.S. 218, 225, 130 S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979(2010).More specifically, we consult (1) the language and structure of the statute, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5)the statute's legislative history.Id.Applying this multi-factor standard, we hold that our General Assembly intended to designate subsection (2)(b)(I) a sentence enhancer, not an element of the offense.

¶4We further hold that where, as here, a cruelty-to-animals (second or subsequent offense) case (1) includes notice in the charging document of the prior conviction for cruelty to animals and (2) is treated as a felony throughout the proceedings—including in terms of its prosecution in district court(not county court), the right to a preliminary hearing (if eligible), the number of peremptory challenges, and the number of jurors—the Sixth Amendment doesn't require that the misdemeanor ? felony transforming fact in subsection (2)(b)(I) be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.Lastly, we hold that, even assuming the defendant's state constitutional challenge was forfeited and not waived, no plain error occurred.¹

¶5 A division of the court of appeals correctly determined that our legislature intended to make subsection (2)(b)(I) a sentence enhancer, not an element.People v. Caswell,2021 COA 111, ¶ 10, 499 P.3d 361, 363.However, the division incorrectly concluded that it could bypass the Sixth Amendment question because it was able to discern a clear legislative intent to treat the fact of a prior conviction as a sentence enhancer.Id. at ¶ 19, 499 P.3d at 365.In doing so, the division relied on part of our discussion in Linnebur v. People,2020 CO 79M, ¶ 31, 476 P.3d 734, 741 : "[I]f we can glean a clear legislative intent in either direction, then we may leave aside the Sixth Amendment issue and simply resolve this case as a matter of statutory interpretation."Caswell,¶ 19, 499 P.3d at 365.

¶6 Today we clarify that we could set aside the Sixth Amendment issue in Linnebur because we ruled that the fact of prior convictions was an element of felony DUI that had to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby granting Linnebur the relief the Sixth Amendment required.SeeLinnebur,¶ 31, 476 P.3d at 741(noting that, "subject to constitutional limitations," whether the fact of prior convictions should be deemed an element of the offense or a sentence enhancer depends on the legislature's intent);O'Brien,560 U.S. at 224–25, 130 S.Ct. 2169(explaining that, "[s]ubject to th[e] constitutional constraint[s]" of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, whether a given fact is an element of the crime itself or a sentence enhancer is a question for the legislature).Because we conclude here that the legislature intended to make the fact of a prior conviction a sentence enhancer, and because we assume without deciding that the defendant's state constitutional challenge was not waived, we must address whether our General Assembly's approach violates the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution.As mentioned, we rule that both constitutional claims fall short.

¶7 Therefore, we affirm the division's judgment.But we do so on partially different grounds.

I.Facts and Procedural History

¶8 Pursuant to a request from Lakewood Animal Control, Deputy Joseph Colpitts, a deputy with the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office("LCSO"), conducted a welfare check on the animals at Constance Eileen Caswell's residential property in Limon, Colorado, on March 15, 2016.Thereafter, the Colorado Humane Society informed the LCSO that it had received a call from someone expressing concern about those animals.Three days after his initial visit, Deputy Colpitts returned to Caswell's property with an investigator from the Colorado Humane Society and an inspector from the Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act Program.They met with Caswell about her animals' welfare.

¶9 Approximately two weeks later, on March 31, LCSO deputies executed a search warrant at Caswell's property.They seized sixty animals: forty-six dogs, four cats, five birds, and five horses.According to the deputies, there was no food or water for the dogs; no water or fresh air for the cats; no food, drinkable water, or fresh air for the birds; and no drinkable water or sufficient food for the horses.The deputies made additional troubling observations: certain enclosed spaces where some animals were located were covered in trash and feces and smelled strongly of ammonia; some of the animals were underweight, others were dehydrated, and still others appeared to be suffering from untreated medical conditions; and there were five dead dogs that had to be exhumed.

¶10 Based on the deputies' search, the People filed a complaint charging Caswell with forty-three class 6 felony counts of cruelty to animals for acts occurring between March 15 and March 31, 2016.Cruelty to animals is generally a class 1 misdemeanor, § 18-9-202(2)(a), but pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(I) of the statute, it is a class 6 felony if the defendant has a prior conviction for that crime.Each of the counts brought against Caswell identified her prior cruelty-to-animals conviction as a fact that elevated the classification of the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and enhanced the applicable sentence.

¶11The People treated Caswell's case as a felony case from beginning to end.Thus, her case was filed and prosecuted in district court(not county court), and she was afforded all the rights available to any defendant charged with a felony, including the right to five peremptory challenges, the right to an additional peremptory challenge for every alternate juror selected, and the right to a jury of twelve.²

¶12 Before trial, defense counsel moved for bifurcation to prevent the jury from hearing about his client's prior conviction for cruelty to animals.The trial court denied the motion as moot, however, ruling that the fact of a prior conviction was a sentence enhancer, not an element of the crime, which meant that it didn't have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶13 The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts.During the sentencing hearing, Caswell conceded that she had previously been convicted of cruelty to animals.The trial court accordingly entered forty-three class 6 felony convictions.It then sentenced Caswell to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention.

¶14 Caswell appealed, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed.Caswell,¶ 1, 499 P.3d at 362.Citing our decision in Linnebur, the division rejected Caswell's contention that her convictions should be reversed because our General Assembly intended the recidivist provision in subsection (2)(b)(I) to be an element of the offense to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.Id. at ¶ 5, 499 P.3d at 363.

¶15 In Linnebur,a case that dealt with the crime of felony DUI, we explained that where a statute doesn't explicitly state whether the fact of prior convictions constitutes an element or a sentence enhancer, "we must look...