Catanise v. Town of Fayette

• Decision Date: 12 July 1989
• Citation: 148 A.D.2d 210,543 N.Y.S.2d 825
• Parties: Matter of Richard J. CATANISE, Appellant, v. TOWN OF FAYETTE, Gail Abbott, Frederick Jensen, Gladys Schultz, William Judd and Robert H. Sorenson, Individually and Collectively as the Town Board of the Town of Fayette, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 825

543 N.Y.S.2d 825

148 A.D.2d 210

Matter of Richard J. CATANISE, Appellant, v. TOWN OF FAYETTE, Gail Abbott, Frederick Jensen, Gladys

Schultz, William Judd and Robert H. Sorenson,

Individually and Collectively as the

Town Board of the Town of

Fayette, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Fourth Department.

July 12, 1989.

John A. De Francisco, Syracuse, for appellant.

Kirk & Mount by William Kirk, Waterloo, for respondents.

Before BOOMER, J.P., and PINE, BALIO, LAWTON and DAVIS, JJ.

BALIO, Justice.

Petitioner is a Town Justice of the Town of Fayette in Seneca County. He instituted this article 78 proceeding to challenge the decision of the Town Board to reduce his annual salary from $5,000 to $3,000 prior to commencement of the third year of a four-year term. His claim that a reduction in salary during his term of office amounted to an unconstitutional encroachment upon the independence of the judiciary was rejected by Special Term, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. We affirm that portion of the judgment dismissing petitioner's request for punitive damages (see, Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 437 N.E.2d 1104) and attorney fees (see, Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 503 N.E.2d 681). We conclude, however, that reduction of a town justice's annual salary during the term of office violates fundamental principles of separation of powers and that the petition should be granted to the extent of reinstating petitioner's salary.

In 1940, the Court of Appeals held that a justice of the peace ¹ was a constitutional officer whose compensation could not be increased or decreased during the term of office (Town of Putnam Valley v. Slutzky, 283 N.Y. 334, 28 N.E.2d 860, rearg denied 284 N.Y. 590, 29 N.E.2d 665; see also, Giuffreda v. Stout, 220 N.Y.S.2d 215 [Supreme Court, Suffolk County]. At that time, however, article VI, section 19 of the N.Y. Constitution provided,

"All judges, justices and surrogates shall receive for their services such compensation as is now or may hereafter be established by law, provided only that such compensation shall not be diminished during their respective terms of office...."

When this section of article VI was revised by the Legislature and adopted by the People in 1961 as section 25 of article VI, the new section provided,

"a. The compensation of a judge of the court of appeals, a justice of the supreme court, a judge of the court of claims, a judge of the county court, a judge of the surrogate's court, a judge of the family court, a judge of a court for the city of New York ..., a judge of the district court or of a retired judge or justice shall be established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which he was elected or appointed...."

Absent from the list of judges and justices is reference to judges of city courts outside the city of New York, and justices of village and town courts. The issue we are called upon to decide is whether fundamental constitutional principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary continue to forbid a diminution in salary of those judges or justices no longer expressly included within article VI, section 25, during their term of office. We hold in the affirmative.

The principal purpose of the 1961 revision of article VI of the State Constitution was to provide for a unified court system. Although city courts (outside New York City), village and town courts were included in the unified system, the revision authorized the Legislature to discontinue those courts, with the restriction that town courts could not be discontinued absent a permissive referendum (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 17[b]. Because the Legislature had the authority to discontinue those courts and because in 1959, the Legislature's apparent preference was for district courts and full-time judges (see, 1959 N.Y.Legis.Ann., at 8-9), it is understandable that judges of city courts outside New York City and village and town justices were not expressly protected by article VI, section 25. We do not read into the 1961 revision any specific intent to abolish the constitutional protections theretofore enjoyed by justices of the peace.

Our State courts applied constitutional principles of separation of powers to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary and specifically, justices of the peace, well before the adoption in 1925 of an express provision prohibiting a salary reduction during the term of office. In 1898, the Court of Appeals observed that "[n]othing is more essential to free government than the independence of its judges" and that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department should be free from interference, in the discharge of its peculiar...