Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Shook

• Decision Date: 23 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 65384,65384
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY, Self-insured Employer, Appellee, v. Leland Dale SHOOK, Appellant, and Iowa Industrial Commissioner, Defendant.

Page 503

313 N.W.2d 503

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY, Self-insured Employer, Appellee, v. Leland Dale SHOOK, Appellant and Iowa Industrial Commissioner, Defendant.

No. 65384.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 23, 1981.

Michael W. Liebbe, of Raben, Liebbe, Shinkle & Bremer, Davenport, for appellant.

Larry L. Shepler, of Betty, Neuman, McMahon, Hellstrom & Bittner, Davenport, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.

McCORMICK, Justice.

The questions here are whether defendant Leland Dale Shook was an employee of plaintiff Caterpillar Tractor Company when he was injured and, if so, whether the injuries occurred during the course of his employment. The industrial commissioner decided these questions in Shook's favor in holding he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Upon Caterpillar's petition for judicial review, the district court reversed on the basis of a negative answer to the first question. Because we believe the industrial commissioner was right, we reverse the district court.

The case was presented on stipulated facts, depositions and exhibits. The stipulation was proposed by Caterpillar. Shook's counsel agreed it could be considered as evidence by the commissioner. It was largely based, however, on deposition testimony of Shook and Gary Brummerstedt, Caterpillar's labor relations manager, as well as documentary exhibits.

Shook had been a machine operator for Caterpillar who was elected by his fellow union members to three union positions to which he devoted full time. He became chairman of the grievance committee, president of the union, and chairman of the union's bargaining unit. The collective bargaining agreement allowed Shook compensation from Caterpillar at the regular rate for his former shift hours while performing his duties as chairman of the grievance committee. He was "considered to be on leave of absence." Deductions were to be made by Caterpillar for time spent by Shook working in his other union capacities. Negotiations were among the excluded activities. Shook accounted to Caterpillar by filing "exception slips" to report time spent on excluded work.

On August 20, 1976, Shook spent the morning at the union hall doing work which the parties agree was compensable under the agreement. A bargaining session was scheduled in the plant offices for 1:30 p.m. Shook left the union hall at approximately 1:00 p.m. to travel to the plant on his motorcycle. The accident which resulted in the present claim occurred en route. He was treated at a local hospital for his injuries and released in time to participate in negotiations starting at 3:00 p.m. and ending at 4:00 p.m.

Pursuant to the agreement, Shook was paid by Caterpillar for his activities until the negotiations began. He filed an exception slip with Caterpillar showing the period he was in negotiations. He filed a claim with the union for that activity and was subsequently compensated by the union for the negotiating period.

The parties' stipulation contains an obvious mistake concerning the date of the accident. The mistake has led Caterpillar to argue that Shook was paid by the union for the period he was traveling to the negotiations. The stipulation erroneously recites that the accident occurred on August 19, 1976. It also recites, accurately, that he was reimbursed for negotiations between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on that date. Shook's claim, his petition for arbitration, his medical bill, Caterpillar's answer, the parties' discovery, and the findings of the commissioner and court all show that the accident actually occurred on August 20. Like the commissioner and district court, we will disregard the mistake in the stipulation. See Estate of Clark v. Lundy, 181 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 1970).

The union maintained a workers' compensation policy which Shook testified covered union employees "being paid by the local union to perform duties." Because Shook contended he was covered for workers' compensation purposes by Caterpillar during the period for which he was compensated by Caterpillar, he filed a claim for workers' compensation with Caterpillar. When Caterpillar denied coverage, he petitioned for arbitration. After hearing, a deputy industrial commissioner filed a proposed decision allowing his claim. Upon appeal by Caterpillar from the proposed decision, the industrial commissioner found in Shook's favor. Upon petition for further review, the district court reversed. In reversing the commissioner's decision, the district court held that the decision resulted partly from legal error and partly from findings of fact that were unsupported by substantial evidence under the whole record.

I. The employer-employee relationship. As defined in section 85.61(2), The Code, an "employee" is a "person who has entered into the employment of, or works under contract of service ... for an employer." Factors to be considered in determining whether this relationship exists are: (1) the right of selection, or to employ at will, (2) responsibility for payment of wages by the employer, (3) the right to discharge or terminate the relationship, (4) the right to control the work, and (5) identity of the employer as the authority in charge of the work or for whose benefit it is performed. The overriding issue is the intention of the parties. McClure v. Union, et al., Counties, 188 N.W.2d 283, 285 (Iowa 1971).

Four additional considerations are relevant. First, because the commissioner is charged with weighing the evidence, his findings will be broadly and liberally construed to uphold his decision. Id. at 284. Second, the primary purpose of the workers' compensation statute is to benefit the worker and the worker's dependents insofar as the statute permits. McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980). Thus the statute is to be interpreted liberally with a view toward that objective. Irish v. McCreary Saw Mill, 175 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Iowa 1970).

Third, the statute is intended to cast upon the industry in which the worker is employed a share of the burden resulting from industrial accidents. Disbrow v. Deering Implement Co., 233 Iowa 380, 392, 9 N.W.2d 378, 384 (1943). The theory is that the ultimate cost is borne "by the consumer as part of the cost of the product." 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 43.51 at 8-17 and 18 (1980). As a result, "any worker whose services form a regular and continuing part of the cost of the product, and whose method of operation is not such an independent business that it forms in itself a separate route through which his own costs of industrial accident can be channeled, is within the presumptive area of intended protection." Id. at 8-18.

Finally, an employee may have more than one employer. In that situation the worker may be an employee of one employer for the purpose of certain activities but the employee of another employer while doing other work. For example, an employee of a company which was struck who was acting as a picket captain was held to be an employee of the striking union. See Jones v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Cal.App.3d 124, 97 Cal.Rptr. 554 (1971) (nothing incongruous about an employee being on one occasion an employee of the company which is struck and on another an employee of the union).

Mindful of these considerations, we examine the relevant criteria in the light of the evidence most favorable to the commissioner's findings.

Caterpillar had no say in Shook's selection as chairman of the grievance committee. However, the company did select Shook as its employee. If it had not done so, he would not have been eligible to chair the committee. Further, Caterpillar consented to have one of its employees put in that position. Thus, although Shook was directly selected as chairman by the union members, Caterpillar did have a role in the process.

Caterpillar had responsibility for paying Shook's wages when he was not engaged in an excepted activity. He was not engaged in excepted activity when he was injured. Therefore Caterpillar was responsible for his wages at that time.

The company lacked authority to remove Shook as chairman of the grievance committee....