Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 4549

• Decision Date: 09 September 1970
• Docket Number: No. 4549,4550.,4549
• Citation: 317 F. Supp. 1304
• Parties: CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director, Department of Labor, State of Illinois, and William J. Scott, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Defendants. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

317 F. Supp. 1304

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director, Department of Labor, State of Illinois, and William J. Scott, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Defendants.

ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, Defendant.

Nos. 4549, 4550.

United States District Court, S. D. Illinois, S. D.

September 9, 1970.

Homer Keller, Seth M. Dabney, III, Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, Peoria, Ill., David W. Zugschwerdt, and Irving Miller, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., for Caterpillar Tractor Co.

Donald W. Morrison, Chicago, Ill., Hugh J. Graham, Jr., Springfield, Ill., for Illinois Bell Telephone Co.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. of Illinois, Springfield, Ill., Robert Dodd, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

POOS, Chief Judge.

These causes which are substantially identical in form and content having come on together to be heard (a) on defendants' motions to strike certain allegations from the complaints and defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints for alleged want of a justiciable controversy and because such causes allegedly constituted suits against the State of Illinois and (b) upon motions by each of the plaintiffs for summary judgment, on August 20, 1970, before the above court, the Honorable Omer Poos presiding; and defendants having moved in open court to withdraw each of the aforesaid motions to strike and to dismiss, which motions to withdraw were and are allowed by the court and said motions to strike and to dismiss were and are thereby withdrawn; and the court having considered all documents filed with respect to said motions for summary judgment, including (a) the complaints of Caterpillar Tractor Co., ("Caterpillar") and Illinois Bell Telephone Company ("Illinois Bell"), (b) the affidavits of Clifford N. Hathway, Clyde C. Boylls, and Bruce C. Hoeffel, and (c) the briefs of Caterpillar, Illinois Bell, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the Commission") as amicus curiae and the defendants; and the defendants in each case not having filed any affidavits in opposition to said motions for summary judgment or otherwise denied or controverted the facts alleged in the complaints and the affidavits supporting said motions for summary judgment; and the court having heard and considered the arguments of counsel for each plaintiff, the Commission and the defendants, and being fully advised in the premises now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiffs, Caterpillar and Illinois Bell, are each "employers" within the meaning of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e through 2000e-15) and are subject to the provisions of said statute.

2. Plaintiffs, Caterpillar and Illinois Bell, are each subject to the provisions of the Illinois Female Employment Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 48, Sections 5 through 8.1.)

3. Caterpillar is a California corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of construction and earthmoving machinery and other products. It operates several factories within the State of Illinois and maintains its headquarters offices in this state. Caterpillar employs approximately 43,374 persons within the State of Illinois, of whom approximately 3,558 are females who fall within the limitation on hours of work specified in the Illinois Female Employment Act.

4. Illinois Bell is an Illinois corporation supplying communication services to users in the State of Illinois and part of Indiana. As of December 31, 1969, Illinois Bell had approximately 41,000 employees, of whom approximately 17,000 were women employed in Illinois and subject to the hours of work restrictions of the Illinois Female Employment Act. Illinois Bell's annual payroll for 1969 was approximately $350 million, of which over $11 million was attributable to pay for overtime work.

5. The amount in controversy in each case exceeds $10,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.

6. The operations of each plaintiff frequently require that their respective employees in Illinois work for daily and weekly periods in excess of the hours for which female employees of each plaintiff may be employed under the Illinois Female Employment Act. In addition certain jobs in each plaintiff's operations normally require that the holders work for overtime hours longer than permitted for females under the Illinois Female Employment Act.

7. Under the Illinois Female Employment Act, the vast majority of female employees of each plaintiff may not work more than eight hours per day or forty-eight hours per week. The only generally applicable exception permits such employees to work nine hours on one day of a calendar week. Neither this exception nor the other exceptions permitted by the Illinois Female Employment Act are adequate to meet the employment requirements of either plaintiff.

8. Both plaintiffs have attempted to comply with the provisions of the Illinois Female Employment Act. As a result each plaintiff has, by virtue of the Illinois Female Employment Act, been prevented from assigning to female employees the same number of overtime hours of work which would be assigned to such employees were they members of the male sex and each has been prevented from promoting or assigning female employees to jobs which normally require work for hours in excess of those permitted by the Illinois Female Employment Act, although it is each plaintiff's practice of employment regularly to assign male employees to such jobs.

9. Overtime hours (i. e. work in excess of 8 hours each day and 40 hours each week) are compensated for at premium rates of pay.

10. Violations of the Illinois Female Employment Act are misdemeanors punishable for each offense by fines of not less than $25.00 nor more than $100.00.

11. Under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful employment practice for each of the plaintiffs "to discriminate against any individual employee with respect to this compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's * * * sex * * *." or "to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any which which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect this status as an employee because of such individual's * * * sex * * *.".

12. Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes employees of each plaintiff, aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice, to file charges with the Commission and to bring civil actions against their employers in the United States District Courts. In such actions the District Courts are authorized to grant injunctive relief against the continuation of such practices and to award back pay and attorneys' fees to the aggrieved employees.

13. Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to bring civil actions seeking injunctive relief against employers, such as the plaintiffs, whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that the employers are engaged in a pattern of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by said Act.

14. As a result of each plaintiff's policy of complying with the Illinois Female Employment Act, female employees of each plaintiff have been prevented from earning additional compensation for identical types of work performed by male employees. Female employees have complained to each of the plaintiffs that they are not receiving their share of overtime hours and are not receiving assignments or promotions to jobs normally requiring the performance of work for overtime hours in excess of those...