Cates v. Cates

• Decision Date: 26 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 73630,73630
• Citation: 189 Ill.Dec. 14,156 Ill.2d 76,619 N.E.2d 715
• Parties: , 189 Ill.Dec. 14 Heather CATES, a Minor, et al., Appellees, v. Timothy CATES et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 715

619 N.E.2d 715

156 Ill.2d 76, 189 Ill.Dec. 14

Heather CATES, a Minor, et al., Appellees, v. Timothy CATES et al., Appellants.

No. 73630.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Aug. 26, 1993.

Theodore J. MacDonald, Jr. and J. Todd Hayes, Burroughs, Hepler, Broom, MacDonald

[189 Ill.Dec. 15] & Hebrank, Edwardsville, for appellants

Rhonda Fiss, Neubauer & Fiss, Fairview Heights, for appellees.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On June 9, 1985, Heather Cates, aged 4 years, was a passenger in an automobile driven by her father, Timothy Cates. At the time, Cates was transporting his girlfriend, her minor son and Heather to his home for the evening. As Cates' auto approached an intersection of two State highways, it collided with an automobile driven by Phillip Darwin. Heather was seriously injured as a result of the accident. At the time of the incident, Cates was exercising his visitation privileges as a noncustodial parent.

Heather, as plaintiff, by her mother and next friend, Nancy Cates Schmittling, filed a negligence action in the circuit court of St. Clair County against Phillip Darwin's estate and Keeley and Sons, Inc., a construction company engaged in repairing the highway area around the collision site at the time of the accident. Heather subsequently amended her complaint, naming Cates as an additional defendant and alleging that Schmittling had assigned to Heather her rights against Cates for medical expenses and other costs expended in Heather's behalf. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Schmittling's insurer, intervened as a subrogor against all defendants to recover uninsured motorist's benefits paid to Schmittling under her policy.

Cates filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the parent-child immunity doctrine precluded Heather's negligence action as well as the subrogation action. The trial court granted Cates' motion for summary judgment with respect to both actions, stating that "[i]t is difficult * * * to determine that the purpose of the parental immunity doctrine would be served by applying it to the facts of this case," but that it was obliged to follow precedent.

Plaintiff appealed from that portion of the order granting summary judgment in defendant's favor on the basis of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. The appellate court concluded that this court had not adopted the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, but the doctrine had been recognized by the appellate court in Foley v. Foley (1895), 61 Ill.App. 577. After examining the doctrine's history, rationale and treatment, the appellate court concluded that the doctrine should be abolished. However, the appellate court declined to fashion a rule abolishing the doctrine as concerning the general area of negligence and decided to partially abrogate in cases of automobile negligence. In doing so, the court stated that it was mindful of a number of factors, including that automobile insurance is mandatory in Illinois. (225 Ill.App.3d 509, 517, 167 Ill.Dec. 689, 588 N.E.2d 330.) The appellate court thus reversed and remanded. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). We now affirm the appellate court.

ISSUES

We must determine whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant. The parties raise two issues: whether this court has adopted the parent-child tort immunity doctrine; and whether that doctrine bars plaintiff's action which alleged the negligent operation of an automobile.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

No genuine issue of material fact exists; therefore, our sole function is to determine whether judgment for defendant was correct as a matter of law. See Scottish & York International Insurance Group/Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Comet Casualty Co. (1990), 207 Ill.App.3d 881, 152 Ill.Dec. 790, 566 N.E.2d 477; Northbrook National Insurance Co. v. Nehoc Advertising Service, Inc. (1989), 196 Ill.App.3d 448, 143 Ill.Dec. 316, 554 N.E.2d 251; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204.

DISCUSSION

Defendant's appeal is premised on the belief that the trial court adhered to precedent and correctly determined that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars plaintiff's negligence action. Defendant argues that the appellate court ignored binding authority (Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill.2d 267, 126 Ill.Dec. 60, 531 N.E.2d 355; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47, 15 Ill.Dec. 639, 373 N.E.2d 1323; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill.2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525) which recognizes application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence. According to defendant, the appellate court failed to realize the distinction between obiter dictum and judicial dictum when it considered these several decisions and wrongly assumed that this court had not recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence. Defendant thus maintains that the appellate decision abrogating the doctrine in automobile negligence cases violates the rule of stare decisis and should be reversed.

Plaintiff counters that the appellate court could partially abrogate the doctrine in automobile negligence cases because the question of whether parent-child tort immunity bars parent-child negligence actions has never been decided by this court. Plaintiff acknowledges that this court has discussed the doctrine in the cases cited by defendant, but disputes those discussions' precedential effect. According to plaintiff, this court has only tangentially discussed application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence in determining other issues.

To evaluate the precedential effect of this court's pronouncements concerning the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, we must preliminarily examine general rules governing judicial statements.

The term "dictum " is generally used as an abbreviation of obiter dictum, which means a remark or opinion uttered by the way. Such an expression or opinion as a general rule is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule. (Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill.App.3d 447, 456, 95 Ill.Dec. 759, 490 N.E.2d 232; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 142 (1990).) On the other hand, an expression of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by the court, though not essential to the disposition of the cause, if dictum, is a judicial dictum. (See Scovill Manufacturing Co. v. Cassidy (1916), 275 Ill. 462, 470, 114 N.E. 181; Rhoads v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. (1907), 227 Ill. 328, 337, 81 N.E. 371; Law v. Grommes (1895), 158 Ill. 492, 494, 41 N.E. 1080; see also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 142 (1990) (such dictum should be considered a judicial dictum as distinguished from a mere obiter dictum ).) And further, a judicial dictum is entitled to much weight, and should be followed unless found to be erroneous. (21 C.J.S. Courts § 142 (1990); see Law, 158 Ill. 492, 41 N.E. 1080; Rhoads, 227 Ill. 328, 81 N.E. 371 (where expression of opinion considered to be judicial dictum held to have force of judicial determination).) Even obiter dictum of a court of last resort can be tantamount to a decision and therefore binding in the absence of a contrary decision of that court. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 142 (1990).

Additionally, the rule of stare decisis cannot be extended to implications from what was decided in a former case. However, that effect must be given to the implications contained in the decision of a higher court and that the premises implicit in a holding are as authoritative as the holding itself. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 139(b) (1990).

The appellate court in the instant case relied on Nix v. Smith (1965), 32 Ill.2d 465, 470, 207 N.E.2d 460, which states that a "judicial opinion is a response to the issues before the court, and these opinions, like others, must be read in the light of the issues that were before the court for determination." (Cf. People v. Palmer (1984), 104 Ill.2d 340, 84 Ill.Dec. 658, 472 N.E.2d 795 (precedential scope of decision limited to facts before court).) The Nix court accordingly distinguished the authority cited by the plaintiff because the issues before the court in those decisions did not relate to the issue before the Nix court.

We believe that the rule and its application in Nix are not necessarily at odds with the previously mentioned rules concerning judicial dicta. Our preliminary inquiry remains the same in either case. To what extent was the issue of parent-child tort immunity previously before this court so that dictum on that point would be considered judicial dictum and thus have the force of a judicial determination? Accordingly, we must examine the authority cited by defendant within the context in which it arose.

The parent-child tort immunity doctrine first appeared in American case law in Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, which held that parents are immune from tort actions brought by their unemancipated minor children. Our appellate court quickly adopted the doctrine in Foley v. Foley (1895), 61 Ill.App. 577, 580. According to defendant, this court first recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine 61 years later in Nudd, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525. Plaintiff argues that Nudd did not hold that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine barred negligence actions because the court did not decide that issue.

Nudd involved a tort action by a child against his father, which alleged the willful and wanton operation of an automobile. The Nudd court granted leave to appeal to "re-examin[e]" the "rule of parental immunity" as announced in Meece v. Holland Furnace Co. (1933), 269 Ill.App. 164 (parent-child tort immunity doctrine prevented child's action against father's employer, brought under a theory of...