Cates v. Farrington

• Decision Date: 18 December 1980
• Citation: Cates v. Farrington, 423 A.2d 539 (Me. 1980)
• Parties: David CATES et al., Co-executors of the Estate of Mae Cates Smith v. Terrence M. FARRINGTON et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 539

423 A.2d 539

David CATES et al., Co-executors of the Estate of Mae Cates Smith v.Terrence M. FARRINGTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 13, 1980.

Decided Dec. 18, 1980.

Daviau, Jabar & Batten, Joseph M. Jabar(orally), Waterville, for plaintiffs.

Lipman, Parks, Livingston, Lipman & Katz, P. A., John M. Parks(orally), Bruce R. Livingston, Augusta, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, GODFREY, GLASSMAN, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ.

GODFREY, Justice.

In an action on a promissory note, the District Court, Division of Northern Kennebec, rendered judgment for defendants.The plaintiff, Mae Cates Smith, moved to vacate the judgment and for a new trial.From a denial of her motions by the District Court, Mrs. Smith appealed to the Superior Court, Kennebec County, which affirmed the District Court's judgment and the denial of plaintiff's motions.The plaintiff then appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court.Pending appeal to this Court, the plaintiff died and her executors were substituted as partiesappellant.

On January 17, 1977, Mrs. Smith began an action against four members of the Donald Farrington family, claiming that the Farringtons owed her $3,250.97 on a promissory note executed in 1973.In a joint answer Terrence and Noreen Farrington raised the affirmative defense of an impending discharge in bankruptcy.Also in a joint answer, Donald and Christine Farrington asserted, among other things, the affirmative defense of release.After Terrence and Noreen Farrington were granted a discharge in bankruptcy, the action proceeded against only Donald and Christine Farrington.

Donald and Christine Farrington had executed an earlier promissory note to Mrs. Smith in 1971.After Mrs. Smith had brought suit on the earlier note, Donald and Christine Farrington had entered into a settlement with Mrs. Smith which included a signed release dated 1976.The 1976 release was on a standard stationer's form.Though it recited that it was "Specifically in discharge of a note dated February 18, 1971," it also contained language of general release and was denominated a "Release of all Demands."Mrs. Smith reserved no other causes of action against the Farringtons in the release.

The suit on the second promissory note came to trial on April 27, 1978, in District Court.None of the parties requested that the proceedings be electronically recorded; hence, there is no formal record of what transpired at trial.On April 30, 1979, the District Court judge rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.Neither party thereafter requested specific findings of fact or conclusions of law as permitted by D.C.Civ.R. 52(a).

Six days after the judgment was entered in the docket Mrs. Smith brought a "motion to vacate" under M.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and a motion for a new trial pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(a) on the ground that the Farringtons' attorney had introduced into evidence the 1976 release allegedly with knowledge that it was not intended to effect the second promissory note.According to the supporting affidavit of Mrs. Smith's lawyer, the release had been admitted into evidence over Mrs. Smith's objection after she had testified that the release did not apply to the second note.

On May 16, 1979, the District Court judge denied Mrs. Smith's motions without a hearing.The judge's order on the "motion to vacate" stated merely, "The Motion to Vacate not setting forth facts requiring a hearing, said Motion is hereby denied."Even more brief was the order on the motion for a new trial: "Motion is hereby denied."At no time before issuing his orders did the judge inform the parties that he would not allow an oral hearing on the motions.

Two days after the District Court denied her motions Mrs. Smith appealed to the Superior Court both the orders denying her motions and the judgment in the underlying action.After a full hearing, the Superior Court judge affirmed the judgment and both orders.Because no electronic recording of the District Court proceeding had been requested and the parties had not adopted an agreed statement of the case, the Superior Court found it impossible to review the District Court's judgment on the merits.Since Mrs. Smith's motions raised issues concerning the merits of the case-whether the judge had relied erroneously on an irrelevant release which had wrongfully introduced in evidence-the Superior Court was unable to review substantively the District Court's denial of those motions.The Superior Court also found that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial judge to have denied Mrs. Smith's motions without a hearing, inasmuch as the same issues raised in the motions were before the District Court at trial and an additional hearing would have been superfluous.

Mrs. Smith appealed to this Courtthe Superior Court's denial of her intermediate appeal.We affirm the Superior Court's judgment and concur in the judge's reasoning.

I.

In the appellants' view, the Superior Court did not need to consider the merits of the underlying action in deciding whether the District Court erred substantively in denying Mrs. Smith's motions.Her allegations of attorney misconduct were asserted to be collateral to the merits of the action.If those...