Cates v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 29874.,29874.
• Parties: Frank W. CATES, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

451 F.2d 411 (1971)

Frank W. CATES, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.

No. 29874.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

September 20, 1971.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Morton Hollander, Patricia S. Baptiste, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellants.

John H. Lewis, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Fowler, White, Collins, Gillen, Humkey & Trenam, Miami, Fla., for other interested parties.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS^* and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

In an appeal which for the most part ignores the distinctive role of this Court as though the balmy pre-McAllister¹ days of reconsideration of admiralty cases de novo were still the birthright of proctors who have also lost their title (see O/Y Finlayson-Forssa A/B v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 5 Cir., 1958, 259 F. 2d 11, 13, 1958 A.M.C. 2070, 2071; Higgins, Inc. v. Hale, 5 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 91, 92, 1958 A.M.C. 646, 647), this case does have two things of special interest.

The first is that what is admittedly a little case arose from a big crisis. Although then unknown to countless embassies, foreign ministers and highly placed world leaders, Frank Cates' fall into a misused Navy whaleboat grew out of the world's tensions when a mid-air collision involving an American Air Force bomber dropped an awesome H-bomb into the waters off the coast of Palamores, Spain, in January 1966. Task Force 65 was formed by the United States Navy to retrieve the bomb and relieve the world. Cates' role was that of a member of the deep-diving submarine, ALUMINAUT, owned and operated by his employer Reynolds.² For towage of ALUMINAUT and transfer of her crew to another government vessel used to quarter and victual them, the USS NIMBLE was assigned. Though no one suggests it by way of attack or defense, one could suppose that the critical nature of this international mission electrified the air.

Second, and more juridically important, the Trial Judge, who can truly be called learned for his prescience, sounded this high note: "A distinguished feature of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is its ability to change when confronted with an unjust result dictated by existing law. In this case there was an occurrence which I find would work such an injustice and I accordingly hold contrary to the existing weight of authority." Whether the course was as bold and precarious as thought, or whether existing principles surrounding those who go down to sea in ships—way down—would have just as readily rejected the Government's harsh plea is not now important. What is important is that the Judge proved his seeworthiness³ by anticipating the "release from the release" at the hands of the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.⁴

In more austere language, this was the case. Frank W. Cates brought suit against the United States and Reynolds claiming damages for injuries suffered while debarking from the USS NIMBLE into a whaleboat alongside for transportation back to the quartering vessel. On the eve of trial, Cates settled his claim with Reynolds and executed a release in their behalf and their vessels'. Upon hearing the case, the District Court entered judgment against the United States in the amount of $8,000 less amounts paid to Cates by Reynolds in consideration of the release, 308 F.Supp. 199. We affirm.

Only two questions are really presented by this appeal: (i) Does a seaman's release which does not specifically reserve rights against another joint tortfeasor operate to release the unmentioned joint tortfeasor as a matter of law? (ii) Was Cates entitled to a warranty of seaworthiness?

I. The Red Letter Release

On the date originally set for trial, all parties appeared and it was announced that Plaintiff had reached a settlement agreement with Reynolds. Plaintiff announced ready to proceed against the Government, but the Government sought and obtained a continuance.⁵ Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff executed a formal written release of Reynolds, which was in everything but color a red letter release which virtually indentured Cates' future to the parties named.⁶ When the case came up for trial a month later, the Government argued for the first time that failure to reserve rights against it expressly in the release operated to absolve the United States from liability.

The Government relies on the general common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor operates to release all tortfeasors unless the written instrument contains an express reservation of rights against others. See, e. g., Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y.1968); Restatement of Torts § 885(1); Prosser, Torts, (3d Ed), pages 268-272.

This argument, even if it validly states the general common law rule—and that if is a very big one⁷—overlooks two things. The first is the role of the Court in admiralty. Over a century ago this high calling was vividly described by Justice Story. "A court of admiralty is, as to all matters falling within its jurisdiction, a court of equity. Its hands are not tied up by the rigid and technical rules of the common law, but it administers justice upon the large and liberal principles of courts which exercise a general equity jurisdiction." The David Pratt F.Case No. 3597 (D.C. Maine 1839). And as we have more recently expressed it, "The Chancellor is no longer fixed to the woolsack. He may stride the quarter-deck of maritime jurisprudence and, in the role of admiralty judge, dispense, as would his landlocked brother, that which equity and good conscience impels."⁸

Second, a release of a seaman—long called the "ward of the Admiralty"⁹ —is precarious, at best, and the burden is on the party setting up the seaman's release to show that it was given by the seaman with an informed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences of his release.¹⁰

If courts of admiralty can refuse to enforce an unjust release in favor of the party purportedly discharged (see, e. g., Bonici v. Standard Oil Company, 2 Cir., 1939, 103 F.2d 437), it follows that the Admiralty has like equitable latitude in declining to enforce, not the release itself, but the antiquated, unreasoned, technical rule in favor of one not even mentioned as a party.

But apart from the two factors of (i) equitable powers of the Admiralty and (ii) the vulnerability of a seaman's release, we are freed at last of this anachronistic and rigid rule of the common law—certainly in cases relating to injuries to seamen, amphibious ambiguous seamen included—by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hazeltine (see note 4, supra).

There the Court, after delineating the three rules which have emerged in cases of this kind,¹¹ declared that it could find no basis in Federal jurisprudence for the "ancient common law" and strictest rule, rejected the second and less severe rule (the one urged by the Government in this case) as "a trap for unwary plaintiffs' attorneys," and adopted the third and modern, sensible rule that the consequence of the release is to be determined by the intentions of the parties.¹²

While it is true that the Court was speaking immediately of statutory claims (patent and antitrust) everything said points to a like approach in Federal question claims whose policies and traditions are as readily identifiable. For maritime affairs and particularly the rights of seamen of all hues, the rights and obligations have emerged from decades of adjudication largely by Federal courts and nearly always under the compulsion of a binding maritime law. Cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 1959, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, 1959 A.M.C. 597.

Case law and a complex of Federal legislation concerning employment, and working and safety conditions reflect a commitment to the policy that allowance of money damages to those harmed by violations of these standards serves the dual purpose of (i) ameliorating the harm and (ii) encouraging others (by deterrence) to take effective preventive steps. For such cases, the Hazeltine approach is most consistent with the aims and purposes of the damages remedy. Likewise, an omnipresent characteristic of modern maritime litigation is its multiparty nature.¹³ Settlements with some, but not all, are frequently made— and should be even more encouraged. And for this Court to "adopt the ancient common-law rule would frustrate such partial settlements, and thereby promote litigation." 401 U.S. at 347, 91 S.Ct. at 810.

The District Judge was right when he rebelled at the sovereign invoking this ancient absurdity. Only in different words did he vary from the Supreme Court's recent declaration that the "straight-forward rule is that a party releases only those other parties whom he intends to release." 401 U.S. at 347, 91 S.Ct. at 810.

As a "forward looking court," see Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 5 Cir., 1970, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (Wisdom, J., dissenting), we must be straightforward, so for us, too, this is the "rule to which we adhere." 401 U.S. at 347, 91 S.Ct. at 810.

In the present case, the Judge had ample basis for concluding that Cates never intended to release the United States. The day after the settlement with Reynolds was reached, Cates announced in open court that he was ready to proceed against the United States. This action is inconsistent with the notion that Cates intended to release the Government. This the Government fully understood for it moved for a continuance rather than dismissal at that time. Indeed, the Government does not, nor could it, seriously contend that Cates intended to release it. What and all it asks for is that we hold Cates to consequences which the law in less enlightened days imposed. The Trial Judge was warranted in determining that the Government, asserting the release,...