Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Dubuque v. Zalesky, No. 2--56720

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: RAWLINGS; MOORE; UHLENHOPP; REYNOLDSON; UHLENHOPP
• Citation: 232 N.W.2d 539
• Parties: CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF the ARCHDIOCESE OF DUBUQUE, Iowa, Appellant, v. Joseph ZALESKY, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 2--56720
• Decision Date: 29 August 1975

Page 539

232 N.W.2d 539 CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF the ARCHDIOCESE OF DUBUQUE, Iowa, Appellant,
v.
Joseph ZALESKY, Appellee. No. 2--56720. Supreme Court of Iowa. Aug. 29, 1975.

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Alfred E. Hughes, Dubuque, for appellant.

James L. Chipokas, of Chipokas, Koehler, Platt & Merrifield, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

En banc.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

Plaintiff, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Dubuque, Iowa, appeals from trial court's declaratory judgment holding The Code 1971, Sections 238.26--238.28 and 600.3 relating to adoptions and child placements for such purpose are unconstitutional. We reverse.

June 16, 1971, Baby Boy Cox was born out of wedlock to Karen Ann Cox. Defendant, Joseph Zalesky, is the natural father of this child. These parents were never married.

June 21 Miss Cox executed a release of parental rights (permanent care and custody) to plaintiff, a licensed child-placement agency. Thereafter plaintiff commenced adoption proceedings. July 11, 1972, the adoption was finalized. It is conceded defendant's consent to a termination of his parental rights or the subsequent adoption was not obtained, nor was he afforded notice and opportunity to be heard in either of these related matters prior to finalization of said proceedings.

November 13 plaintiff commenced the instantly involved declaratory judgment action seeking an adjudication as to validity of the aforesaid adoption. December 20 defendant filed answer thereby attacking Code §§ 238.26--238.28 (child placement statutes) and § 600.3 (adoption statute) as violative of equal protection and due process.

In relevant part chapter 238, particularly §§ 238.26--238.28 prescribe the manner in which a voluntary termination of parental rights may be effectuated and custody of a minor transferred to a child-placement agency.

Section 238.26 says: 'No person may * * * transfer to another his rights, or duties with respect to the permanent care or custody of a child * * * unless * * * the parent or parents sign a written release * * * of the * * * custody of the child to (a child-placement) agency * * *.'

Section 238.27 declares: 'Neither parent may sign such release without the written consent of the other unless * * * the parents are not married to each other.'

Section 238.28 states: 'If the parents are not married to each other, the parent having the care and providing for the wants of the child may sign the release.'

Chapter 600 prescribes procedures relative to direct adoption of a child or through a child-placement agency.

In relevant part § 600.3 says:

'The consent of both parents shall be given to * * * (an) adoption unless * * * the parent or parents have signed a release of the child in accordance with the statute on child placing. * * * If the child has been given by written release to a licensed child welfare agency in accordance with the statutute on child placing, the consent of the agency to whom the release was made shall be necessary.'

July 30, 1973, trial court held §§ 238.26--238.28 and 600.3, quoted above, violate equal protection and due process, as alleged by defendant, because they permit termination of parental rights of a putative father without first requiring his consent or affording him notice and opportunity to be heard. In brief, trial court's holding was premised on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S.Ct. 1488, 31 L.Ed.2d 786 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S.Ct. 1488, 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972).

In support of a reversal plaintiff contends trial court erred in holding the above cited statutory enactments are unconstitutional.

I. Since the filing of this appeal both parties hereto have conceded defendant has formally consented to the aforesaid adoption of Baby Boy Cox. By reason thereof the case now before us is moot. See Board of Directors Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1264--1265, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).

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II. Despite the above holding we have said that where, as here, 'the issue presented is of substantial public interest there exists a permissible exception to the general rule that a case which has become moot or presents only an academic question will be dismissed on appeal.' Board of Directors Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa at 1264, 147 N.W.2d at 856.

In this vein it is evident trial court's decree places a cloud upon Code chs. 238 and 600 and will, in effect, jeopardize all adoption proceedings whether previously completed, now in process or which may be hereafter instituted. Therefore, an adjudication as to constitutionality of the statutes above cited is deemed to be a matter of public concern, desirable for guidance of our trial courts or other public officers and bodies and all concerned citizens, and necessary because of a likelihood the same problem instantly presented may recur.

Under these circumstances we conclude the issues at hand should be now entertained by this court, albeit in the abstract.

III. At the outset these guiding standards set forth in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687, 689--690 (Iowa 1974) come into play:

'Ordinarily, statutes, with notable exceptions not here involved, regularly enacted by the legislature will be accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality and all reasonable intendments must be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislation attacked. One who challenges legislation on constitutional grounds has the burden to negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute may be sustained. Where the constitutionality of a statute is merely doubtful or fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere. Thus a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and without doubt, infringes the constitution. Hearth Corporation v. C--B--R Development Co., Inc., Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 632, 636, 637; State v. Vick, Iowa, 205 N.W.2d 727, 729, and the many authorities cited in these opinions. The legislature is given wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classification of persons or things. If a classification is reasonable and operates equally upon all within the class, it is a valid classification. Brown Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton, Iowa, 192 N.W.2d 773, 776 and citations.

'The judicial branch of the government has no power to determine whether legislative Acts are wise or unwise, nor has it the power to declare an Act void unless it is plainly and without doubt repugnant to some provision of the Constitution. Graham v. Worthington, supra, 259 Iowa 845, 850, 851, 146 N.W.2d 626, 631.'

IV. As an additional preface to our consideration of the constitutional issues here presented an evaluation of Stanley, supra, is deemed appropriate.

There a man and woman, though not married, had lived together intermittently for eighteen years. Three children were born to them. When the mother died two of the children were adjudged to be dependents of the state. The known father was accorded no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to termination of his parental rights.

The involved Illinois law allowed all statutorily defined 'parents' to be heard on the matter of fitness prior to termination of custodial rights. But the father of an illegitimate child was not included within the definition of 'parent'.

Stanley appealed the parent-child termination judgment to the Illinois Supreme Court. See In re Stanley, 45 Ill.2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970). He there argued the exclusion of unwed fathers from the statutory definition of parent violated equal protection. This argument was rejected by the Illinois high tribunal. Thereupon the United States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, reversed and held a proceeding which culminated in termination of an unwed father's cutody of his child without notice and opportunity to be heard violated

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equal protection and due process. This holding was reached by first considering the Illinois statutes under due process, then employing such analysis as a basis for finding denial of equal protection.

As to due process the Court, upon recognizing a putative father's interest in his illegitimate child, balanced the private and public interests against one another. In so doing the Court observed that when the state separates a putative father from his child without a hearing such parent is deprived of a legally protected right without furthering the public interest in any substantial way. It was consequently held, absent noticed hearing, the statutory method by which Illinois had chosen to implement its state interest unreasonably interfered with the putative father's rights.

And, having determined such a parent's rights could not be thus cursorily terminated, the court reasoned that since all married Illinois parents were statutorily entitled to a fitness hearing prior to being separated from their children, it was a denial of equal protection to deny the same right to a putative father.

Two state court decisions involving issues raised in Stanley, were remanded for consideration in light of that opinion and thereupon vacated. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 47 Wis.2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub. nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S.Ct. 1488, 31 L.Ed.2d 786 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 126 Ill.App.2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S.Ct. 1488, 31 L.Ed.2d 786 (1972). See also Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Court for City of Los Angeles, 41 Cal.App.3d 273, 115 Cal.Rptr. 849 (1974); People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); Doe v. Department of Social Services, 71 Misc.2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1972). See generally In re Adoption of Anonymous, 78 Misc.2d 1037, 359 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1974); In re M., 132 Vt. 410, 321 A.2d 19 (1974); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis.2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).

V. Mindful of the...