Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of Colo.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA1010 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES COLORADO, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado and Katie Muhs, Respondents. |
Hall, Render, Killian, Health & Lyman, P.C., Mark L. Sabey, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
No Appearance for Respondent Katie Muhs
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
¶ 1 Suffering from a fentanyl addiction, claimant, Katie Muhs, stole and self-injected fentanyl while working as a registered nurse for Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado.1 Once discovered, Catholic Health terminated Ms. Muhs's employment. Ms. Muhs later sought and was awarded unemployment compensation benefits based on a finding that her addiction rendered her fentanyl theft and use nonvolitional, and thus she was not at fault for her unemployment.
¶ 2 Catholic Health challenged the benefit award, arguing Ms. Muhs was not entitled to benefits because — even if her addiction rendered her not at fault for her unemployment — she undisputedly did not comply with section 8-73-108(4)(b)(IV), C.R.S. 2020, of the Colorado Employment Security Act (Act), which explains how an employee terminated because of a no-fault addiction may qualify for a full benefit award.
¶ 3 Unpersuaded, the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed Ms. Muhs's benefit award. It agreed that she had not complied with subsection (4)(b)(IV) and was not entitled to unemployment benefits under that subsection. But it concluded that because Ms. Muhs's "use of fentanyl, and the urge to steal it, was outside of her control," she was entitled to benefits under the Act's broad no-fault policy. See § 8-73-108(1)(a).
¶ 4 Catholic Health now challenges the Panel's order and again argues that, even if Ms. Muhs's use and theft of fentanyl were outside her control, she still needed to comply with subsection (4)(b)(IV) to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. Since she did not, Catholic Health insists that the Panel got it wrong and that Ms. Muhs does not qualify for unemployment benefits.
¶ 5 We agree with Catholic Health and conclude that subsection (4)(b)(IV) plainly says how an employee who loses employment because of a nonvolitional drug or alcohol addiction
may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits. Because it's undisputed that Ms. Muhs didn't comply with that subsection, we have no choice but to set aside the Panel's order upholding her award of unemployment benefits.
¶ 6 For several months in 2019, while working as a registered nurse for a Catholic Health hospital, Ms. Muhs stole and self-injected fentanyl
. After a supervisor reported a missing bag of fentanyl from a patient room where Ms. Muhs had been present, Catholic Health questioned Ms. Muhs about the missing fentanyl and asked her to undergo urinalysis testing. The test came back positive for fentanyl. Ms. Muhs then admitted she had been diverting and using fentanyl while working. Catholic Health terminated her employment for multiple violations of company policy, including theft of company property, diverting fentanyl, and reporting to work under the influence.
¶ 7 About a month later, Ms. Muhs submitted a claim for unemployment compensation benefits, stating that she was fired for substance abuse, that she was addicted to fentanyl
, and that she had started treatment for acute stress disorder and substance use disorder. A deputy for the Department of Labor and Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) awarded Ms. Muhs unemployment compensation benefits under subsection (4)(b)(IV).
¶ 8 Catholic Health appealed the deputy's determination. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Muhs testified that she began using fentanyl
during work hours to self-medicate her migraine pain. She explained that she had become addicted to fentanyl and had tried to stop using it but could not. She also explained how she took fentanyl-filled syringes and then, after self-injecting the fentanyl, replaced the missing fentanyl with saline solution.
¶ 9 Although Ms. Muhs testified she had undergone treatment, she did not provide the hearing officer with written substantiation "within four weeks" after admitting her addiction to the Division, as required by subsection (4)(b)(IV). Ms. Muhs did submit, however, an out-of-time treatment program report form that was signed by an authorized representative and showed that she had enrolled in a treatment program.2
¶ 10 After the hearing, the hearing officer sua sponte entered an order stating that Ms. Muhs had submitted "insufficient documentation to determine [her] entitlement to benefits" and ordered her to submit the documentation required by subsection (4)(b)(IV). In response, Ms. Muhs submitted a physician's letter stating that she had "a substance use disorder" and that she was "currently participating in a recovery program." She also submitted additional treatment program reports. The hearing officer set a second hearing "to allow the admission" of the supplement. But Ms. Muhs failed to appear at the second hearing, so the hearing officer did not admit the supplement and it's not part of the record.
¶ 11 The hearing officer later issued a written decision. He determined that Ms. Muhs "failed to meet the documentation requirements" of subsection (4)(b)(IV) and thus an award under that subsection was "not available." Still, the hearing officer found that Ms. Muhs had no control over her addiction and that her fentanyl use and theft were nonvolitional. Based on this finding, the hearing officer concluded that Ms. Muhs was not at fault for her termination and awarded her benefits.3
¶ 12 On review, the Panel agreed with the hearing officer. It rejected Catholic Health's contention that Ms. Muhs's entitlement to benefits depended on her compliance with subsection (4)(b)(IV). It instead noted that an employee "is generally entitled to unemployment benefits if she is unemployed through ‘no fault’ of her own." Because Ms. Muhs's addiction and the resulting fentanyl use and theft were out of her control, the Panel concluded that she was not at fault for her unemployment and was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
¶ 13 The Act is designed to ease "the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own." Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 2017 CO 78, ¶ 18, 396 P.3d 1114 (quoting Colo. Div. of Emp. & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989) ); see § 8-73-108(1)(a) (). Under the Act, fault doesn't require culpability; rather, it requires "some volitional act" or that the employee "exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from employment." Gonzales v. Indus. Comm'n , 740 P.2d 999, 1003 (Colo. 1987) ; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Denver v. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Training , 754 P.2d 1382, 1383 (Colo. App. 1988). Beyond this broad no-fault principle, the Act identifies several specific situations under which an employee may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits. See § 8-73-108(4)(a)-(y). In determining whether an employee qualifies for a full award, the Division "must" consider the qualifying reasons, "along with any other factors that may be pertinent" to the Division's determination. § 8-73-108(4). None of the qualifying provisions, however, are couched in terms of fault. See id.
¶ 14 We review de novo the Panel's legal conclusions, including its statutory interpretations. See M & A Acquisition Corp. v. Indus. Claims Appeals Off. , 2019 COA 173, ¶ 11, 456 P.3d 102 ; see also Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. , ¶ 17. While we sometimes defer to the Panel's interpretation of the Act, we won't defer to an interpretation that is inconsistent with the Act's plain language. See Safeway Stores 44 Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 973 P.2d 677, 680 (Colo. App. 1998) ; see also Whitewater Hill, LLC v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 2015 COA 5, ¶ 19, 345 P.3d 984 (). And we will set aside the Panel's decision if it is legally erroneous. See § 8-74-107(6)(d), C.R.S. 2020; accord Whitewater Hill , ¶¶ 26-27.
¶ 15 When interpreting a statute, we must determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. See Destination Maternity v. Burren , 2020 CO 41, ¶ 22, 463 P.3d 266 ; Laub v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 983 P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. App. 1999). To do that, we always start with the statute's language, giving words their plain and ordinary meanings. See Laub , 983 P.2d at 817. We also endeavor to give effect to all a statute's provisions and avoid constructions that render any provision meaningless or that lead to an illogical result. See Mounkes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 251 P.3d 485, 487 (Colo. App. 2010). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further. See Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson , 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 16 Catholic Health contends the Panel erred by ignoring subsection (4)(b)(IV)’s requirements and awarding Ms. Muhs unemployment compensation benefits because she was not at fault for her addiction or the resulting fentanyl use and theft. The Panel counters that even though Ms. Muhs undisputedly did not comply with subsection (4)(b)(IV), that subsection is not exclusive. And because Ms. Muhs was not at fault for her addiction or resulting fentanyl use and theft, she "is entitled to benefits" under the Act's general no-fault provisions.
¶ 17 Subsection (4)(b)(IV) provides as follows:
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