Catlett v. N.J. State Police, Civil No. 12-153 (JBS/AMD)
| Decision Date | 20 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 12-153 (JBS/AMD) |
| Parties | AMY K.Z. CATLETT, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Amy K.Z. Catlett
Plaintiff Pro Se
Paola F. Kaczynski, Esq.
WILLIAM J. FERREN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants City of Vineland Police Department
& Vineland Emergency Medical Service
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Amy K.Z. Catlett, pro se, brings this suit alleging a series of constitutional and common law tort claims against the City of Vineland Police Department, Vineland Emergency Medical Service ("EMS"), and unnamed police officers and emergency medical technicians ("EMTs"), among others. Plaintiff claims that she was tortiously and unconstitutionally detained by police and medical professionals and was administeredunwanted medical treatment upon suspicion that she was suicidal. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants City of Vineland Police Department and Vineland EMS [Docket Item 43]. Plaintiff Catlett opposes the motion. [Docket Item 50.]
The key inquiries for the Court are (1) whether Plaintiff sufficiently pleads the existence of a police department or EMS policy or custom that can be causally linked to her alleged injury, in order to ground liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and analogous state-law claims, and (2) whether it can be determined from the Complaint that the police and the EMTs acted reasonably in the circumstances, thus precluding liability on state-law claims against the moving Defendants. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss without prejudice and permit Plaintiff to file a motion to amend her complaint, consistent with this Opinion and the Court's previous orders.
II. Background
In the afternoon of November 21, 2009, a state trooper ("Trooper Scott") received an anonymous tip that Plaintiff had posted a suicidal message on the social networking website, Facebook.1 (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that TrooperScott then contacted the Vineland Police Department ("VPD") and relayed the information about Plaintiff's suicidal posting. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he aforesaid calls" -- those made by the unnamed "Caller(s)/Informant(s)" and Trooper Scott -- "were baseless and wrongfully and unlawfully conveyed false information" about Plaintiff to the police. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.)
Vineland police officers and EMTs responded to Plaintiff's residence, "removed [her] from her home and forced [her] to go to South Jersey Healthcare-Regional Medical Center in Vineland," where she claims she suffered injuries to her mouth and shoulder when medical staff attempted to restrain her, among other injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 43.) Plaintiff alleges that during her interactions with the police and EMTs she "was acting peaceably and in a lawful manner." (Id. ¶ 16.) She further alleges that "no advanced call was placed to South Jersey Healthcare-Regional Medical Center to ensure that appropriately trained individuals were present to assess Plaintiff's status." (Id. ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff claims she was falsely imprisoned and otherwise injured at the medical center and "released from imprisonment during the late evening hours of November 21, 2009 . . . ." (Id. ¶ 18.) Thus, the incident lasted, at most, several hours.
Count Two alleges the VPD and Vineland EMS "[d]eprived Plaintiff of rights and liberties guaranteed her by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of New Jersey and the laws of the State of New Jersey." (Id. ¶ 20.) The count also alleges that the police and EMTs failed to investigate and verify the information upon which they were acting and failed to take "proper steps to ensure that appropriate individuals would evaluate and assess the situation." (Id.)
Count Four alleges that the VPD "is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agents, servants and/or employees . . . ." (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff claims that the VPD was negligent in hiring, training and supervising its officers and negligent in implementing proper procedures to ensure the safety and rights of individuals. (Id. ¶ 30.) Count Five alleges substantially similar claims against Vineland EMS. (Id. ¶¶ 32-36.) Both counts allege that Plaintiff sustained physical and emotional harm, temporary and permanent injuries, medical expenses, and a loss of earnings and earning capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 36.) She seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
Plaintiff brought the current suit in New Jersey Superior Court, and Defendants removed the matter to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction.[Docket Item 1.] Following a motion for dismissal and summary judgment by Defendant New Jersey State Police ("NJSP"), the Court terminated the NJSP from the suit. Catlett, 2012 WL 3757005, at *2-*4. The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, because the proposed amended complaint repeated deficient claims against Defendant NJSP. Id. at *4. Plaintiff did not move to amend the complaint until opposing Defendant Dr. Dominic Diorio's motion to dismiss. [Docket Item 29]. Catlett, 2013 WL 941059, at *2.
The Court dismissed with prejudice all § 1983 and New Jersey Civil Rights Act claims against Defendant Diorio and all civil rights claims against Defendants Diane Stavoli and South Jersey Healthcare, because Plaintiff did not and could not plead those Defendants acted under color of state law. Id. at *4. The Court denied without prejudice Dr. Diorio's motion to dismiss state-law tort claims, because his defense relied on matters outside the pleading. Id. at *6. At the same time, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint, because the proposed Amended Complaint included allegations that Dr. Diorio and others acted under color of state law. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file one final motion to amend, with a proposed Amended Complaint that cured all deficiencies previously noted in the Court's opinions and orders, but ordered Plaintiff to refrain from filing such a motion until the Court ruled on thepresent motion. Id. at *6 n.8; see also Order, Catlett v. New Jersey State Police, No. 12-153 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2013), ECF No. 47 at 1-2.
In this motion to dismiss, the Vineland Defendants argue that the constitutional claims must be dismissed because the Vineland Defendants had probable cause to "seize" Plaintiff and they acted to protect and preserve Plaintiff's physical safety. (Def. Mot. at 2-3.) The Vineland Defendants also argue that (1) the VPD is not a proper defendant, (2) Vineland EMS is not a state actor, (3) Plaintiff has not stated a proper claim against a municipal entity, and (4) state-law claims should be dismissed because the Defendants acted reasonably or Plaintiff's pleading is otherwise deficient. (Id. at 3-6.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Docket Item 50.] The Vineland Defendants did not file a reply in support of their motion.
III. Standard of review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). The complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Allegations that are no more than legal conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). To determine if a complaint meets the pleading standard, the Court must strip away conclusory statements and "look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Pro se filings must be liberally construed. Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. Discussion
The Vineland Defendants seek to dismiss all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and analogous claims under the New Jersey Constitution. They advance several theories supporting dismissal. First, the Defendants construe the Complaint as alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore argue that dismissal is appropriate because any seizure that occurred was reasonable in the circumstances. (Def. Mot. at 2-3, 5.) Second, Defendants argue that a "municipal police department is not a proper defendant in a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (Id. at 3.)Third, Defendants contend that Vineland EMS is not a state actor, and therefore any claim that requires a showing of action under color of state law must be dismissed. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead that she suffered injury as a result of any action by an official within the VPD or Vineland EMS or that a policy or custom of the VPD or Vineland EMS caused her injuries. (Id. at 5.) Because § 1983 does not permit liability on the basis of respondeat superior, Plaintiffs urge dismissal. (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff responds that Defendants acted unreasonably. (Pl. Opp'n at 2-3.) She asserts that if the police or EMTs were taking Plaintiff for mental health screening against her will, New Jersey law requires she be taken to a screening service, which the Regional Medical Center was not. (Id. at 2-3, citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.1, et seq., and Fair Oaks Hosp. v. Pocrass, 628 A.2d 829, 833 (...
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