Catlin v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 18-CV-322 JLS (MDD) |
| Parties | SCOTT CATLIN, as guardian ad litem for C.R., an individual, SCOTT CATLIN, an individual, and DOES 1-10, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ROES 1-50, inclusive, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the Court is Defendant the United States' Motion to Dismiss, ("MTD," ECF No. 4). Also before the Court is Plaintiff Scott Catlin's Opposition to, ("Opp'n," ECF No. 9), and Defendant's Reply in Support of, ("Reply," ECF No. 10), the Motion. The Court vacated the hearing on the Motion and took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 8.) Having considered the Parties' arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows.
On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on behalf of C.R., a minor. (See "Compl.," ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is the step-father and legal custodian of C.R. (Id. ¶ 7.) This case involves searches by federal custom officials at the border of Mexico and the United States upon C.R., without a search warrant or parental consent. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges "law enforcement officers cannot perform [searches] upon a child in the absence of a search warrant and without parental consent." (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges "many custom and border patrol agents who acted on the behalf of the United States government . . . intentionally probed the most sensitive body parts of C.R., an underage female without a warrant, without parental consent and without probable cause." (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff has not ascertained the identity of the federal agents and is proceeding against them using fictitious names, i.e., the Roe Defendants. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff brings causes of action against the United States and Roe Defendants for: (1) violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) violation of due process under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (See Compl. ¶¶ 8-16.) After Defendant responded by filing the present motion, Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint as matter of right. (ECF No. 5.) Defendant moved to strike the amended complaint as untimely filed. (ECF No. 7.) The Court granted Defendant's objection and struck the amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such have an obligation to dismiss claims for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Demarest v. United States, 718 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). "The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989)). "Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate if the complaint, considered in its entirety, on its face fails to allege factssufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction." Id. (citing Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Motions for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may challenge jurisdiction facially or factually. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack is one in which "the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. In evaluating such a challenge, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). In contrast, where the defendant challenges the factual basis underlying the allegations, the court need not accept the allegations as true and may make factual determinations. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). "In ruling on a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the district court is ordinarily free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes." Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). When making such a ruling, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cnty., 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2 (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, "a plaintiff's obligation to providethe 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[F]acts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true "legal conclusions" contained in the complaint. Id. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This review requires "context-specific" analysis involving the Court's "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention "consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) ).
Defendant advances three general arguments in support of its motion. First, Defendant argues Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens should be dismissedbecause the United States is not a proper party to a section 1983 or Bivens claims. Second, Defendant maintains Plaintiff improperly relies on the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") as basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Third, Defendant asserts Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring claims against it.
Plaintiff alleges claims against the United States and the Roe Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8-13.) "Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of law of any state or territory or the District of Columbia." Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1982)). "There is no valid basis for a claim under section 1983 . . . against federal officials acting under color of federal law." Id. It follows, therefore, that a section 1983 claim cannot lie against the United States—it is not a person under the statute.1
Plaintiff concedes he cannot bring a Bivens claim against the United States. (Opp'n 3.)2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the United States and the individual Roe Defendants.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's FTCA claims because Plaintiff is attempting to bring an FTCA claim without first exhausting administrative remedies. (MTD 6.) The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for tort actions. Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). Generally, the United States can be held liable under the FTCA if a private individual, under identical circumstances, would be liable tothe plaintiff under the law of the state where the event occurred. Before filing a civil action in federal court, the Act requires an individual to seek an administrative resolution of her claim before she can file an action against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Cadwalder v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "a claim is deemed presented for...
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