Catlin v. United States

• Decision Date: 08 November 1957
• Docket Number: No. 13252.,13252.
• Citation: 251 F.2d 368
• Parties: Robert Lee CATLIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

251 F.2d 368 (1957)

Robert Lee CATLIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 13252.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued September 20, 1956.

Decided November 8, 1957.

Mr. James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), for appellant.

Mr. Fred L. McIntyre, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., Lewis Carroll and Arthur J. McLaughlin, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., at the time record was filed, also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, FAHY and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In Lyles v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. ___, ___ F.2d ___, the Court sitting en banc has held that, in a case where the defense of insanity is fairly raised and it does not appear that the defendant does not desire such an instruction, it is error for the trial judge not to inform the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,

"means that the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent has certified, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or to others, in which event and at which time the court shall order his release either unconditionally or under such conditions as the court may see fit."¹

In the present case the defense of insanity was fairly raised, and defense counsel in his argument to the jury sought to advise the jury of the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. It follows that it cannot be said defendant did not wish the instruction. Upon the authority of Lyles, therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We point out, however, that the better practice is for the trial judge, rather than for counsel, to give the explanation to the jury.

Questions regarding the procedure for determining appellant's mental competency to stand trial, which arose because of changes in the statute while the proceedings were under way,² need not be decided since they are unlikely to arise again. In event of a new trial if appellant's competency to stand trial need be determined the proceedings would necessarily fall within the present statute.

Appellant complains that the court's charge on the defense of insanity did not include a requested instruction that if the jury should find that at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed Catlin was suffering from a mental disease to which the commission of the offense was attributable it should find him not guilty by reason of insanity even though the jury should further find that he was able to distinguish right from wrong and did not act under an irresistible impulse. There was no evidence with respect to appellant's ability to distinguish right from wrong, or that he acted by reason of an irresistible impulse. There was accordingly no need for the trial judge to go into these matters.

Reversed and remanded.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

This appellant was indicted in May, 1955, for assault with intent to commit robbery and was tried in October of that year. The proof showed he had viciously attacked an elderly woman in a down-town park. Rejecting his plea that he was insane when he committed the crime, the jury found Catlin guilty as charged. This court now reverses the conviction because the trial judge did not permit defense counsel in his argument to tell the jury what would be done with the defendant if he were acquitted by reason of insanity. For reasons to be stated, I think that the point is not properly presented here; and that, if it is before us, the trial judge did not err but acted in accordance with the law as it then existed. So, I dissent.

The trial court's refusal to permit the argument is held reversible error on the authority of Lyles v. United States, Oct. 25, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. ___, ___ F.2d ___. There a majority of this court announced that, when the defense is insanity, the trial court must — on pain of reversal — tell the jury how the defendant will be dealt with if he is acquitted on that ground. They added, however, that if the defendant does not want the jury to have that information, it shall not be given to them. But they did not say whether giving the information over his protest requires reversal.

Thus, rather curiously, the defendant is to decide whether the jury shall be informed of the consequences of an acquittal because of insanity, although the Lyles majority said, "We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict * * *." (My emphasis.) The right is denied them, however, if the defendant does not want them to know.

The only reason assigned for requiring the informational instruction is that the result of an acquittal because of insanity is not commonly understood and therefore the jury is said to be entitled to the information. It follows that the only purpose of the instruction is to satisfy what the Lyles majority apparently regarded as the natural curiosity of the jurors as to what will happen to the defendant if they acquit him because of insanity.

Significantly, it is not said that the jury may or should take the information into account in reaching a verdict. Obviously, I think they should not allow it to play a part in their determination of the factual issue concerning insanity. I suppose none will say such determination should depend to any extent on whether the jurors approve of the legal consequences of their verdict.

That being so, I think Judge Bastian wisely suggested in his separate Lyles opinion that, if such information must be given to the jurors, they should be warned not to let it influence their decision, which is to be based on the evidence only. If that warning were given, the instruction would be identified as no more than a news item, which is all it can properly be called. Unfortunately the Lyles majority did not adopt Judge Bastian's suggestion and so left it for the jury to suppose that the information contained in the instruction could and should play a part in the formation of a verdict.

So, the holding is that the defendant may, if he chooses, require the trial judge to give the informational instruction, without any explanation as to its purpose or the use which the jury may or should make of it. The critical question here is whether the ruling requires or even justifies reversal of Catlin's conviction. I suggest that it does neither, for two reasons: (1) the point was not properly preserved for appeal; and (2) the Lyles holding is only prospectively effective. These reasons will be discussed separately.

1. Catlin did not request that an instruction concerning the consequences of an insanity acquittal be given, and did not complain of its omission after the trial judge completed his charge to the jury. Consequently, under Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., he cannot complain to us on that score. My brothers of the majority say that, because defense counsel in his argument sought to advise the jury of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, "it cannot be said defendant did not wish the instruction."

Perhaps their inference satisfies the Lyles rule, but I suggest it does not sufficiently meet the requirements of Rule 30 to enable the appellant to raise the point here. It would have been easy for defense counsel to ask the court to give the instruction which he himself was not permitted to give, and at the conclusion of the charge to ask that it be added. Probably counsel thought it would be futile to do so; but anticipation of the court's refusal did not excuse him from making the requests required by the Rule as conditions precedent to making the point on appeal.

2. The Lyles ruling is by its terms applicable only to future cases. Having only prospective effect it cannot properly be relied upon as a reason for reversing Catlin's conviction, which occurred nearly two years before its announcement. This is apparent from the language of the Lyles holding, which I quote:

"Sometimes a defendant may not want such an instruction given. If that appears affirmatively on the record we would not regard failure to give it as grounds for reversal. Otherwise, whenever hereafter the defense of insanity is fairly raised, the trial judge shall instruct the jury as to the legal meaning of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in accordance with the view expressed in this opinion." (My emphasis.)

This is simply the promulgation of a new procedural requirement to be followed in the future. It was not intended to be, and therefore is not, retroactive in effect. Consequently, the new ruling neither requires nor justifies the majority's reversal of Catlin's conviction.

Since the Lyles rule is inapplicable here, it is necessary to ascertain what the law of this jurisdiction was in October, 1955, when Catlin was tried, in order to determine whether the trial judge erred in not permitting counsel to instruct the jury concerning the consequences of an acquittal because of insanity. For this purpose I need go no further than the Lyles opinion, which thus describes the pre-existing rule before extending it:

"* * * The doctrine, well established and sound, is that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the nature or extent of it, or in probation. * *"

This doctrine of course included a verdict of not guilty because of insanity, for the jury has no more to say about the treatment of the prisoner after such a verdict than it has when he is found guilty. Furthermore, unless the previously effective doctrine did extend to that verdict, there was no occasion for the Lyles...