Catone v. Medberry, 87-542-A

Citation555 A.2d 328
Decision Date06 March 1989
Docket NumberNo. 87-542-A,87-542-A
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
PartiesWilliam V. CATONE v. Edward E. MEDBERRY, Jr., et al. ppeal.
OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This civil action arises out of a fatal collision between an automobile driven by the plaintiff's decedent and a vehicle owned and vicariously operated by the State of Rhode Island. The plaintiff's wife died when an automobile she was operating collided with a state-owned truck. The plaintiff, William V. Catone, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Fely C. Catone and as parent and best friend of Keith C. Catone, appeals the decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Edward E. Medberry, Jr. (Medberry), an employee of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation; W. Edward Wood, then director of the Department of Transportation; and the State of Rhode Island. We reverse.

The facts germane to this appeal are not in dispute. On the morning of June 5, 1981, Medberry was the driver of a state-owned dump truck assigned to a litter-cleanup detail on Route 4 in East Greenwich, Rhode Island. Medberry's task apparently necessitated driving the truck slowly, or stopping it completely, near or partially on the high-speed lane of the highway while other state employees collected trash from the median strip. During the course of the cleanup plaintiff's wife, Fely C. Catone, was traveling northbound along Route 4 in her automobile. When she encountered a bus moving slowly in the center lane of the highway, Mrs. Catone maneuvered her car into the high-speed lane in an effort to accelerate past the vehicle and then collided with the state's dump truck. She died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.

The plaintiff brought suit under the Wrongful Death Act, G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) chapter 7 of title 10, claiming among other things that the State of Rhode Island, by and through its employees, negligently caused his wife's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that they were immune from suit under the "public duty doctrine." The motion justice, relying on our holding in Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976 (R.I.1985), found as a matter of law that defendants owed no duty to Mrs. Catone in her individual capacity at the time of the accident and granted defendant's motion. Final judgment was entered on December 15, 1987, under Rule 54(b). The issue before this court is whether the public duty doctrine operates in these circumstances to bar plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. We shall begin our discussion with an overview of the relevant principles of law.

Under a traditional application of governmental immunity, individuals tortiously injured by an agent of the state or one of its subordinate political bodies are barred from recovery absent express statutory consent to suit or a constitutional waiver of immunity. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 131 at 1032 (5th ed.1984). The rationale for this rule stems from a common-law theory thoroughly rejected by the American people under King George III, namely, that "The King Can Do No Wrong." Since 1957 the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have either limited or repudiated the doctrine of sovereign immunity by court decision or legislative fiat. See, e.g., Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla.1983); Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss.1982); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla.1957); see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988). See generally Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 895B, 895C app. (1982) (compilation of each state's position on state and local immunity). Consistent with this trend, this court in Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970), abolished the common-law immunity conferred upon municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. Following the Becker decision, the General Assembly enacted the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act, G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) chapter 31 of title 9. The act permits individuals to sue governmental units in the same manner as private individuals for injuries caused by the negligence of state or local employees. Section 9-31-1. Under the Tort Claims Act, money damages are generally limited to $100,000. Sections 9-31-2 and 9-31-3. We note, however, that this waiver of immunity by itself does not establish a cause of action in tort against governmental entities.

Under the prevailing public duty rule, private plaintiffs must show that the governmental body or its agent breached a special duty of care owed to them in their individual capacities. See South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1855). Where the duty is a general one owed to the entire public, most courts prohibit individuals from recovering for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of governmental employees. To recover against the government, therefore, the facts of the case ordinarily must establish a "special relationship" between the plaintiff-victim and the state or its agent. It is the existence of this special relationship that triggers a duty of care and establishes the basis for potential liability. If the state breaches this obligation and this breach in turn causes harm to a particular individual or member of an identifiable class, then liability will attach.

In recent years an increasing minority of states have rejected or limited the application of the public duty doctrine as an attempt to resurrect the ghost of sovereign immunity. Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351 (La.1980); Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d 254 (1986); Schear v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Wood v. Milin, 134 Wis.2d 279, 397 N.W.2d 479 (1986); see also 5 F. Harper, F. James, Jr. & O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 29 (2d ed.1986). 1 Nevertheless, the majority of states that have abolished sovereign immunity continue to require the existence of a special relationship as a prerequisite to the government's liability in tort. See Note, Governmental Tort Liability: A New Limitation on the Public Duty Rule in Massachusetts?, 19 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 667, 668 (1985). This court has steadfastly maintained that "[i]n suits brought against the state, plaintiffs must show a breach of some duty owed them in their individual capacities and not merely a breach of some obligation owed the general public." Ryan v. State Department of Transportation, 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I.1980). Since the Ryan decision we have repeatedly rejected claims of negligence brought against political bodies. See Kowalski v. Campbell, 520 A.2d 973 (R.I.1987) (no cause of action against state for negligently maintaining highway safety lines); Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I.1985) (no liability for police officer's negligent failure to remove intoxicated driver from road); Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976 (R.I.1985) (state not liable to motoring public in general for negligent maintenance of highway intersection); Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545 (R.I.1984) (parole board not liable for negligently paroling prisoner who injured member of general public); see also Saunders v. State, 446 A.2d 748 (R.I.1982) (prison employees must have objective knowledge that violent prisoner would murder particular inmate before holding state liable). In each of these cases, the claimants failed to establish the existence of a special duty of care owed them by the state as specific identifiable individuals or members of a particular class.

We have allowed suit against governmental entities on two occasions. See Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 390 A.2d 350 (1978) (clerk's negligent failure to record order recalling outstanding capias resulted in wrongful arrest of specific identifiable individual under circumstances where clerk was not clothed with judicial immunity); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970) (police placed prisoner with known suicidal tendencies in cell containing blanket which he later used to hang himself). In both of these situations, "either the plaintiffs have had prior contact with state or municipal officials who then knowingly embarked on a course of conduct that endangered the plaintiffs, or they have otherwise specifically come within the knowledge of the officials so that the injury to that particularly identified plaintiff can be or should have been foreseen." Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d at 978. It is against this backdrop that we turn to the case at bar.

The instant case places squarely in issue the viability of the public duty doctrine and impels us to examine the extent of its application. The plaintiff claims that the motion justice misapplied the public duty doctrine and, by doing so, excused the state from a duty imposed upon every individual at common law to exercise reasonable care when operating a motor vehicle. The plaintiff further argues that the underlying policy considerations that led to the adoption of the public duty doctrine are not advanced by extending its application to bar recovery in these circumstances. We agree.

We garner support for our conclusion from an examination of the liability of the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act....

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    • May 1, 2021
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