Catto v. Plant

• Decision Date: 06 June 1927
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CATTO v. PLANT ET AL.

137 A. 764

106 Conn. 236

CATTO v. PLANT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 6, 1927

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New London County; Charles B Waller, Judge.

Action by Robert Smith Catto against Henry B. Plant and others executors, to recover the amount of a legacy claimed under the will of defendants' decedent, tried to the court. Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal. No error.

Charles B. Whittlesey, of New London, for appellants.

John F. Barry, of Boston, Mass., for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HINMAN, BANKS, and ELLS JJ.

BANKS J.

Morton F. Plant died November 4, 1918, leaving a will dated October 16, 1918, the third paragraph of which contained the following bequest:

" To each of the domestic servants in my employ at the time of my death who shall have been continuously in my employ for the period of ten years prior thereto the sum of one thousand ($1,000) dollars."

The plaintiff had been continuously in the employ of Mr. Plant for ten years prior to the latter's death, first as an assistant gardener and later as head gardener, and claimed to be entitled to such legacy as one of the " domestic servants" in his employ at the time of his death.

The question to be determined upon this appeal is not the abstract question whether a gardener is a " domestic servant," but the concrete question is whether in this clause of his will the testator intended to include the plaintiff among the domestic servants who had been in his employ at the time of his death continuously for the period of ten years prior thereto. " A testator's intent is to be ascertained from the words of his will, interpreted in the light of their context and of the surrounding circumstances, and 'the court should place itself in the situation of the testator, surrounding itself by the facts which were before him, and then ascertain the meaning of the language it is called upon to construe.‘ " Day v. Webler, 93 Conn. 308, 311, 105 A. 618, 620. The record before us does not contain any portion of Mr. Plant's will other than the single clause we are asked to construe, and we are therefore deprived of such assistance in ascertaining his intent as might be gained from an examination of the context of this clause, and a consideration of the will as a whole. The claimed corrections in the finding would simply substitute the language of the draft finding for that of the finding as to matters which are not sufficiently material to affect the decision. The finding discloses the following facts: The testator, Mr. Plant, owned and occupied a large estate at Eastern Point, in the town of Groton, the house grounds covering about 44 acres, which were elaborately laid out and required the services of a number of men to maintain. The plaintiff entered Mr. Plant's employ in May, 1908, as assistant gardener, and continued as such until the summer of 1912, when he was placed in charge of the gardening work on the home grounds and continued as head gardener until Mr. Plant's death. Plaintiff's work was in taking care of the garden, where vegetables and flowers were grown, and in the care of the shrubs on the home grounds, but he occasionally rendered services in connection with the delivery of vegetables to the kitchen and flowers for use in the house. He had no regular duties to perform in the mansion house. From September or October, 1908, until he was married in 1913, plaintiff boarded with a woman who conducted a boarding and lodging house, in which eight or nine of those working on the estate boarded or lodged under an arrangement with Mr. Plant, and in a house located on the home grounds. After his marriage in 1913 plaintiff lived in a cottage on the home grounds furnished for his use by Mr. Plant.

The trial court reached the conclusion that the services performed by plaintiff upon the grounds of the Plant house concerned the home and contributed to the comfort and pleasure of those living in the home, and that plaintiff was a domestic servant within the class described in the third paragraph of the will. Defendants appealed upon the ground that the court erred in holding that one who worked on the grounds, but who neither worked nor resided in the house of the testator, was a domestic servant. " The term 'domestic‘ " has a widely varying meaning, and, while its primary significance relates to the house or home, it is often used in a vastly broader sense. Its significance must always be determined with reference to the subject-matter and the relation in which it appears." Kimball v. N.E. Harbor Water Co., 107 Me. 467, 78 A. 865, 32 L.R.A. (N. S.) 805. Definitions of lexicographers giving the primary meaning of the word are not particularly helpful, and precedents are only of limited authority upon the construction of the word " domestic" or the phrase " domestic servants" as used in a will, since their use in each case presents an individual problem which the court must solve, not merely from the language used, but from that language viewed in the light of all the other provisions of the will involved and of the surrounding circumstances.

Defendant cites upon his brief two English cases (Ogle v. Morgan [1852] 1 De G., M. & G. 359, 16 Jur. 277, and Vaughan v. Booth [1852] 13 English Law & Equity, 351, 16 Jur. 808), each of which, as he correctly states, is practically identical with the case at bar. In the first case the bequest was " to each person as a servant in my domestic establishment" and in the second " to each of my domestic servants." In each case the plaintiff was a gardener and lived in a cottage furnished him by the testator. In each case it was held that the bequest was limited to servants living or working in the house, and that the gardener was not included therein. Ogle v. Morgan, decided in 1852, was followed, not only by Vaughan v. Booth but by In re Drax (1887) ...