Cau v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1902
• Docket Number: 1,081.
• Citation: 113 F. 91
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Parties: CAU v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO.

113 F. 91

CAU v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO.

No. 1,081.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 7, 1902

B. K Miller, for plaintiff in error.

N.W. Finley W. W. Howe, W. B. Spencer, and C. P. Cocke, for defendant in error.

Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover the value of certain cotton delivered to the defendant in error to be transported from Texarkana, Tex., to the port of New Orleans La., at an agreed charge for freight of 60 cents per 100 pounds. The petition alleged that, in evidence of the contract, the company delivered to the plaintiff in error its certain bills of lading; that while the bales of cotton were awaiting further shipment, but after they had been received by the railway company as a common carrier and were in its possession as such and after it had issued its bills of lading to carry the same, the whole of the cotton was destroyed by fire. The petition alleged, further, that by the third clause of the bills of lading the railway company attempted to limit its liability as a common carrier declaring that it should not be liable for any damages to, or destruction of, the cotton caused by fire; that this clause is wholly inoperative, null, and void against the petitioner on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff did not receive any consideration from the railway company for such limitation of its common-law liability; (2) that the destruction of the cotton by fire was due to, and caused by the negligence of the company, its agents and servants; (3) that the cotton was received by the railway company prior to the issuance of the bills of lading, and it was without authority, after the receipt of the cotton as a carrier, to limit its liability under the common law. The answer, besides the general issue, set up specially the terms of the third clause of the bills of lading, which, so far as necessary to recite, expressed 'that neither the Texas & Pacific Railway Company nor any connecting carrier handling said cotton shall be liable for damage to, or destruction of, said cotton by fire. ' The case came on for trial, and, the evidence having been closed, counsel for the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant, which motion was granted, and the jury, under the direction of the judge, returned their verdict, 'We, the jury, find a verdict in favor of the...