Caudill v. City of Kenton
| Decision Date | 09 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11 CV 1767 |
| Parties | Timothy P. Caudill, Plaintiff, v. City of Kenton et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Pending before this Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss Plaintiff Timothy Caudill's Complaint (Docs. 21 & 24). Defendants are the City of Kenton, Kenton Police Chief John Vermillion, Kenton Police Officer Marc Coffman, Hardin County, Hardin Sheriff Keith Everhart, and Hardin Deputy Scott Holbrook ("Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Coffman and Holbrook used excessive force, violating the Fourth Amendment (Count I). Plaintiff also contends Coffman and Holbrook's municipalities and supervisors are liable for the use of force in their official capacities (Count II).1 The Complaint further asserts state law claims against Coffman and Holbrook for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) and assault and battery (Count IV). Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motions (Doc. 26) and Defendants replied (Docs. 28 & 29).
Additionally, this Court requested supplemental briefing on whether summary judgment was appropriate for Hardin County and Sheriff Everhart pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 56(f) (Doc. 33). Plaintiff and Defendants Hardin County and Sheriff Everhart responded (Docs. 35 & 37).
On December 11, 2010, Officer Coffman received a call from Kenton dispatch regarding a customer disturbance at a local restaurant. When Coffman arrived, the restaurant manager informed him that Plaintiff kicked a booth and was disturbing other customers. Coffman also learned Plaintiff had a large knife. Coffman took the knife from Plaintiff, escorted him outside the restaurant and, along with Deputy Holbrook, conducted a quick search. The search uncovered several unopened beer cans and the cap to a hypodermic needle. Following the search, Plaintiff was arrested for disorderly conduct and taken to the Kenton Police Department (Doc. 21-1 at 1-2).
Once at the station, Plaintiff was placed in a booking room, which was equipped with a camera that captured the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury. The parties have stipulated that the video, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzYd6yatnhg, is part of the record (Doc. 27).
As the video shows, Plaintiff was handcuffed during the booking process. Plaintiff was also observably drunk, aggressive, and refused to comply with Coffman's requests to stand up (Video at 3:30). Coffman repeatedly asked Plaintiff to stand up so he could remove his handcuffs and conduct a more thorough search for weapons before Plaintiff was placed into a holding cell. Coffman's chief concern was the syringe cap found during the initial search, as he thought Plaintiff might still be in possession of the actual needle (Doc. 21-1 at 2).
Holbrook was in the next room when he noticed Plaintiff becoming agitated and uncooperative (Doc. 24-2 at 1). Holbrook entered the booking room to assist Coffman and immediately told Plaintiffto "get up, before you get hurt" (Video at 4:00). The two officers got Plaintiff to his feet and placed him face-first against a wall. Plaintiff remarked, "that's a little rough, gentlemen." (Video at 4:40). Plaintiff remained handcuffed.
Holbrook held Plaintiff against the wall while Coffman searched Plaintiff's right side (Video at 4:45). As Coffman removed items from Plaintiff, Plaintiff continued to be belligerent and to resist the search. Holbrook informed Plaintiff if he persisted, he was "going to get fucking dropped" (Video at 4:50). Coffman completed the search of Plaintiff's right side and began to search his left side (Video at 5:07). Plaintiff became more agitated and screamed "drop me" three times, each time louder than the last (Video at 5:10). Holbrook swept Plaintiff's legs out from underneath him and both he and Plaintiff fell to the floor (Video at 5:14).
The fall knocked Plaintiff unconscious and he began to bleed from his head (Video at 5:20). Coffman immediately called for medial assistance (Video at 5:23). Both officers started administering aid. Holbrook confessed, "I lost it man, I lost it." (Video at 6:45). Paramedics arrived and Plaintiff, still unconscious, was taken to Hardin Memorial Hospital. Lab reports indicated that Plaintiff was extremely drunk at the time of the arrest, with a blood alcohol level ("BAC") of 0.421 percent. A BAC that high can be life threatening (Doc. 26-1 at 7). As a result of the fall, Plaintiff was in a coma for several days and suffered a brain injury (Doc. 1 at 5).
Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This burden "may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—thatthere is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court must draw all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). This Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute; rather, this Court determines only whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a civil cause of action against individuals who, while acting under color of state law, deprive a person of the "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 2005). It is undisputed Defendants were acting "under color of state law."
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states by "incorporation" through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures." See O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff alleges the Fourth Amendment was violated when Defendants "determined to take Plaintiff down to the floor with Defendant Holbrook performing a sweeping kick maneuver" even though "Plaintiff lacked any ability to protect himself from the ensuing fall . . . ." (Doc. 1 at 4). Defendants contend Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because they are protected by qualified immunity (Docs. 21 at 4-5; 24 at 6).
Section 1983 claims are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity which, if applicable, shields individuals against liability. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity protects state officials so long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine balances two important interests -- the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly, and the need to shield officials from liability when they perform their duties reasonably. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
Qualified immunity applies unless it is obvious no reasonably competent official would have concluded the actions taken were unlawful. Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009). In fact, qualified immunity was designed to give "ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quotations omitted). The accommodation for reasonable error exists because officials should not always err on the side of caution due to the fear of being sued. Id. The protection of the doctrine applies whether the official's error is a mistake of law, fact, or mixed questions of law or fact. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2005). The "objective legal reasonableness" standard under this framework rests on a fact-specific, case-by-case determination, of whether a reasonable official in Defendants' position "could have believed [their] conduct was lawful, judged from the perspective of the reasonable official on the scene." Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 306(6th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987)). To this end, the Sixth Circuit mandates a two-step sequence for resolving qualified immunity claims: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of Defendants' alleged misconduct. Id. With regards to the second step, Plaintiff must show the right was "clearly established" in this particular context -- that is, a reasonable officer confronted with the same situation would have known using force would violate that right. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199-200 (2004).
Under the first step, if the facts do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, then qualified immunity applies. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1997). Conversely, if the question of immunity is "completely dependent upon which view of the facts is accepted by the jury," this Court should not grant immunity. Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1989).
Individuals have a...
To continue reading
Request your trial