Caudle v. Bonneville County, Docket No. 34678 (Idaho App. 4/30/2009)
| Decision Date | 30 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 34678 |
| Parties | JIMMIE HAROLD CAUDLE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BONNEVILLE COUNTY, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge.
Order denying appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting respondent's motion for summary judgment, affirmed.
Jimmie H. Caudle, Jr., Orofino, pro se appellant.
Anderson, Nelson, Hall, Smith, P.A.; Blake G. Hall, Idaho Falls, for respondent.
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Jimmie Harold Caudle, Jr., appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting Bonneville County's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
In August, 2005, officers from the Bonneville County Sheriffs Department arrested Caudle at his home pursuant to an outstanding warrant. Caudle did not cooperate with the officers, and was subsequently charged with resisting and obstructing an officer. Caudle was acquitted following a trial on that charge, and filed a civil complaint against Bonneville County (the County) for violations of his civil rights due to illegal arrest, assault, and battery. The district court denied Caudle's motion for appointment of an attorney, but allowed him to file an amended complaint. Following the County's answer, both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to the County and dismissed Caudle's complaint with prejudice. This appeal timely followed.
Caudle begins his appeal by asserting that pro se litigants are treated with great deference due to their lack of legal training. However, in Idaho, pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney. Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101, 106 P.3d 425, 427 (2005); Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 444, 80 P.3d 1043, 1045 (2003). Pro se status does not excuse parties from adhering to procedural rules, even though they may be unaware of such requirements. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997).
Caudle raises six issues on appeal; we will only address three of those issues. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Although Caudle asserts that the district court erred by not granting a default judgment, by failing to compel mediation, and by failing to compel discovery, he does not support any of those assertions with authority. The remaining issues on appeal are whether the district court erred by denying Caudle's motion to disqualify for cause, whether the district court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel, and whether the district court erred by granting the County's motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint. Both Caudle and the County request attorney fees on appeal.
Prior to filing his amended complaint, Caudle filed a motion to disqualify the district court judge assigned to his case pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2)(A)(4). That rule states, in relevant part, that "[a]ny party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds . . . [t]hat the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the.case in the action." In order for a judge to be disqualified under this section, the alleged bias and prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his or her participation in the case. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27, 29, 813 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1991). This Court reviews the denial of a motion to disqualify for cause under an abuse of discretion standard. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000); see also Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 435, 860 P.2d 634, 638 (1993); Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 529, 835 P.2d 1331, 1340 (Ct. App. 1992).
Caudle asserts on appeal that the district court's "erroneous rulings" in the underlying case are proof of bias and prejudice. However, adverse rulings, by themselves, do not demonstrate disqualifying bias. Samuel, 134 Idaho at 88, 996 P.2d at 307; Bell, 122 Idaho at 530, 835 P.2d at 1341. Furthermore, neither Caudle's motion for disqualification nor any accompanying affidavits are included in the record on appeal. An affidavit "stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in support of the motion" must accompany the motion for disqualification. I.R.c.P. 40(d)(2)(B). It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. Powell, 130 Idaho at 127, 937 P.2d at 439. In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error. Id. The judge denied Caudle's motion for disqualification because his recusal in other civil matters filed by Caudle had to do with the subject matter of the actions, and not with Caudle himself. We find no error in the judge's reasoning and conclude that he did not abuse his discretion by denying Caudle's motion for disqualification for cause.
Caudle asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel. In support of this contention he cites to the standards for appointing counsel under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedures Act, Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004), and 28 U.s.c. § 1915, which allows a court to appoint counsel in federal civil actions when the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. Neither of these applies in this case, as this is not a proceeding under the UPCPA, and federal procedures do not control in state actions. The constitutional right to counsel arises only in criminal actions. U.s. const, amend. VI; IDAHO Const, art. 1, § 13; Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 198-99, 832 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (1992). In a civil case such as this, the district court had no authority to appoint counsel for Caudle because he had no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. See, e.g., Murray, 141 Idaho at 101, 106 P.3d at 427. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying Caudle's motion for appointment of counsel.
Caudle's complaint alleged violations of the Idaho Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the Idaho Code. He asserted that the officers, as employees of the County, willfully and maliciously conducted an illegal arrest, and assaulted and battered him. He thus raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Idaho Tort Claims Act. We will address the court's grant of summary judgment as to each in turn.
We first note that summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., Ill Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist, 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct App. 1994).
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994), Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156.
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a...
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