Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa

Decision Date12 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 00-2352.,Civ.A. 00-2352.
Citation167 F.Supp.2d 898
PartiesPhelix Ramon CAUSEY v. THE PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Paula Anne Perrone, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis, Breslin & Murray, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff.

Clifton Thomas Speed, Office of District Atty., Greensburg, LA, for Defendant.

Scott G. Vincent, New Orleans, LA, for Scott Perrilloux, Richard R. Perkins.

Winston Gerard DeCuir, Linda Law Clark, DeCuir & Clark, Baton Rouge, LA, Ron S. Macaluso, Hammond, LA, for Hal Price, Hammond City, Hammond Poolice Dept., Southeastern Louisiana University Police Dept.

ORDER AND REASONS

DUVAL, District Judge.

Before the Court motions to dismiss filed by two groups of defendants, (1) J. Edward Layrisson, Charles Fitz and the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office (doc. 16)and (2) the Hammond Police Dept., the City of Hammond, Detective Price, Detective Pevey, Lieutenant Miller and Detective Deliberto (doc. 25) as well as a motion for judgment on the pleadings by Southeastern Louisiana University and Sergeant Hal Price (doc. 29). The Court heard oral argument on the motions on January 31, 2001 and has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and finds for the reasons that follow.

I. Background

On October 7, 1998 members of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Department arrested Larry Briggs in connection with the October 1, 1998, murder of Robert Connelly. Briggs, the driver of the vehicle, gave a statement on October 7, 1998. Briggs told police that the other men in the car with him were "Champ" (real name Felix Baptiste), the shooter and "Mike" (Champ's cousin), simply a passenger, Complaint at ¶ 6. Approximately two hours later, Briggs gave a different version of the story, identifying Reggie Moore ("Mike") as the shooter and Champ ("Phyllis Baptiste") as the passenger. Complaint at ¶ 7. In his third statement to police, Briggs admitted that he falsely identified "Champ" ("Phyllis Baptiste") out of fear that if he did identify the true gunman (Reggie Moore) there would be reprisals against him or his family. Complaint at ¶ 8. Although none of the names provided to police was an identical match with the plaintiff here, plaintiff's grandmother told law enforcement that "Phelix Batiste" was her grandson's alias.

Based on the statement implicating "Champ" as the murderer, and the grandmother's statement that Phelix Batiste was plaintiff's alias, Southeastern Louisiana University police officer Hal Price appeared before Judge Douglas Hughes of the 21 st Judicial District Court of the Parish of Tangipahoa and obtained an arrest warrant for Phyllis Batiste Causey (alias "Champ"). See State of Louisiana v. Phyllis Batiste Causey, No. 98-003477, 21 st Judicial District Court, 10/7/98. One day later, on October 8, 1998, plaintiff Causey was arrested by officers of the Hammond Police Department and questioned. During an October 8, 1998 interrogation conducted by Officer Hal Price and Detective Pevey, plaintiff stated that he was present in the backseat of Briggs' car when the shooting occurred. See Complaint at ¶ 11.

On October 9, 1998 Reggie Moore allegedly told one of the officers that a man named "Dooley" (Marquis Frazier) was the third man in the car, not Causey. On October 14, 1998 Briggs made a fourth statement to the police, this time stating that "Dooley" also went by the nickname "Champ" and then stating that Causey was not the "Champ" he referred to in his previous statements. Complaint at ¶ 14. On October 14, Dooley (Marquis Frazier) was arrested and he subsequently admitted that he was the third person in the car along with Briggs and Moore. Complaint at ¶¶ 14-15. Thus, by the time Marquis Frazier confessed to being a passenger in the car, four men had confessed to being in a car that only had three occupants at the time the shooting occurred.

On October 22, 1998 a grand jury in Tangipahoa Parish returned a true bill on Causey, Frazier, Briggs and Moore on the charge of second degree murder. Complaint at ¶ 17. The grand jury issued a second indictment for the same charge on October 29, 1998. The prosecutor on each indictment was Assistant District Attorney Richard Pickens.

On January 19, 1999 plaintiff brought a motion to suppress his October 1998 confession, arguing that the confession was "illegally procured without warrant and without probable cause." Complaint at ¶ 17. At the hearing Officer Price verified that Briggs' statements and Causey's confession constituted the extent of the State's evidence against Causey. Complaint at ¶ 18. The presiding judge, Judge Drake, denied Causey's motion. Id. Presumably, the reason plaintiff's motion was denied because the trial judge made a finding of a valid arrest warrant and probable cause.

Plaintiff's bail was originally set at $500,000.00 and thereafter reduced to $175,000.00. Complaint at ¶ 19. Plaintiff then presented three bonds totaling $175,000.00 to the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office, which although approved by a district judge in the parish in which the property was located, were denied by Chief Charles Fitz due to defects in the mortgage certificates. Complaint at ¶ 19.

Approximately two weeks before the August 9, 1999 trial was to commence, Causey submitted to a lie detector test, which confirmed his innocence. On August 9, 1999 upon motion of the state, an order of nolle prosse was entered and the second degree murder charge was dismissed. Complaint at ¶ 20.

Plaintiff alleges that racial animus was the driving force behind his arrest and imprisonment. Complaint at ¶ 23. He claims that the "primarily Caucasian" Tangipahoa Parish Police Department sought retribution against the African American defendant because a Caucasian was killed. Id. Causey claims that his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in that his following federally guaranteed rights were violated: (1) freedom from illegal search and seizure; (2) freedom from illegal detention; (3) freedom from humiliation, intimidation and harassment; (4) freedom from malicious prosecution; (5) enjoyment of life, liberty and property and freedom from their deprivation without due process of law; (6) equal protection of the law; (7) freedom from invasion of privacy; (8) earn a living without illegal interference. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' actions, under color of state law, individually and through their conspiracy with one another, were in accordance with the official policy of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Department. Complaint at ¶ 24.

At this juncture, the Court is presented with a plaintiff arrested pursuant to valid arrest warrant who confessed to committing a crime and who was indicted twice and whose statements were deemed admissible after a suppression hearing. Plaintiff sued a plethora of persons and entities. By Minute Entry entered March 27, 2001 (doc. 37), this Court granted District Attorney Scott Perriloux's and former Assistant District Attorney Richard Picken's motions to dismiss based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and dismissed plaintiff's claim against the District Attorney's Office for the 21 st Judicial District on the grounds that the office is not a proper party defendant. On April 4, 2001 (doc. 38), the Court granted the Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government's consent motion to withdraw its motion to dismiss.

Although plaintiff sued a myriad of defendants, the Court notes that the complaint and amended complaint are extremely vague. Neither pleading specifically alleges which defendant or defendants committed the alleged transgressions. Indeed, plaintiff names several persons in their individual and official capacities, but fails to delineate what activities by those persons were carried out in the different capacities. Moreover, the complaint names multiple defendants who do not have capacity to be sued under Louisiana law. The utter ambiguity of the complaint and amended complaint are further demonstrated by the fact that several of the named defendants do not even appear in the body of either pleading. To the extent that certain defendants are named in more than one capacity, the Court has analyzed whether claims can go forward against certain defendants in multiple capacities and as far as the factual allegations go, the Court has applied the facts to the defendants discretely identified with the alleged activities.

Layrisson, Fitz and the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Department make several arguments, asserting defenses of sovereign immunity, absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and the preclusive effect of a prior determination of probable cause, among others. Plaintiff contends that he has adequately plead his cause of action and overcome the immunity defenses. Alternatively plaintiff requests an opportunity to conduct limited discovery and amend his complaint. Neither party accurately focuses its arguments on the parties and their proper procedural capacities, thus the arguments are largely unhelpful. However, the Court shall properly characterize the parties, evaluate if there is indeed a cause of action against such a party or entity, and then determine whether or not immunity defenses and heightened pleading requirements are available. First, the Court presents the relevant legal standards.

II. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a disfavored means of disposing of a case." Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Board of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). "A motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim `admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's right to relief based upon those facts.'" Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir.1995)(quoting Ward v. Hudnell, 366 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir.1966)). "The district court may not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) `unless it appears...

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