Causey v. State

• Decision Date: 03 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. BC-479,BC-479
• Citation: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 127,484 So.2d 1263
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 127, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 701 Brenda CAUSEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1263

484 So.2d 1263

11 Fla. L. Weekly 127, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 701

Brenda CAUSEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. BC-479.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Jan. 3, 1986.

On Motion for Rehearing March 20, 1986.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Kenneth L. Hosford, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Patricia Conners, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SHIVERS, Judge.

Brenda Causey appeals judgment withholding adjudication of guilt and placing her on probation for five years. The public defender filed an Anders brief and the appellant Causey has not filed a pro se brief. The jury had found appellant guilty of first-degree arson for setting fire to her boyfriend's home.

The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence. We reverse because the trial court limited the defense's cross-examination of the primary prosecution witness.

Brenda Causey was convicted of first degree arson for setting fire to her boyfriend's home. On appeal, defense counsel found no appealable issue, and so filed an Anders brief with this court. We find, however, that the trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination of a prosecution witness, and so reverse for a new trial.

On the evening of February 12, 1984, the Panama City Fire Department responded to a call of fire by persons unknown, at 914 Louisiana Avenue, the rented home of George "Junior" Lovett, Ms. Causey's boyfriend of five years. The door to the back porch was found burning. Officials at the scene determined that the fire had been set with kerosene, poured from a brown beer bottle that was recovered from the back yard.

At trial, the prosecution's theory was that Ms. Causey was motivated by anger; that a quarrel between them had caused Mr. Lovett to move from her apartment back to his house on Louisiana Avenue the day before the fire. Of two latent fingerprints found on the beer bottle, one was Ms. Causey's (one, not hers, was not further identified), and some of her possessions were found in the back yard that night.

Mr. Paul Matthews, testifying for the prosecution, said he was approached by Ms. Causey shortly before the fire, a block or so from Mr. Lovett's house. She was carrying a brown beer bottle that smelled like kerosene, stuffed with paper at the top; she asked him for a match, but produced her own. She then walked away toward Mr. Lovett's house. Upon her return she did not have the beer bottle, and asked Matthews to tell "Junior Lovett" that she was sorry his house was burning. Matthews had not known her before that night. He then went down a trail to Lovett's house, saw the fire, and heard that neighbors had called the Fire Department.

For the defense, Mr. Lovett and Ms. Causey testified that she was not in the vicinity of his house until after the Fire Department had arrived, had not been carrying a beer bottle, and, that their quarrel was no more serious than others in their relationship. Defense counsel brought forward testimony intended to show that the prosecution's physical evidence was not necessarily indicative of guilt, and further, that Mr. Lovett had seriously quarrelled with his neighbor, shortly before the fire, over ownership of a valuable appliance.

At the time of the trial, Mr. Matthews was in jail awaiting disposition of pending criminal charges of grand theft. Prior to trial, the State made a motion in limine, to exclude a defense question on Matthews' current residence, to prevent "impeach[ing] him without a conviction." The court reserved a ruling, but then granted the motion, over objection, when it was renewed in chambers immediately prior to Matthews' testimony. The court limited cross-examination in that area to "whether or not he has ever been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement." The trial court's basis was that "the purpose of the evidence rule is to prohibit ... some sort of innuendos about prior criminal history of any crime...."

This limitation was in error. Generally, impeachment of a witness on the basis of a prior criminal activity or dishonesty is limited to past convictions, not past...