Causor-Cerrato v. United States
| Decision Date | 17 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-CV-4011-DEO,13-CV-4011-DEO |
| Parties | MARTIN CAUSOR-CERRATO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter is before this Court on the Government's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's, Martin Causor-Cerrato's [hereinafter Mr. Causor], 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition. Docket No. 3. The parties appeared for several hearings on this matter, most recently on May 27, 2014. After listening to the parties' arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement and now enters the following.
On May 20, 2010, the grand jury returned an indictment against Mr. Causor on one charge related to the distribution of methamphetamine. On September 16, 2010, Mr. Causor appeared before this Court to plead guilty to Count 1. 10-CR-4041-DEO-1, Docket No. 17. On December 30, 2010, this Courtsentenced Mr. Causor to 120 months incarceration on Count 1. 10-CR-4041-DEO-1, Docket No. 27.
Mr. Causor did not appeal his conviction. He filed the present 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition on January 23, 2013. Docket No. 1. On May 2, 2013, this Court entered an Initial Review Order appointing Mr. Causor counsel and allowing the case to proceed. Docket No. 2. One week later, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 3, arguing Mr. Causor's claim is time barred. Id.
On January 10, 2014, this Court held a hearing on the Government's Motion to Dismiss. The hearing was recessed before the parties had an opportunity to address all the pending matters.
On January 21, 2014, this Court put out an Order stating:
Following the hearing and a review of the entire record, the Court is persuaded that the parties shall proceed to briefing the merits of the pending habeas petition.
On February 10, 2014, the Petitioner filed his merit's brief. Docket No. 29. In that document, the Petitionerargued issues contained in his original 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion as well as issues related to safety-valve relief and the Vienna Convention.
On February 13, 2014, the Government filed a responsive brief. Docket No. 31. In that brief, the Government stated in part:
Movant filed his Amended Petition without authority arguing new claims on February 10, 2014, approximately two years past the one-year time limitation. Therefore, the safety-valve claim and the Vienna Notification claim are procedurally barred. In the event the Court deems the new claims raised in the amended petition timely, the government would ask the Court allow it to brief the merits.
Docket No. 31, p. 5. The Court did not rule on the Government's procedural issues but instructed the Government to also address the merits of those arguments.
The Court held a final hearing on the pending issues on May 27, 2014. During that hearing, Mr. Causor stated this his sister may have evidence relevant to the case. The Court instructed appointed counsel to investigate that issue and then, if necessary, supplement the record. Docket No. 47. On April 8, 2015, appointed counsel filed a status report statingthat the investigation was inconclusive, and requesting the Court rule on the Government's original Motion to Dismiss. Docket No. 53.
A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. See Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). "Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255] if (1) the ... allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact." Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Delgado v. United States, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (); United States v. Hester, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (). Stated differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where "the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). See also Hessman v. United States, C08-3052-LRR, 2012 WL 10486 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 3, 2012), appeal dismissed (June 21, 2012).
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides four general grounds for relief:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose suchsentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255; Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) (). Thus, a motion pursuant to § 2255 "is 'intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal Habeas corpus.'" United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).
One "well established principle" of § 2255 law is that "'[i]ssues raised and decided on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be relitigated in a collateral proceeding based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'" Theus v. United States, 611 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2001)); Bear Stops, 339 F.3d at 780. One exception to that principle arises when there is a "miscarriage of justice," although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "recognized such an exception only when petitioners have produced convincing new evidence of actual innocence," and the Supreme Court has not extended the exception beyond situations involving actual innocence. Wiley, 245 F.3d at 752 . Just as § 2255 may not be used to relitigate issues raised and decided on direct appeal, it also ordinarily "is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam ). "Where a defendant hasprocedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in Habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"Cause and prejudice" to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim may include ineffective assistance of counsel, as defined by the [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] test, discussed below. Theus, 611 F.3d at 449. Indeed, Strickland claims are not procedurally defaulted when brought for the first time pursuant to § 2255, because of the advantages of that form of proceeding for hearing such claims. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003). Otherwise, "[t]he Supreme Court recognized in Bousley that 'a claim that "is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel" may constitute cause for a procedural default.'" United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (). The "actual innocence" that mayovercome either procedural default or allow relitigation of a claim that was raised and rejected on direct appeal is a demonstration "'that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner].'" Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). "'This is a strict standard; generally, a petitioner cannot show actual innocence where the evidence is sufficient to support a [conviction on the challenged offense].'" Id. (quoting McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2001)).
§ 2255 has a strict statute of limitations.
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 imposed, among other things, a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners under...
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